DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE, SUITE 250
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2487

5830
Ser N00/179
9 May 19

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr of 18 Dec 18

From: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING THE FIRE ONBOARD USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) ON 10 NOV 18

1. I have thoroughly reviewed the subject investigation and its endorsements. I approve the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations as previously endorsed.

2. I note that CSG 10 has implemented Recommendations 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

3. As noted by CSG 10, this fire was the third major shipyard fire in the last several years to occur as a direct result of hot work. Accordingly, by copy of this endorsement, the Damage Control Board of Directors (DCBoD) shall take appropriate measures to further improve our processes for prevention and management of shipboard fires in the industrial setting. The DCBoD will coordinate the implementation of all outstanding recommendations from this investigation and all of the recommendations from the safety investigation into this incident.

4. It is apparent that all stakeholders are involved and committed to the safety and security of our sailors and ships. We need to continue to stress the importance of having our Sailors best postured to safely operate in an industrial environment. Going forward we have an opportunity to set and raise the standards of firefighting and fire prevention force wide.

C. W. GRADY

Copy to:
COMSECONDFLT
NAVSEA
COMNAVSAFECEN
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COMCARSTRKGRU TEN
COMDESERON TWO SIX
USS OSCAR AUSTIN

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS MONTEREY CG 61
UNIT 100265 BOX 1
FPO AE 09578

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5102
Ser C0/269
18 Dec 18

From: Commanding Officer, USS MONTEREY (CG 61)
To: Commander, Carrier Strike Group TEN

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING THE FIRE ONBOARD USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) ON 10 NOV 2018

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, JAGMAN
(b) COMFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 Rev C CH7 Joint Forces Maintenance Manual
(c) CNSP/CNSLINST 3500.11 Surface Force Exercise Manual
(d) NAVSEA TECH PUB S0570-AC-CCM-010/8010
(e) NSTM 074 vol 3 Rev 6, Gas Free Engineering
(f) NSTM 555 vol 1Rev 15, Surface Force Firefighting
(g) CNSP/CNSLINST 3502.7 Surface Force Readiness and Training Manual
(h) MARMCINST 11320.1B Fire Response Plan
(i) BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair Procedure #49

Encl: (1) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CI appointment letter
(2) NAVSEA 05 Fire safety investigators report
(3) BAE internal fact finding report
(4) SRA 75% Conference report
(5) Work Item 150-005 SHIPALT DDG-51-AER83007D
(6) BAE project lead (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) oral statement
(7) 1st Shift plate shop supervisor (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement Audio
(8) 2"d Shift plate shop supervisor (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement
(9) Hot work operator (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement (Plus Audio File)
(10) NAVSEA Drawing number 8570464 Rev B (Plus Audio File)
(11) Plate Shop Night Notes 10 NOV 2018
(12) Shop work request dated 10 NOV 2018
(13) Hot Work Chit for
(14) Electronic Hot work log
(15) Job Hazard Analysis
(16) Firewatch Supervisor (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) Statement
(17) Firewatch (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(18) Firewatch (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(19) Firewatch (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(20) OSA Chief Engineer / 10 NOV Command Duty Officer - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Statement
(21) OSA fire party interview (Plus Audio File)
(22) Section Leader, Scene Leader - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Statement (Audio Only)
(23) OSA EDO (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement (Audio Only
(24)0SA Repair Locker Plotter (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Statement
(25) BAE Security Guard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Statement
(26) OSA Fire Marshal (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Statement (Plus Audio File)

(27) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Statement (Audio Only)
(28) Oscar Austin DC Plate 4
(29) USS Cole Deck log
(30) USS OSA Deck log
(31) OSA DCA (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement
(32) Project Manager (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) oral statement
(33) 10-11 NOV BAE Weekend Work List
(34) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement
(35) MARMC Safety (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement
(36) RADM printout of 10 NOV 18 watchbill
(37) OSA Engineering Log - 10 NOV 2018
(38) OSA Fire Marshall Turnover reports 09-11 NOV 2018
(39) MARMC Safety report dated 08 Jun 2018

1. Preliminary Statement. In accordance with reference (a), this reports the command investigation convened pursuant to enclosure (1) to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the fire onboard USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 76) (OSA) on 10 November 2018 while berthed at the BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair facility in Norfolk VA. This investigation focuses on the cause of the fire and the damage control response to the fire. To understand any possible contributing factors it attempts to provide context for the maintenance availability in which it occurred as well as examining the safety record, organizational relationships and existing policies and procedures in place.

2. Executive Summary. The cause of the fire was human error in that hot work was performed by BAE systems personnel in an unauthorized location. This agrees with enclosure (2), NAVSEA 05 Fire Safety Investigation and enclosure (3), the internal investigation conducted by BAE. The fire was put out by Sailors from the OSA and USS COLE (DDG 67) (COL), but not before significant damage bad occurred to several spaces and potentially damaged combat systems equipment in nearby radar spaces. Several OSA Sailors were affected by smoke inhalation and one received a minor head laceration that did not require stiches. One of those Sailors was transported to a local hospital and was assessed and released without treatment. The exact dollar amount of damage is still being assessed.

a. OSA is executing a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) to conduct extensive upgrades to Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HME) as well as Combat Systems modernization. The availability, awarded to BAE Systems and conducted at their facility in Norfolk VA, began on 19 February 2018 and had completed 264 of the planned 452 days with 384 of those days in plant at BAE.

b. During the second shift on the evening of 10 November 2018, a contracted hot work operator (HWO) with an oxygen / acetylene cutting torch was removing plate steel, as part of an approved ship alteration (Ship Alt) and cut a topside section of deck plating on the OSA's starboard side SPY array deck (03 level) that was not part of that day's planned work. The space below that cut, stateroom ((b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130), was outside of the work boundary and was therefore not

prepared for hotwork and a firewatch was not on station. Although the space was almost entirely empty the overhead and bulkhead lagging had not been removed. According to enclosure (2), when the plate cutting operations penetrated the aft starboard comer of the stateroom, molten metal was discharged into the space igniting the fire.

c. Although the exact timing is difficult to determine, the fire likely burned for 10-15 minutes before smoke was seen by the HWO located above on the 03 level as well as fire watches in nearby spaces. At the time smoke was first observed, the fire had likely spread acros the stateroom. Once discovered, the shipyard personnel conducted no damage control actions with the exception of the HWO who poured two buckets of water onto the small opening into t e stateroom's overhead to no avail. The shipyard personnel evacuated the area and notified the OSA crew.

d. The crew announced the casualty and the duty section personnel provided the damage control response. Supplemented by personnel from the COL, eventually three hose teams were simultaneously fighting the fire from two sides. At some point the class Alpha fire started a class Charlie fire when insulation on the cables in overhead bundles and bulkhead mounted distribution boxes melted, thereby exposing energized wires. The fire was extinguished by a combination of securing power to the ship and the application of firefighting water. All fire hoses used were temporary fire stations; the ship's firemain was not operational. The Norfolk Fire Department (NFD) responded providing support to the OSA team (refilled SCBA bottles, loaned lighting and gas free equipment) but did not actively fight the fire. The NFD sent two firefighters into the ship during the safety assessment and atmospheric testing phases of the casualty response in direct support of OSA's Damage Control Assistant (DCA).

e. The fire completely demolished the stateroom where it originated as well as passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 outside the stateroom. Fire also significantly damaged the main wardroom area passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and ladderwell (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 Damage from smoke and heat from the fire and firefighting water occurred in the Commanding Officer's Inport Cabin, radar spaces and array rooms on the starboard side and starboard side passageway leading to the pilot house.

3. Investigating Team

a. Assistant Investigating Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CSG 10, N4A

b. Technical Assistants. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (CVN 69), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (CSGlO), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (CDS 26)

c. Naval Sea Systems Command code 05P5 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

d. Judge Advocate: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CSGlO, Command JAG

4. Findings of Fact

Background Facts

(1) OSA was executing CNO Availability TPPC-DDG79-MARMCN18-CN0 lat BAE Ship Repair Facility Norfolk, VA. The availability commenced on 19 Feb 2017 with a planned length of 452 days with 348 days planned in the BAE facility. [encl 4]

(2) SIDPALT DDG-51-AER83007D, Reinforcing topside decks was part of the SRA package. [encl 4,5]

(3) SIDPALT DDG-51-AER83007D had not previously been performed at BAE Systems. [encl 6]

(4) The day shift plate shop supervisor is exclusively assigned to the OSA project and responsible for the planning the execution of SIDPALTDDG-51-AER83007D. [encl 7]

(5) The SIIlPALT work on the 03 level had been ongoing for several weeks. Work was typically conducted on both first and second shift up to seven days a week. However no Work Authorization Form has been filed for the job and was therefore not posted at the work site as required by reference (b). [encl 4, 7]

(6) The second shift plate shop supervisor and the Hot Work Operator (HWO) have both worked this SIDPALT extensively. [encl 8]

(7) The first shift plate shop supervisor has 31 years of experience. The second shift plate shop supervisor has 39 years of experience. The Hot Work operator had 32 years of experience. [encl 7, 8, 9]

(8) Drawing number 8570464 Rev B shows the deck plate arrangement specific to the 03 level. [encl 10]

(9) The day shift supervisor establishes and documents the work to be performed on second shift on a document referred to as night notes. [encl 11]

(10) The night notes specified work to be accomplished on the SIDPALT in question according to plate numbers as referenced from the drawing. [encl 10, 11]

(11) The night notes for the work on the OSA 03 level starboard side array deck did not list any burning work required. [encl 11]

(12) The first shift and second shift plate shop supervisors conducted turnover in the shop area and not onboard the ship. A copy of the night notes was present, but the drawing was not present. [encl 7, 8]

(13) The second shift plate shop supervisor is responsible for plate shop work in three locations: OSA, COL and the land based workshop (building 620) on BAE. [encl 8]

(14) The second shift plate shop supervisor walked the 03 level job site after turnover and found that the work on the night notes could not be executed as written because a portion of plate #3 had not been completely removed. He did not contact the first shift supervisor for additional guidance. [encl 8]

(15) A copy of the drawing had been posted at the work site, but had been missing for several days. [encl 7,8]

(16) The HWO was supposed to report for work to BAE at 1600 but did not arrive until 1752. [encl 3,9]

(17) The second shift plate shift supervisor walked the 03 level work site with the HWO and pointed out the portion of plate #3 to be removed. The HWO's next task was to remove the welds on the edges of plates #1 between the exterior 03 level deck and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130. There was no physical marking on the deck if what areas to remove and what areas should not be cut. [encl 8]

(18) The second shift supervisor stated he did not direct the removal of plate #13. [encl 8]

(19) The Hot Work Operator stated the second shift supervisor verbally directed him to remove plate # 13. [encl 9]

(20) The second shift plate shop supervisor had worked with the HWO over many years. When asked if there had been previous instances of failure to follow verbal directions, the supervisor stated he has heard that the HWO sometimes "does thing his own way" and "does things on his own". The supervisor provided an example of where the HWO exceeded directions and performed additional work. [encl 9]

(21) Portions of plate # 13 are located in the overhead of Stateroom (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130. [encl 10]

(22) The HWO believed that plate #13 was located over a void that was within the work boundary and being monitored by a firewatch. [encl 8,9]

(23) Plate # 13 was planned to be removed at a later date and a request had been submitted earlier on 10 NOV, by the first shift plate shop supervisor, to have the space prepared on 11 NOV for the upcoming hot work. [encl 12]

(24) A Hot Work Chit (HWC) for work on the 03 level had been submitted on 09 Nov 2018 to support work on 10 Nov 2018. It listed two other spaces as being affected by this work, Passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 Stateroom (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 was not included on the HWC. While not directly below the area of hot work, it was only inches away from the work boundary. [encl 13]

(25) There were 104 HWC submitted by BAE to OSA on 09 Nov in support of potential worksites for 10 Nov. [encl 14]

(26) The HWC for the 03 level had been signed as approved for work by the OSA's Fire Marshall on 09 Nov. [encl 13]

(27) The HWC for the 03 level was picked up on the morning of 10 Nov by the first shift plate shop supervisor. [encl 7]

(28) The first shift plate shop supervisor walked the job site, inspected the affected spaces listed on the HWC and signed it as the Permit Authorizing Individual (PAI), signifying the listed spaces were safe for hotwork operations when the qualified HWO and fire watches (FW) were on station. The HWC was then posted on the 03 level. [encl 7,13]

(29) The first shift plate shop supervisor also filled out a Job Hazard Analysis for the 03 level works. This was also posted on the 03 level. [encl 7, 15]

(30) During the *fust* shift hotwork was conducted on the 03 level. All first shift HWOs and FW's signed the HWC and the HWOs also signed the JHA. [encl 7, 13, 15]

(31) The second shift plate shop supervisor filled out another JHA for the second shift team, but it could not later be located. [encl 8]

(32) Because the weld shop was working in the same vicinity and was under the same HWC, the second shift weld shop supervisor signed the hotwork chit as the PAI for the second shift.[encl 3, 8, 13]

Actions leading to fire

(33) After receiving instructions from the second shift plate shop supervisor, the HWO made contact with the second shift Fire Watch Supervisor (FWS) and requested three fire watches. The HWO and all three FW signed the hotwork chit. The HWO and FWS walked the spaces listed on the HWC and placed one FW in storeroom (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 located below the work area, one in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and one on the 03 level weather decks with the HWO. [encl 9,13,16,17,18,19]

(34) Portions of the 03 level deck had been previously removed so the HWO could see the FW directly below in storeroom (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 [encl 9,17]

(35) The FW in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 could not been seen by the HWO. An emergency signal of "two taps" on the bulkhead had been arranged and tested. [encl 9,16,17]

(36) (-1910) HWO finished gathering tools, connected lines to the torch and began cutting operations by completing the removal of a portion of plate # 3. The plate shop supervisor and FWS were no longer on the 03 level when the burning operations began. [encl 8,9,15]

(37) Instead of commencing work on plate #1 as directed by the plate shop supervisor, the HWO began to remove plate #13. [encl 9]

(38) In his first step to remove plate #13, the HWO burned a hole in the plate using the torch. This discharged hot slag into the stateroom. The HWO believed the slag was going into the void monitored by the FW below him in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130. [encl 9]

(39) Evidence of the slag was found by the NAVSEA 05 investigators on the bulkhead inside the stateroom. This slag is the likely ignition source. [encl 2]

(40) After burning the hole, a small flame appeared in the hole. The HWO believed it to be "sound dampening material." [encl 9].

(41) The FW on the 03 level observed the HWO stick the end of his unlit torch into the small opening and discharged compressed gas (either oxygen or acetylene). The flame was no longer visible. [encl 19]

(42) (-1925) The HWO then adjusted his position and began a cut along the outboard edge of plate #13 and the stateroom bulkhead. Sometime shortly after the completion of that ~6 inch cut, black smoke began to come from the cut. [encl 09, 19]

(43) The FW on the 03 level weather deck offered to discharge his 5 lbs. C02 extinguisher, but the HWO told him no. The HWO then got a bucket and filled it with water from the 03 level temporary fire station ~10 feet from the work site. The HWO poured the water on the opening of the cut. [encl 9, 19]

(44) The appearance of smoke increased after the first bucket of water. The bucket was filled a second time and again poured on the cut. Smoke continued to pour out of the cut. [encl 9,19]

(45) At approximately the same time as the buckets were being filled and used, the FW located in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 began to see smoke in the Array Room. Her location was approximately 30 feet, up one level and around three 90 degree turns from the stateroom where the fire began. The door at the base of the ladderwell was open and fouled by temporary services. The ladderwell was acting as a chimney for the fire. [encl 2, 18]

(46) She attempted to use the emergency signal by tapping with a broom handle but received no response. Smoke continued to build and the FW donned a particulate filter respirator and continued to tap on the bulkhead. Growing concerned she decided to egress the space. She found the passageway outside (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 filled with heavy smoke. On her hands and knees she climbed the ladder outside the array room to the pilot house. Her entire route was filled with smoke. Unable to get enough oxygen, she removed her mask as she egressed. The FW eventually exited the hull from the aft entrance to the pilot house to the weather decks. She descended two flights of stairs externally and found the FWS. The FWS directed her to go to the pier. [encl 16, 18]

(47)The FW stationed below the HWO was also receiving smoke in his space, passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 which leads from the stateroom to the storeroom where he was positioned. This distance is approximately 20 feet and includes two doorways, open due to temporary service lines and two 90 degree turns. Unable to egress through that passageway he crawled through the hole in the overhead of the storeroom and out to the 03 level near the HWO. [encl 17]

Response to the Fire

(48)The HWO, unaware that the two internal FW had already evacuated ordered everyone "to get out of here, sound the alarm and get off the boat." [encl 9]

(49)The FWS and the two remaining FW as well egressed towards the quarterdeck. FWS encountered the rapid response personnel and proceeded with them to the starboard 01 level access to the ship. The FW never contacted or reported to the OOD while exiting the ship. [encl 16,17,18,19]

(50)(-1930)The HWO reported smoke to the OSA OOD, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who passed "white smoke" passed over hydra radio. [encl 9, 19, 20, 21, 22]

(51)(1930) OSA OOD called away Class A fire on 03 level, over lMC. [encl 20]

(52)The HWO returned to the 03 level to show two Sailors where he was working. He also told them someone may be trapped in the array room based on a comment he heard from another fire watch. [encl 9]

(53) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (EDO) who was also the CCS Supervisor Watch, assumed the role as Repair Locker leader (RLL). (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) left CCS and manne_d DC Conex Box on OSA flight deck, adjacent to the quarter deck. [encl. 23]

(54)(1930) RLL orders Primary/Secondary Boundaries to be set. [encl 24]

(55)(1931) OSA OOD called BAE security via Emergency phone to report fire, does not recall requesting assistance. [encl 21, 25]

(56)(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Fire Marshal (FM) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) attempted to access the fire from the STBD side 01 level access with Shipyard firehose. The FWS assisted with hose handling for initial team. They entered thru the starboard 01 weatherdecks and proceeded towards (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 passageway. FM and FCAI fought the fire for several minutes but had to back out due to heat. (FFE) Neither was wearing Fire Fighting Ensembles. [encl 21, 26, 27]

(57)(1938) Repair Locker Leader orders Investigators (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) out. [encl 28]

(58) The FWS went to the pier and mustered all of the firewatches who were working in several locations around the ship. The muster report was made to the HWO but was not made to the ship. (encl 16]

(59) MMC and STGC attempt to rig a hose thru the Pilot house via the scaffolding on Foc'sle which covered the forward superstructure. There was no access from scaffolding to bridge wings, the attempt was abandoned. [encl 22, 27]

(60) FM and FCA1 proceed to the port side and then to the Wardroom passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 FCA1 was replaced with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Based on a call over the radio, FC2 and FM proceeded to the 03 level portside (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 to search for a missing shipyard worker reported as trapped. They did not find anyone and returned to the Wardroom passageway where they met MMC and commenced fighting the fire that had spread from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130. (encl 26, 27]

(61) (1940) Watchstanders on the COL located in a dry dock on the opposite side of the pier from OSA noticed smoke coming from the pilot house on the OSA and notified the COL quarterdeck. [encl 29]

(62) (1940) Second call made by OSA OOD to BAE security requesting assistance and declaring an emergency. BAE Security did not call 911 and believed the ship did not require assistance. [21, 25]

(63) (1942) Hose team 1 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Departed the flight deck towards the scene. [encl 28]

(64) (1953) Rescue and Assistance (R&A) team from COL arrives with six firefighting personnel, 1scene leader and one duty electrician as backup. [encl 29]

(65) (1957) Hose Team 2 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) departs flight deck. COL Sailors are being integrated into OSA fire teams. (encl 23, 30]

(66) (-2003) Third call made to BAE security, this time by LT requesting Fire Department, Chief Engineer (CHENG) and also OSA Command Duty Officer (CDO). [encl 20, 25]

(67) (2008) BAE security calls 911, NFD en route. [encl 25]

(68) (2008) Announcement made over BAE announcing system by the BAE security of a fire on OSA. [encl 25]

(69) (2010) Report of class "C" Fire. Hose teams on the port side of Wardroom passageway (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. see blue flashed in the overhead and hear loud popping sounds. [encl 20, 21, 26, 27]

(70) (2010) BAE response team arrives. [encl 30]

(71) (2010) BAE security lets NFD on the shipyard. [encl 25]

(72) (2010) NFD arrives at BAE Pier 6. [encl 29, 30]

(73) (2011) OSA CDO calls BAE Security to secure shore power and temporary services to OSA. [encl 20, 25]

(74) (2013) MMC opens breakers for shore power at (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 SWBD 2012. [encl 20, 27, 30].

(75) (2013) Scene reports fire appears to be out. [encl 26, 28, 30]

(76) (2013-2138) Hoseteams cooling bot spots on 02 level (stateroom, passageways and ladderwell), 03 level (starboard ladderwell, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130) and 04 level (Pilot House). OSA and COL fire party personnel rotated several times (up to three times) for SCBA bottle change out. [ends 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29]

(77) While spaces are being cooled, investigators are repeatedly sent to search for a reported missing person in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130. [encl 21, 23, 29]

(78) (2021) NFD trucks position on the pier 6. [encl 28]

(79) (2023) EDO orders muster of all OSA personnel. [encl 29]

(80) (2036) OSA Commanding Officer onboard. [encl 29]

(81) (2044) BAE reports to OSA that all personnel have been accounted. [encl 28].

(82) (2054) OSA completes muster of all duty section personnel all accounted. [encl 29]

(83) (2105) NFD filling SCBA bottles on pier. [encl 29.

(84) (2130) STGC and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) being treated for smoke inhalation by OSA Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC) who was part of the duty section. STGC also treated by NFD. [encl22, 29]

(85) (2138) All OSA Sailors return to locker. [encl 28

(86) (2144) COL Sailors depart OSA. [encl 29

(87) (2156) MMC and GSM3 being treated for smoke inhalation by OSA JDC. [encl 29]

(88) (2201) DCA and FM depart repair locker to perform post fire atmospheric testing utilizing NFD equipment. [encl 29, 31]

(89) (2213) DCA reports high levels of carbon monoxide (CO) on 02 level. [encl 29]

(90) STGC taken to the emergency room by NFD, STGC later released after assessment withoqt treatment required. [encl 29]

(91) (2226) Two NFD personnel enroute to wardroom to join DCA in atmospheric and safety assessment. [encl 29, 31]

(92) (2240) DCA orders ventilation for 02 level. [encl 29, 31]

(93) (2249) Desmoking in progress using NFD portable fans. [encl 29,31]

(94) (2256) DCA and FM return to locker atmospheric testing complete. [encl 29,31]

(95) (2326) NFD departs ship. [encl 29]

(96) (2332) DCA reports ship is safe for personnel. [encl 28, 29]

(97) (2342) OSA secures from casualty. [encl 29]

Other facts not associated with the 10 Nov 2018 timeline.

(98) The availability was behind in general and in this work item in particular. The 75% conference held on 07 Nov however the reported the overall completion percent of 67% / 57% accoring to BAE and MARMC respectively. The 150-80-001 work item covering the deck SHIPALT was at 52%/43%. The 05 and 06 level portions of the SHIPALT had been sub-contracted out and were nearly complete with the 03 level portion being conducted by BAE was at 40%. Weekend and second shift work required to meet timelines. [encl 4, 7]

(99) Project leadership from the OSA, BAE and MARMC all reported that OSA enjoyed a good working relationship with both BAE and MARMC however the BAE organizational relationship with MARMC was strained. All parties characterized the availability as "tough" or "challenging" however no root cause other than poor communications amongst the maintenance team could be cited. Production behind timeline and poor housekeeping noted by the project leaders. [encl 6, 20, 27, 32]

(100) BAE provided a weekend work list to MARMC and OSA as required by reference (b). however many of the OSA duty section leadership interviewed were not familiar with the process and had not reviewed the intended work items for 10 Nov. [encl 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 31]

(101) The OSA Fire Marshals signed the HWC prior to turnover. There was inconsistency regarding a policy on touring areas listed on hotwork chits prior to signing the HWC. [encl 20, 23, 26, 31, 34]

(102) OSA conducted damage control drills on three section duty sections. IAW reference (c) all IET should be drilled, yet databases only allow recording for 3 sections and certification is done on only three section. OSA has been in six section duty throughout the SRA, however no drill had ever been conducted testing the six section teams. [encl 20, 26, 31, 34]

(103) OSA conducted one DC related drill per week for one of three duty sections. [encl 20, 26, 31]

(104) OSA conducted daily training for DC, ATFP and Medical IAW approved training schedules. [encl 20, 22, 26, 31]

(105) BAE PM (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and MARMC Safety Representative (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) reported one previous hotwork related fire in MER 1. The fire was due to rags in a bilge pocket that had caught fire and was extinguished by FW. This fact was not known by most of the OSA Sailors interviewed. [encl 20, 26, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39]

(106) The daily Inport Emergency Team (IET) watchbill was included in the duty section watchbill. It was not reviewed or validated at duty section turnover. Positions routinely changed from duty day to duty day. [encl 20, 22, 23, 26, 27]

(107) Duty section personnel did not fill their assigned IET roles as listed on the watchbill during the fire. Duty section personnel did not know what their IET roles were on 10 Nov during post fire interview. [encl 21].

(108) The watchbill for 10 Nov had numerous lineouts and changes to the watch rotation [encl 36]

(109) OSA watchbill designated MMC as the EDO, however GSM2 was filling the role of EDO on 10NOV18. Both CDO (CHENG), MMC, and GSM2 believed GSM2 was the EDO at time of fire. GSM2 was qualified and signed into the Engineering Log as the EDO [encl 20, 22, 23, 27, 36, 37]

(110) Many of the watchstanders were either standing port and starboard watches or three section rotation. On weekdays this is mitigated by having the sister section cover the first two watches. of the day. [encl 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 36]

(111) OSA had one Damage Control Repair Station (DCRS) in a conex box located on the flight deck adjacent to the quarterdeck. Two DCRS are required IAW reference (d). [encl 26, 31]

(112) The gas free kit in the DCRS was not complete. The 4-gas analyzer did not have a functioning 02 sensor. This was noted on 09 Nov. The other two units were in storage and not available for use. [encl 20, 26, 31, 34]

(113) The DCA was designated as the Gas Free Engineer and was current in qualifications. During post fire atmospheric testing only a six gas analyzer was used. This analyzer was

borrowed from NFD since the ship's only 4 gas analyzer was OOC. Para 26.1 of reference (e), requires that additional tests with Drager tubes be performed based on items burned. In this fire extensive electric cable insulation and water piping insulation were burned. [encl 20, 31]

(114)As required by chapter 12 of reference (d), a fire drill had been conducted with the NFD and the combined BAE, MARMC and OSA emergency response teams on 21 April 2018. Reference (d) also requires that drill to be completed every 180 days, which expired on 21 October 2018. [encl 20, 31]

(115)IAW para 7.10.2.3 of reference (f), ventilation of spaces prior to atmospheric testing is required. OSA DCA and FM commenced post fire atmospheric testing after allowing natural ventilation for 45 minutes.

(116)IAW para of 10.2.3 of reference (f) is 4 changes of air and 95% fresh air in the space. Ventilation was never ordered after the fire was out IAW para 7.10.2.1 of reference (f). The only ventilation used was two battery operated fans provided by NFD and operated for no more than 30 minutes. [encl 29, 31]

(117)The OSA fire party personnel believed that natural ventilation was sufficient. [encl 21]

(118)No personnel on the OSA fire party donned Fire Fighting Ensembles (FFE) at any point during the casualty. Para 6.1.1 of reference (f), requires that after the rapid response team and first hose team, all personnel shall don a FFE prior to entering the affected area. [encl 21, 22, 23, 26]

(119)The ship bad no working Emergency Breathing Air Charging station available. The NFD recharged the bottles once on scene. [encl 26, 29, 31]

(120)Communications were not effective between the scene and the controlling stations. The only radios used were the ship's hydra radios used for duty section communications. No additional DC radios were employed. [encl 21, 22, 25]

(121)All the fire hoses used were temporary service fire stations provided IAW standard NAVSEA items for SRA. The nozzles provided were plastic. [encl 2, 6, 32]

(122)During firefighting one nozzle broke and had to be replaced. This is a previously identified problem, but the change to the standard item was not part of the OSA availability work package. [encl 2]

(123)NFD personnel were not explicitly asked to board the ship and participate in firefighting efforts. [encl 20, 23, 31]

(124)Two NFD personnel were asked and did join the OSA DCA during post fire atmospheric testing. [encl 20, 31]

(125) When asked NFD supported OSA by providing a 6-gas analyzer, portable fans and lights. [encl 20]

(126) As directed in reference (d), MARMC has developed a fire response plan, reference (h), and BAE developed reference (i). The basic plan outlined in both references were followed by their respective organization. The guidance provided in references (d), (h) and (i), in the area of fire prevention were in place. [encl 6, 20, 31, 32, 35]

(127) Enclosure 2 was prepared by subject matter experts from NAVSEA 05, including the technical warrant holder for Damage and Fire Recoverability. The facts and conclusions of enclosure 2 are accepted as fact.

Opinions

(1) The root cause of the fire was human error on the part of the Hotwork Operator (HWO). Specifically hotwork performed outside of established work boundaries. [encl 2, 3](ff 18, 19, 21, 22, 36-42]

(2) There was ambiguity between the turnover of work between the 1st and second shift plate shop supervisors with regard to the status of work completed on first shift and the work to be performed on second shift. The maintenance practice is for the document referred to as "night notes" to outline the scope of work. On the night of 10 November, the night notes did not match the physical progress. This however, did not cause the confusion between the second shift supervisor and the HWO. It does point to inconsistencies, complacency and poor practices between the two shift supervisors which include: not reviewing the drawing during turnover, not replacing the drawing at the work site, conducting turnover in the shop instead of on the ship in order to walk the worksite. [ff 3, 8-17]

(3) The second shift plate shop supervisor was very familiar with the job and recognized when he walked the 03 level worksite that the night notes were not ready to be executed as written. He was able to correctly ascertain the next steps in the work sequence and walked the HWO through that night's assignment. [ff 6, 7, 14]

(4) The HWO is a contract labor worker who typically works the second shift and had worked on deck replacement SHIPALT many previous shifts. That evening he was late to work. By the time he received his assignment, gathered tools and began the burning operation, there was less than 45 minutes available to perform work. At 1945 there is a the mandatory cease all hotwork practice to allow for a 30 min cooldown period before firewatches take the second shift lunch break. He was rushed and trying to catch up or otherwise distracted after his arrival. [ff 6, 16-20]

(5) The second shift supervisor provided the correct directions to the HWO who either misunderstood or tried to do more than he was directed by removing the last section of plate (plate #13) remaining in that corner of the 03 level SPY array deck. [ff 17-19]

(6) The HWC process provides numerous distractions to the ship's crew by providing a submission for every possible area where bot work could be performed. There is no follow on notification where botwork is actually being performed. With 104 spaces for the day, a close review of the weekend worklist reveals that work was being performed in far fewer places. [ff 25, 100]

(7) The number of bot work locations aside, the OSA Fire Marshalls do not have clear guidance on what to do before signing a hot work chit. The two interviewed said that they did not always tour each space prior to signing the chit. The chit seems to be treated more as a notification than a process that seeks permission. [ff 101]

(8) The times gathered in the investigation are not exact including the time hot work actually began through the initial actions of the fire party. The fire likely burned for at least 10-15 minutes before discovery and at least 30 min before a fire hose was brought to bear on the edges of the fire. [ff 36-56]

(9) The response to the fire by the OSA duty section was effective in combatting and extinguishing the fire. Especially when considering that the exact location of the fire was not known and the maturity of the fire when the rapid response team arrived. The extent of the damage is caused more by the delay in discovery and reporting and not reflective of the team's effort or effectiveness. [ff 127]

(10) The efforts of the fire party were aided by a lack of fuel in the area. The fire likely ran out of fuel in the stateroom and the passageway outside the stateroom as few combustibles remained. The firefighting efforts prevented the spread of the fire further down the wardroom passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 as well as into the radar and array rooms on the 03 level. Without the cooling effects from the firefighting efforts I believe the fire would have continued to spread through the 03 level and in to the pilot house on the 04 level. [ff 127]

(11) The melted insulation on the numerous cableways and power panels in the wardroom passageway (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and the application of firefighting water from the port side of that passageway resulted in a class C fire. This was recognized and neutralized by opening all shore power breakers locally at the switchboard. Electrical isolation of the area was not ordered during the response and would have prevented the class C fire. The majority of the damage however was caused by the class A fire. [ff 69,74,75]

(12) The FW stationed in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 egressed in the early stages of the fire and reported to the FWS, yet this information was not shared. Throughout the active firefighting and during the overhaul period, rumors of a missing person in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 continued to circulate and consume personnel resources to conduct several searches. BAE did not have an effective means to account for personnel who were working on the ship at the time of the casualty. [ff 45, 46, 52, 77]

(13) Although they successfully combatted the fire, the OSA fire party was not well organized and did not follow the Inport Emergency Team watchbill for the day as listed on the duty section

watchbill. Furthermore they did not follow all of the established fuefighting doctrine of reference (f), or gas free engineering practices of reference (e). [ff 106-109, 111-113, 117, 120]

(14) The initial response by the rapid response team did not occur as described in reference (f), rather several members of the duty section, including two Chief Petty Officers and two other Sailors did occur. The two chiefs transitioned from rapid response to fill the roles of scene leader and team leader as well as investigators and repair electrician throughout evening. [ff 107]

(15) The effort of the two Chiefs was instrumental in getting the hose teams in a position to engage the fue from multiple sides. [ff 56, 59, 60, 74]

(16) Some DC gear was not ready for use. Besides the 4 gas analyzer, portable lighting was not available in the conex box repair locker. At one point personnel were assigned to open and install batteries on recently purchased head lamps. Eventually NFD provided some flashlights. [ff 88, 93, 111, 112]

(17) The IET that fought the fire had not executed a single drill as a team throughout the 9 months of the SRA. They participated in one drill every three weeks but only in combination with their partner section (section 4 of 6) as a larger three section team (1of 3). The requirement for DC training is a three section IET rotation IAW reference (c). This led to an ad hoc, response. The scene on the quarterdeck where the conex box acting as the repair locker was located and the majority of the duty section was located, was described by several individuals as chaotic, and not just during the first few minutes of the casualty. Drilling as a team would have improved the organization as well as the command and control of the casualty. [ff 102-104, 106-108]

(18) The duty section drilling requirements of reference (c) and its replacement, reference (g), state to run the drills on every IET, but ships are certified on three section. The guidance on which IET to train and how to document is not clear and led to a misunderstanding of the requirements. The shipyard environment is more challenging and duty section IET should be trained and tested in matching rotation and include the use of shipyard systems. [ff, 102, 103]

(19) The OSA crew was not clear on the process to request help from the NFD via the emergency phones and the BAE security team. The OOD did not know to specifically request help during the phone call. Furthermore, once the NFD did arrive, the CDO and EDO did not understand that they needed to directly request the NFD to come aboard the ship and assist. By the time NFD arrived on the scene, electrical power was being secured to the ship and the fire was essentially out. The expired Chapter 12 fue drill of reference (d), may have improved this understanding. [ff 114]

(20) The response by the COL watchteam in spotting the smoke, contacting the OSA and providing support teams on their own imitative is noteworthy. In just minutes they provided firefighters in full firefighting ensembles ready to enter the space. The Fire Marshal in particular assumed a leadership role and was instrumental in organizing the COL response and integration with the OSA teams. [ff 61, 64, 65]

(21) The BAE security team was slow to pass the word about the fire over the shipyard's internal announcing system. After the first of three phone calls from OSA, the security lead did not call 911 and did not pass the word, but began making phone calls to alert BAE leadership in accordance with a phone roster located in the security station. During the 30 minutes from the first OSA call to the final OSA call very few personnel on the shipyard were aware of the fire and therefore were not available to assist the crew in response. [ff 55, 62, 66-68, 71]

(22) The provisions of the reference (d), with respect to a major fire and the combined MARMC, BAE, NFD and OSA response were never evoked. One of the definitions of a major fire is a multi-level fire. This fire did technically meet this definition as the fue spread to the ladderwell from the 02-03 level. The fire the fire party encountered was running out of fuel and was responding to the application of firefighting agent. Had a major fire been declared by the CDO, the response time by the additional resources from MARMC and NFD would not have changed the outcome. If however the fue had not been discovered when it was, this could have become a major fire and could have consumed more of the forward deck.house 02 level and above. The CDO did not seem to be aware of her responsibilities as the on scene commander as described in reference (d) or the requirement for her to make a determination of major fire. [ff 55, 62, 66, 114, 118, 119, 120]

(23) The OSA duty sections were stretched thin, with nearly every Sailor standing multiple watches and performing other duty functions. The depth of bench is limited. Without the assistance of COL Sailors, OSA Sailors would have been challenged to maintain the cycle of personnel entering the affected area. The watchstanding burden is reduced during normal working days, but not on holidays and weekends. [ff 110]

(24) Despite the deficiencies in the OSA IET response, the delayed arrival of the NFD and the delayed notification of personnel on the BAE shipyard, it is my opinion that the overall damage from the fire would not have changed significantly. The estimated time that the fire was burning, the amount of smoke reported by the fire watches and the hotwork operator leads me to believe that the fire had already consumed most of the stateroom and has spread into the adjacent passageway at 1930 when fire was first called away. The temporary service lines fouling the door to the ladderwell all the way to the pilot house provided a natural chimney for heat and smoke to the radar rooms on the 03 level by the time the word was arriving at the OSA QD. The lack of available fuel and the eventual cooling for the spaces by the fire party prevented the spread of damage. [ff 127]

(25) Since reference (d) is a direct product of the USS MIAMI, it focuses much of its direction to the coordination of organizations in the combating of a major fire. Subsequently both reference (h) and (i) do not provide much detail on actions carried out in the immediate response to a smaller fire. [ff 126]

Recommendations

(1) Though several compliance matters were identified, none amounted to the level of an NJP offense. In fact the actions of the Sailors were in several instances courageous and exhibited toughness. [OP 9, 24]

(2) BAE formalize the turnover process between BAE supervisors from 1st to second shift to remove ambiguity in assignments. [OP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

(3) BAE formalize a process to account for personnel onboard a ship during a casualty. This method should be known by crew and MARMC and tested during Chapter 12 fire drills. [OP 12]

(4) BAE review procedures and train security personnel to 1) proactively engage and question emergency calls with regards to assistance and 2) pass the casualty over the shipyard announcing system before making phone calls to senior shipyard personnel. [OP 21]

(5) OSA should inventory and update as required the damage control locker in the conex box. IAW reference (d) it should contain all the items of a shipboard damage control repair station. Items required to be plugged in a central location. [OP 16]

(6) OSA establish a second damage control locker IAW reference (d). [OP 16]

(7) OSA repair or obtain a working 4 gas analyzer. [OP 16]

(8) OSA conduct duty section drills for six sections. Although not explicitly required by reference (c), the six section IET teams should regularly drill together. The comprehensive training plan used by the OSA crew is not a substituted for teamwork built in a drill. [OP 13, 14, 15]

(9) OSA formalize and standardize the procedures for assigning personnel to the IET to include a review and muster during duty section turnover. [OP 13]

(10) OSA should review manning and conduct a manpower analysis to validate if 6 section duty is sustainable. [OP 13, 23]

(11) OSA, MARMC, BAE as a maintenance team should establish additional controls to inform the ship as to the location where hotwork is actually being performed, beyond the submission of a HWC. Especially during second shift and weekends. [OP 6, 7]

(12) MARMC should review the contract language and general work items with regard to HWC process and the performance of hotwork. MARMC and NAVSEA should consider a hotwork notification process to the ship, especially on second shift and weekends. [OP 6, 7]

(13) OSA, MARMC, BAE schedule and conduct a chapter 12 fire drill with NFD IAW reference (d). [OP 19, 22]

(14) CNSL should review the drill frequency and reporting requirements for ships in the shipyard. [OP 18]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
CARRIER STRIKE GROUP TEN
9756 DECATUR AVE SUITE 100
NORFOLK VA 23511-3232

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5820
Ser N00/221
14 Nov 18

From: Commander, Carrier Strike Group TEN
To: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FIRE THAT OCCURRED ABOARD USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) ON 10 NOVEMBER 2018

Ref: (a) JAGMAN, Chapter II

1. Per reference (a), you are hereby appointed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the fire that occurred aboard USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) on 10 November 2018. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) are appointed to serve as your assistant investigators.

2. Investigate the cause of the fire, conditions that contributed to the spread of the fire, resulting damage and injuries, and any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form to me by Friday, 7 December 2018, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, you should also read reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation.

3. You may seek legal advice from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) during the course of your investigation. Consult (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) before beginning your inquiry or collecting any evidence.

4. By copy of this appointing order, Commanding Officer, USS OSCAR AUSTIN, is directed to furnish all necessary support and assistance in furtherance of this investigation.

J. F. MEIER

Copy to:
DDG 79
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
1333 ISAAC HULL AVE SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20376-0001

IN REPLY REFER TO

9555
Ser 05P/409
11 Dec 18

From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 05P5)
To: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 05P)

Subj: USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) FIRE INVESTIGATION (ORIGIN, CAUSE, AND FIRE SPREAD) INTERIM REPORT

Ref: (a) Email, RDML John F. Meir (COMCARSTRKGRU TEN), Subj: OSA FIRE INVESTIGATION, 11 Nov 18
(b) Email, RDML Lorin C. Selby (SEA 05/CHENG), Subj: OSA FIRE INVESTIGATION, 12 Nov 18

Encl: (1) USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) Fire Investigation (Origin, Cause, and Fire Spread) Interim Report of 11 December 2018

1. Background

a. On Saturday, 10 November 2018, USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) was in a CNO Availability at BAE shipyard in Norfolk, VA when a fire occurred aboard ship in Stateroom (b)(3), 10USC130 Per the ship's deck log, at approximately 1935 local time, white smoke was reported on the 03 level by a BAE employee. The fire was fought by crew from the USS OSCAR AUSTIN, rescue and assistance (R&A) rendered by USS COLE (in neighboring drydock), and Norfolk Fire Department. The fire was reported out at 2012. At approximately 2024 local time, the overhauling process was started. The fire resulted in significant fire damage to the stateroom of origin, a number of 02 level passageways, a ladderway leading to the 03 level, 03 level passageways, and two other 03 level compartments. In addition, there were many other compartments on the 02, 03, and 04 levels affected by lesser amounts of fire, heat, water, and smoke damage.

b. In response to reference (a) requesting assistance with the investigation, reference (b) directed two personnel from the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) SEA 05P5 (b)(6) and (b)(6) (b)(6) to conduct an origin and cause investigation of the incident, with the results to be provided for use by the concurrent Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) and Safety Investigation Board (SIB) investigations.

c. The SEA 05P5 team conducted the on-scene assessment, origin processing, evidence collection, and damage photography of the incident ship 13-16 November 2018. In addition, the team visited and photographed an exemplar ship constructed by the same shipyard as DDG 79 (Bath Iron Works), USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL (DDG 81), on 14 November 2018.

2. Enclosure (1) is the SEA 05P5 Team interim report addressing the origin, cause, and general fire spread associated with the subject incident.

Enclosure (2)

Subj: USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) FIRE INVESTIGATION (ORIGIN, CAUSE, AND FIRE SPREAD) INTERIM REPORT

3. As documented in enclosure (1), the amount of damage sustained in the compartment of origin (Stateroom (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130 was exceptionally severe. The level of damage far exceeded that expected of a stateroom empty of transient fuel contents other than a desktop printer. In response, NAVSEA is conducting fire tests of various materials which were installed in the stateroom that may have provided unanticipated fuel for the fire. These include non-metallic bulkhead materials, bulkhead insulation, pipe insulation, ventilation duct insulation, and bunk spring protective covers. A final version of the subject report will be issued upon completion of such tests and analysis of the results.

4. The point of contact for this letter is (b)(6) (SEA 05P5), commercial (b)(6) or email (b)(6) @navy.mil.

(b)(6)

Technical Warrant Holder for Damage and Fire Recoverability - Ships

Copy to:
COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC (SEA 05PB, 05P5 (b)(6)
(b)(6)
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Safety Investigation Board (SIB) Senior Member)
MARMC NORFOLK VA (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Code 300)
USS MONTEREY (CG 61) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Command Investigation/JAGMAN Senior Member)

USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79)
FIRE INVESTIGATION
(Origin, Cause, & Fire Spread)

INTERIM REPORT
(Pending Materials Testing)

DATE: 11 December 2018

Naval Sea Systems Command, NAVSEA 05P

(SEA05P5, Technical Warrant Holder, Damage and Fire Recoverability – Ships)

(SEA05P5, Engineering Manager, Industrial/CVN Fire Recoverability)

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On Saturday, 10 November 2018, USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) was in a CNO Availability at BAE Systems shipyard (Pier 6) in Norfolk, VA when a fire occurred aboard ship in Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 Per the deck log (reference (a)), at approximately 1935 local time, white smoke was reported on the 03 level by a BAE employee. Fire was reported out at 2012. At approximately 2024 local time, overhauling process was started. Figures 1 through 4 generally show the primary areas of fire damage on the 02 and 03 levels on DDG 79 along with exemplar photos taken on DDG 81 as part of the investigation. In addition to the damage depicted in these figures, there were many other compartments on the 02, 03 and 04 levels affected by lesser amounts of fire, heat, water and smoke damage. Note that all times used in this report are approximate local times as adjudicated from multiple sources of information. They show sequence of events and approximate time of logging or occurrence.



Figure 1 – Compartment of Fire Origin DDG 79 Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 (Left) & DDG 81 Exemplary Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 (Right)



Figure 2 – Passage (b)(3),10USC130 DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right).



Figure 3 – Passage (b)(3),10USC130 DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right).

Figure 4 – View up ladder to 03 Level; Passage [redacted] to Passage [redacted] DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right)

On 12 November 2018, at the request of RDML John F Meier (COMCARSTRKGRU TEN, N00), RDML Lorin Selby (Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Chief Engineer (CHENG)) directed two personnel from NAVSEA 05P5 ([redacted] to conduct an origin and cause investigation of the incident, with the results to be provided for use by the concurrent Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) and Safety Investigation Board (SIB) investigations. The NAVSEA 05P5 team conducted the on-scene assessment, origin processing, evidence collection, and damage photography of the incident ship from 13-16 November 2018. In addition, the team visited and photographed an exemplar ship constructed by the same shipyard as DDG 79 (Bath Iron Works), USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL (DDG 81), on 14 November 2018.

1.1 Fire Origin, Cause, and Spread Summary

The ignition/heat source for this fire was direct torch contact or hot slag from the oxygen-natural gas torch cutting being conducted above the area of the Officer Baggage Storeroom, aka Computer Storeroom (b)(3),10USC130 Figure 5 shows the location of the cutting area on the 03 Weather deck. The cutting operations extended beyond the boundaries of (b)(3),10USC130 to include Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 which was not intended to be affected, and, as such did not have a fire watch. After contacting combustibles in the stateroom, torch flame and/or hot slag started a Class ALPHA fire. Over the course of the incident, the fire grew, engulfing the stateroom and spreading through the open stateroom door, eventually causing complete destruction of the non-metallic joiner bulkhead that separates Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 and Passage (b)(3),10USC130 The fire spread throughout this passageway and further into the 02 level both FWD and AFT. The fire also spread through an open door into and up the adjoining Ladderway (b)(3),10USC130 (b)(3),10USC130 which resulted in fire spreading to the 03 level and, in time, completely compromised the non-metallic joiner bulkheads separating the Passage from the Ladderway on the 02 level. Figures 6 and 7 show the primary areas of fire damage (where flaming combustion occurred) on the 02 and 03 levels. In addition, many additional spaces on the 02, 03, and 04 levels suffered varying degrees of heat, smoke, and water damage. No visible damage was observed on the 01 level directly underneath the compartment of fire origin or its adjacent compartments. Appendix C contains general arrangement drawings for the 01 to 04 levels in the vicinity of the casualty.



Figure 5 – 03 Weather Deck Torch cuts

(b)(3),10USC130

2.0 INVESTIGATION TEAM FINDINGS – ORIGIN AND CAUSE

2.1. Fire Overview

The most probable ignition scenario is that direct torch flame or hot slag from an oxygen-natural gas torch cut in the deck on the 03 weather level above Officer Baggage Storeroom, aka Computer Storeroom (b)(3),10USC130 ignited combustible materials in Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 resulting in a Class ALPHA fire. The availability of combustible Class ALPHA fuel sources in the compartment in the area of origin resulted in full engulfment of the stateroom and the fire spreading out the open Stateroom door into Passage (b)(3),10USC130 The intensity of the fire in the stateroom also resulted in complete destruction of the inboard non-metallic joiner bulkhead between the Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 and Passage (b)(3),10USC130 facilitating increased fire communication into the passage. Once in the passageway, significant amounts of electrical cable and possibly duct insulation in the overhead became involved, eventually leading to a Class CHARLIE electrical fire in addition to the Class ALPHA fire. The fire progressed aft and outboard on the 02 level to include Passage (b)(3),10USC130 as well as forward and inboard to include Passage (b)(3),10USC130 where significant damage to electrical cables occurred. The fire also spread through an open door into and up the adjoining Ladderway (b)(3),10USC130 which resulted in fire spreading to the 03 level and, in time, completely compromised the non-metallic joiner bulkheads separating the Passage from the Ladderway on the 02 level. On the 03 level, the fire involved Passage (b)(3),10USC130 and eventually progressed in a limited fashion to impact overhead portions of Electronic Workshop (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 (b)(3),10USC130 Fire progression was aided by most compartment doors being open and/or inhibited by temporary services.

2.1.1 Origin

The location of the torch cuts in the overhead of (b)(3),10USC130 Figure 8), the proximity of the torch cut area to the bunk (Figure 9), the appearance of remaining combustibles, and the intensity of damage to aluminum stateroom furniture (Figure 10) indicate that the point of origin was located in the AFT/STBD (Outboard) corner of the Stateroom. It is difficult to state for certain if the first fuel ignited was bulkhead insulation located high in this area or on the bunk itself (fabric spring cover or printer located on lower bunk). However, damage evidence indicates that a significant radiant source existed on the Aft portion of the bottom bunk in the early stages of the fire. Please see the following section for additional discussion on the cause.



Figure 8 – Torch Cut Locations in Notched Portion of Overhead in Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130



Figure 9 – Notched Portion of (b)(3),10USC130 **verhead above Bunk; DDG 81 Exemplary**

Figure 10 – Aft Outboard corner of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right).

2.1.2 Cause

The following is the most probable sequence of events leading to ignition of the fire.

On the evening of the fire, at approximately 1845 hours, the Subcontractor Firewatch Supervisor placed firewatches in the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 below the array room (Officer Baggage Rm (b)(3),10USC130 and Passageway (b)(3),10 and on the 03 level with the shipfitter/burner (reference (b)). Shortly after, the shipfitter/burner commenced cutting operations with an oxygen/natural gas torch on "Plate 13", which was located above Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 where no firewatch was posted (reference (b) and (c)). Reference (b) states that Plate 13 was not intended to be worked on the evening of the fire. However, according to information gained via interview with the shipfitter/burner (reference (c)), he thought his instructions were in fact to remove Plate 13 and also thought it was located above the void adjacent to the Officer Baggage Rm (b)(3),10USC130 where a firewatch was positioned. The shipfitter/burner began operations on Plate 13 by burning a hole through the plate at the AFT interior corner of the plate (which was located just inside the AFT bulkhead of the stateroom at Frame 166) and then moved to the outboard corner of the plate and commenced burning a line cut (reference (c)). At some point after burning the hole, a small flame emerged from the hole in the plate (references (b), (c), and (d)). The firewatch located in the weather with the shipfitter/burner, stated that the shipfitter/burner turned off one of the torch gases, inserted his torch in the hole, and discharged the other gas (which would have been either pure oxygen or natural gas but was most likely oxygen via the cutting lever valve), resulting in the fire from the hole to cease (reference (d)). Thereafter, while continuing with the line cut, fire/smoke again became visible from the linear cut (references (b), (c), and (d)). With this, the shipfitter/burner attempted to extinguish the fire by pouring two buckets of water down the linear cut (references (b), (c), and (d)). Being overwhelmed by heavy black smoke, the shipfitter/burner, the firewatch from 03 weather, and the firewatch from the baggage storeroom evacuated to the Quarterdeck and reported the fire (reference (b)).

Inside Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 located just below the hole burned through deck, the bulkhead was insulated with a foam-type insulation as shown in Figure 11 (tests are undergoing to determine the exact material). In addition, below and approximately three inches forward of the area of the hole was a two-bunk assembly (Figure 10). Although the mattresses and privacy curtains were believed to be removed from the bunks (as evidenced by condition of other Staterooms), spring covers, manufactured from cotton duck (reference (e)) were installed on the bunks. Figure 12 shows one of these covers in another stateroom. Remains of a printer were recovered from the AFT end of the bottom bunk (Figure 13). Crossing a part number stamped on one of the metal printer components and scaling the size of the remains, resulted in a determination that this printer was a desktop laser printer, likely a Samsung ML 6510 ND or similar, which is comprised of significant amounts of combustible plastic.

Based on the statements of the shipfitter/burner and firewatches, it is most probable that the hole burning operation provided the ignition source that initiated the fire. Figure 14 shows slag from the burning operation that

was recovered on the horizontal bulkhead angle just below the burned hole (Figure 11). Natural gas/oxygen torch flames capable of burning through steel are generally in excess of 2700°C (reference (f)). Contact of such with the bulkhead foam-type insulation would have resulted in its ignition. Figure 15 depicts combusted bulkhead insulation in the area below where the hole was burned through. The reported black smoke, typically associated with a fire involving a hydro-carbon based material, is indicative of the bulkhead foam material being ignited. Once the bulkhead insulation was involved it could have spread to the insulation around the pipe seen in Figure 11. In addition, molten slag could have easily fallen onto the top or bottom bunk cover after spattering off the bulkhead angle. Slag is generally in excess of the 700°C minimum oxy-fuel cutting steel "kindling/ignition" temperature (reference (f)). The auto-ignition temperature of cotton is in the range of 255-400°C (reference (g)). Therefore, slag coming in contact with the thermally thin cotton duck cover would have likely resulted in the cover's ignition. If this were the bottom bunk cover, it would have spread to the printer early in the event, also producing dark smoke.



Figure 11 – Looking Up Above (b)(3),10USC130 unk Area Showing Location of Bulkhead Insulation and Structural Angles Below Location of Burned Hole in Deck.



Figure 12 – (Left) Bunk Assembly Located Approximately 3" Forward of Burned Hole at Top of Bulkhead (DDG 81 Exemplar Stateroom).
(Right) Exemplar Cotton Duck Spring Cover on Bunk (DDG 79 Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130



Figure 13 –Printer Remains Recovered on Lower Bunk in (b)(3),10USC130



Figure 14 –Slag from Burning of Hole Found on Angle Below Hole in (b)(3),10USC130

Figure 15 –Combusted Bulkhead Insulation in the Area of the Hole Burned through the Overhead of (b)(3),10USC130 (orange dowel inserted through the hole for clarity of location).

The fabric spring covers and the printer were supported by a spring mattress support frame, which provided ample air circulation around these combustibles, enabling the start and sustainment of a significant Class ALPHA fire. Ample airflow existed within the compartment due to the compartment door and adjacent passageway and ladder access doors being open to support the ignition and development of substantial amounts of fire in the stateroom. Note that the BAE Critique review, captured in reference X, indicated that hot work affecting Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 was not authorized or intended. Therefore (b)(3),10USC130 was not required to be in a condition to support hot work above, and no firewatch was present in the compartment, nor were combustibles cleared of the area. The combustibles believed to be ignited by torch/slag were un-viewable from the three manned firewatch locations reported by the shipyard (reference (b)), making these aforementioned ignition scenarios and subsequent growth possible without firewatch detection. It is the opinion of the authors that either of these ignition scenarios (or a combination of both) were the initiating event(s) leading to the fire.

2.1.3 Spread and Transfer

As fire involving the bunk area became fully developed, fire spread up the AFT/Outboard corner of the compartment to engage the overhead. At this point the fire became hot enough to cause significant structural failure of the aluminum bunk furniture, eventually causing structural collapse of the Aft end of the upper bunk, and causing significant panel holing of the Aft end of the bottom bunk. As the compartment heated, it is anticipated that other combustibles on the bulkheads and in the overhead became involved, such as the bulkhead, duct, and pipe insulation as well as the limited amount of cabling present. As the compartment became fully involved, it caused the structural collapse of the aluminum compartment cabinetry (Figures 16 and 17) and complete destruction of the non-metallic joiner bulkhead separating the stateroom from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 Figure 18).



Figure 16 – Forward Bulkhead (b)(3),10USC130 iew, DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right)

Figure 17 – Aft Bulkhead (b) (3),10USC130 iew, DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right)



Figure 18 – Inboard Bulkhead between Stateroom [redacted] and Passage [redacted] Fire Destroyed on DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 Exemplar (Right)

Figure 19 shows the remains of the stateroom door hinge halves, looking from above. This photo shows the door slab hinge half (edge of door) remains are at approximately a 90-degree angle with the door frame hinge half remains. The remains of the cipher lock were also found on the deck against the aft bulkhead. This indicates the door was open during the fire, which would have enabled smoke and fire to spread from the stateroom to Passage [redacted] even prior to the failure of the stateroom bulkhead. As the fire exited the stateroom, it spread into the overhead of Passage [redacted] The heat in the overhead of [redacted] and [redacted] was so significant that aluminum HVAC ductwork in these areas completely melted and collapsed (Figure 20).



Figure 19 – Looking from Above. Remains of Stateroom [redacted] Entry Door Hinge Halves.



Figure 20 – Passage (b)(3),10USC130 ooking Forward at Missing Overhead Ductwork DDG 79 (Left) and DDG 81 (Right)

The fire, now in the passage, was supplied with ample air flow from multiple directions due to most doors in the area being open. Aft of the Stateroom and outboard of passage (b)(3),10USC130 an open door between passages (b)(3),10USC130 and (b)(3),10USC130 Figure 21), allowed access to ventilation from a ladderway and a natural ventilation duct at the outboard end of Passage (b)(3) 10USC130 which drew the fire outboard down this passage. Forward of the stateroom, significant oxygen was available from open compartments and passages in O-country, which drew the fire in that direction also. The door to Passage (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130 (ladderway outside the Stateroom), was open during the fire, as evidenced by the presence of temporary service remains in the doorway and early reports of smoke on the 03 level from the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 firewatch (reference (h)). This open door provided access for the fire to spread up the ladder to the 03 level. A significant deck cut through the overhead of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 allowing airflow to the 04 level Pilot house area, drew the fire in that direction through intervening doors that were open (or removed) during the fire.



Figure 21 – View Aft from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 through Open Door to Passage (b)(3),10USC130

The fire spread forward from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 into Passage (b)(3),10USC130 unabated as the door between the Passages had been removed. Significant damage occurred to the electrical cabling and ductwork in the overhead of Passage (b)(3),10USC130 from fire and heat exposure (Figures 22 and 23). Impact to inboard Passage (b)(3),10USC130 and the other staterooms accessed via Passage (b)(3),10USC130 was primarily limited to smoke and/or water damage (Figures 24 and 25). *(Reserved for comment regarding possible chlorides from cable combustion)*



Figure 22 – Overhead Damage in Passage Overhead Looking Inboard from (b)(3),10USC130 to (b)(3),10USC130 and (b)(3),10USC130

Figure 23 – Overhead Damage in Passage (b)(3),10USC130 Overhead Looking FWD towards Female Head



Figure 24 – Overhead Smoke Damage Typical of Staterooms off Passage (b)(3),10USC130

Figure 25 – Corrosion to CRES Sink in Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 Door was Open During Fire)

The Commanding Officer's Cabin (b)(3),10USC130 which is off the FWD end to the outboard of Passageway (b)(3),10USC130 sustained smoke damage throughout, but only minor fire damage around the top of the doorway despite the heavy fire in the passageway. Based on the presence of and damage to a temporary lighting cable running through the doorway, as well as the burn/damage pattern on the door itself, it is believed the CO Cabin door was only slightly ajar (to accommodate the lighting cable) during the fire, thus limiting damage to the cabin (Figures 26 and 27).

Figure 26 – Fire Damage to CO's Cabin Door (b)(3),10USC130 Passageway-side (Left). Only Minor Fire Extension into CO's Cabin Above Door which was Believed to be Only Partially Ajar During Fire (Right).

Figure 27 – Temporary Lighting Cable Running Past CO's Cabin (b) (3),10USC130 Door Jam. Damage Pattern to Cable Indicates Door was Only Partially Ajar During Fire.

The fire moved AFT from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 and was primarily confined to Passage (b)(3),10USC130 Fire damage in Passage (b)(3),10USC130 primarily impacted cabling and ductwork located in the overhead (Figure 28). Impact to the storeroom and locker (b)(3),10USC130 nd (b)(3),10USC130 located off Passage (b)(3),10USC130 was primarily heat, smoke and, and water damage. However, the forward bulkhead of the storeroom and locker was shared with the primary fire compartment (b)(3),10USC130 and exhibits substantial fire/heat damage to the non-metallic joiner bulkhead.



Figure 28 – Passage (b)(3),10USC130 oking Inboard towards Passage (b)(3),10USC130

The fire moved inboard from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 into Passage (b)(3),10USC130 and upward via the ladderway (Figure 4) into Passage (b)(3) 10USC130 The fire was so intense in Passage (b)(3) 10USC130 that the non-metallic joiner bulkhead between Passages (b)(3) 10USC130 and (b)(3) 10USC130 was eventually completely destroyed (Figure 3). The non-metallic joiner bulkhead between Passage (b)(3),10USC130 nd Officer's Head (b)(3),10USC130 was severely compromised, with some minor fire occurring in the Head (Figure 29).



Figure 29 - Compromised Non-Metallic Joiner Bulkhead
Outboard Side (L) in Passage (b)(3),10USC130 Inboard Side (R) in Officer's Head (b)(3),10USC130

The fire continued to spread in the overhead of the 03 level and progressed from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 both forward and aft. *(RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITIONAL CONTENT ABOUT DECK DAMAGE)*

Forward of Passage (b)(3),10USC130 the door to (b)(3),10USC130 had been removed, and there was substantial fire damage to overhead cables, ductwork, light fixtures and radar wave guides in the overhead in a linear path proceeding forward from the removed door (b)(3),10USC130 Other spaces forward of this point, Radar Room No. 1 (b)(3),10USC130 and Array Room No. 1 (b)(3),10USC130 received primarily smoke and/or water damage due to open doors.

(b)(3),10USC130

Outboard of Passage (b)(3),10USC130 the fire proceeded to involve the overhead electrical cables, ductwork and lighting fixtures in Electronic Workshop (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 via an open door (Figure 32). Continuing aft, the spaces accessible via Passage (b)(3),10USC130 (including (b)(3),10USC130 were primarily affected by smoke and/or water damage due to open doors. (b)(3),10USC130

(b)(3),10USC130

(b)(3),10USC130 *Reserved for comment regarding possible chlorides from cable combustion)*

(b)(3),10USC130

04 level impact was primarily limited to smoke and/or water damage, however the deck in the Pilot House (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 directly above Passage (b)(3). 10 U.S.C. 130 exhibited heat damage from the fire below (Figure 34).

(RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITIONAL CONTENT ABOUT DECK DAMAGE)

Figure 34 – Pilot House (b)(3),10USC130 eck Coating Damage

2.2 Compartment of Origin Analysis

The known location of the instigating hot work operations (burning) above Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 eye witness accounts (references (c), (d), and (h)), patterns of damage within Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 and assessment of the fire spread all supported a conclusion that the compartment of fire origin was Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130

2.3 Potential Fuel Loads in the Compartment of Origin (RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITIONAL CONTENT)

The fire investigation team's ignition analysis and inspection of the compartment of origin (Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 adjoining compartments, and exemplary compartments on DDG 81, allowed the team to establish a forensic structure to determine the most probable fuel sources in Stateroom (b)(3),10USC130 At time of this report, the spring covers and the printer were the only "transient" combustible fuels known to be in the subject stateroom. Other potential "installed" fuels include examples such as electrical cable and bulkhead, pipe, and duct insulations. The charts below show the material attributes and locations of the fuel sources present in the compartment of origin.

Samsung Laser Printer	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Located on the aft portion of the bottom berth of double bunk furniture, which was located on the outboard bulkhead. The foot (Aft) of the bunk furniture was located directly underneath the torch cut area.	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Desktop Laser Printer as Possible Fuel Source

Fabric Bunk Spring Cover	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Secured to exposed bed frames to cover springs. Located on the top and bottom berths of the double bunk furniture, which was located on the outboard bulkhead. The foot (Aft) of the bunk furniture was located directly underneath the torch cut area.	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Bunk Spring Cover as Possible Fuel Source

Chilled Water Pipe (CWP) Insulation	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – CWP Pipe Insulation as Possible Fuel Source

Fire Main (FM) Pipe Insulation	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – FM Pipe Insulation as Possible Fuel Source

HVAC Duct Insulation	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Duct Insulation as Possible Fuel Source

Bulkhead Insulation	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Bulkhead Insulation as Possible Fuel Source

Overhead Deck Insulation	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Overhead Deck Insulation as Possible Fuel Source

Non-Metallic Joiner Bulkheads	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Non-Metallic Joiner Bulkheads as Possible Fuel Source

Electrical Cables	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Electrical Cables as Possible Fuel Source

Paint	
- Material type - Linear and dimensional statistics - Individual quantity (if applicable) and approximate total weight of fuel - Location in compartment	
Conclusion:	
Substantiation:	

Table X – Paint as Possible Fuel Source

2.4 Timeline

Appendix A contains a detail timeline of the incident as captured in reference (b). The reference (b) timeline contained the times/events that BAE assembled from their fact finding interviews, the Ship's Engineering Log, the Ship's Deck Log, Norfolk Fire Department Log, and the BAE Security Log. ***(Reserved for future additional content)***

3.0 CHARTER, ORGANIZATION AND PROCESS *(RESERVED FOR FUTURE CONTENT)*

3.1 Investigation Charter and Organization

On 12 November 2018, at the request of RDML John F Meier (COMCARSTRKGRU TEN, N00), RDML Lorin Selby (Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Chief Engineer (CHENG)) directed two personnel from NAVSEA 05P5 (b)(6) and (b)(6) to conduct an origin and cause investigation of the incident, with the results to be provided for use by the concurrent Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) and Safety Investigation Board (SIB) investigations.

3.2 Investigation Process

Investigation Team members started the investigation by visiting USS Oscar Austin (OSA) at the BAE shipyard in Norfolk, VA arriving on 13 November 2018 and departing on 16 November 2018. The Team conducted the following inspections and analysis:

- Initial tour of OSA damage
- Tour/photo documentation of exemplar ship (DDG 81 at NOB, Norfolk)
- Forensic analysis of fire damage and debris.
- Ship damage assessment, sketching, photos and measurements.
- Evidence/sample collection (BH/pipe/duct insulation, non-metallic joiner BH sample, weld slag, failed fire nozzle).

3.3 Investigation Activities by Date

13 November 2018: Team transited to and arrived at BAE-Norfolk and was processed through Pass and ID for yard access and parking. Established temporary working office in MARMC trailer near OSA pier. Requested, received, and reviewed Compartment and Access (C&A) drawings of affected ship areas. Was provided initial tour of OSA damaged areas. Introduced to OSA CO and (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (JAG Senior Member). Identified exemplary ship (DDG 81) and made arrangements for visit.

14 November 2018: Received and reviewed insulation and fire detection drawings for DDG 79/81. Processed application for investigation camera pass. Toured DDG 81 at NOB, Norfolk, taking photographs of areas that were damaged on DDG 79 to use as exemplars. Documented via photographs and notes the general type/degree of damage of interest (fire, heat, smoke, water) on the 03 and 04 levels of OSA to facilitate release of these areas for initial wash-down.

15 November 2018: Documented via photographs and notes the general type/degree of damage of interest (fire, heat, smoke, water) in stateroom and outside passageway on 02 level. Excavated area of origin in stateroom and photo documented findings. Collected samples of potential fuel sources. Bagged, tagged, and recorded samples. Excavated stateroom entry to determine status of door during fire. Co-lead RDML Selby tour of damage with OSA CO.

16 November 2018: Toured (b)(3),10USC130 with ship's force (b)(3),10USC130 documenting specific (b)(3),10USC130 (b)(3),10USC130 request of RDML Selby). Analyzed all the doors in the fire path for open/closed orientation and documented opinion. Documented via photographs and notes the general type/degree of damage of interest (fire, heat, smoke, water) in the balance of the damaged 02 areas. Collected pipe insulation, ventilation insulation, and non-metallic BH samples. Bagged, tagged, and recorded samples. Assessed and photo documented various ignition/fire fuel scenarios. Photo documented size/length of torch cuts into the stateroom. Sketched and measured all piping in stateroom to facilitate future estimation of pipe insulation quantity. Provided tour and out brief of preliminary observations/findings to (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) JAG Investigation Team. Provided out brief of preliminary observations/findings to (b)(6) /(b)(6) Performed initial cleaning of and packed investigation equipment. Transited back to residences.

17 November 2018: Unpacked, performed final cleaning, and re-stowed equipment and PPE. Downloaded, organized into logical folders, and burned DVDs of all photos (1000+) from investigation camera. Assembled rough brief of key photos for RDML Selby/VADM Moore. Provided scene clearance email to JAG, SIB, and MARMC.

3.4 Key Observations from Scene Assessments (Fire Behavior and Damage): (RESERVED FOR FUTURE CONTENT)

3.5 Eyewitness statements: (RESERVED FOR FUTURE CONTENT)

4.0 SUMMARY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LESSONS LEARNED *(RESERVED FOR FUTURE CONTENT)*

Table XX - Recommendations

#	Finding	Recommendation	Actionee	Priority/ Timeframe

4.1 Lessons Learned (RESERVED FOR FUTURE CONTENT)

The following are lessons learned from this investigation:

5.0 REFERENCES *(RESERVED FOR FUTURE CONTENT)*

a. USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79) SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET, 10 NOV 2018.
b. BAE FACT FINDING REPORT FORM – CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF RELEVENT FACTS, Final Report, (b)(6) (Senior Manager in Review), Report Serial Number 20-FF-18-028, Signed/Issued 12/03/2018.
c. Command Investigation (JAG) Interview ((b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) , Senior Member) with Mr. (b)(6) (Shipfitter/burner), Interview Date: 21 November 2018.
d. Command Investigation (JAG) Interview (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Senior Member) with Mr. (b)(6) (Firewatch assigned in weather on 03 with the Shipfitter/burner), Interview Date: 21 November 2018.
e. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Drawing 805-1632586, REV D, dated 10/17/72.
f. "OXYFUEL CUTTING-PROCESS AND FUEL GASES", Table: Fuel Gas Characteristics, TWI Ltd, Cambridge, UK, Copyright 2018.
g. Table 6.5.7, "Fire Hazard Properties of Common Textile Fibers", FIRE PROTECTION HANDBOOK, 20th Edition, National Fire Protection Association, Copyright 2008.
h. Command Investigation (JAG) Interview (b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Senior Member) with Ms. (b)(6) Firewatch assigned to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 Interview Date: 21 November 2018.

(b)(3), 10USC130

(b)(3), 10USC130

(b)(3), 10USC130





(b)(3), 10USC130



(b)(3), 10USC130



(b)(3), 10USC130



(b)(3), 10USC130



(b)(3), 10USC130



(b)(3), 10 USC 130

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
(b)(5)

BAE SYSTEMS
SAFETY DEPARTMENT
Witness Statement Template
Revised – 07 July 2015

Statement Follow Up 1.

This Witness Statement is provided to clarify the events leading to:		
Statement of: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	**Job Title:** Shipfitter Supervisor	**Badge #:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date and Time of Statement:	11/11/2018	1430
Date and Time of Incident:	11/10/2018	1930 Approx
Type of Incident: Class "A" Fire & Class "C"	**Companies Involved:** BAE Norfolk Ship Repair (NSR) AR Tech	
Exact Location of Incident: (i.e., Ship, Space, Building #, Shop)	USS Oscar Austin 02, 03 & 04 Levels	
In your own words please describe the day's events starting from when you reported to work up to and including the incident, continuing through the time that the incident was corrected or medical treatment was complete.		

I arrived at work at approximately 1545. I went to plate shop supervisor's office to get a turn over from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for the Oscar Austin and from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for Cole second shift work. After getting the jobs from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I then went by the AR Tech fire watch coordinator to tell them how many fire watches I needed for each ship. I then went to Bldg. 620 to get up with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get the jobs to be worked in 620. I then met with all my shipfitters and burners for 620, Oscar Austin and Cole in 620. We went over the jobs, filled out JHA's and I put the shop 620 people to work. As I was putting the 620 people to work the Oscar Austin and the Cole crews went to the ships and I told them to wait on me till I get there. After putting the 620 people to work I went to the Oscar Austin first. I met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the 03 level fwd at frame 160 stbd. When I finished with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came on the job and I took him to the job and showed him everything about the 04 and 03 level. Then we went down to the 02 level and I showed him where he would be and looked up to show him exactly where he would be working.

GENERAL QUESTIONS	
Question:	**How long have you worked at BAE Systems NSR?** 10 years
Question:	**Did you report the incident to your supervisor?** Yes
If yes,	**What is the name of the supervisor you reported the injury to?** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Enclosure (8)

If no,	**Why not?** N/A
Question:	**Did you report the incident to the main gate?** No
If yes,	**When?** No they were already notified when I found out
If no,	**Was this incident reported to the Main Gate?** Yes **Who notified the Main Gate?** Ships Force **When?** At approximately 2000
Question:	**What do you think could have prevented this incident from occurring?** The burner should not have been that close to the bulkhead and a firewatch should have been placed in the stateroom
Question:	**Were there any other witnesses?** Yes
If yes,	**What were their names and who did they work for?** Fire Watches (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) & (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

TASK	
Question:	**Was a Safe Work Procedure used?** No
If not, Why?	Well not really he started scrapping out too close to the bulkhead
Question:	**Had conditions changed to make the normal procedure unsafe?** No
If yes, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were the appropriate tools and materials available?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were the proper tools being used?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were safety devices working properly?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Was lockout used when necessary?** No
If not, Why?	N/A

MATERIAL

Question: **If yes,**	**Was there an equipment failure?** No **What caused the equipment to fail?** N/A
Question: **If yes,**	**Was the machinery poorly designed?** No **What was the design problem?** N/A
Question: **If yes,**	**Were hazardous materials or substances involved?** No **What were the hazardous materials or substances?** N/A
Question: **If not, Why?**	**Were they clearly identified?** No N/A
Question: **If yes,**	**Was there a less hazardous alternative substance possible and available?** No **What was available?** N/A
Question: **If yes, Why?**	**Was the raw material substandard in some way?** No N/a
Question: **If yes,**	**Was a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) Used?** No **Where is the SDS?** N/A **Note: Get the original SDS used for this incident file.N/A**
Question:	**What PPE was being used?** Yes
Question: **If no, Why?**	**Were you wearing your gloves?** Yes Click here to enter text. **Note: If employee's injury involves their hands, the gloves they were wearing at the time of the injury become part of the investigation. Get photos front and back of both gloves involved**
Question: **If yes, why?**	**Was any required PPE not used?** No But I don't know for sure
Question: **If not, Why?**	**Were the users of the PPE Properly trained?** Yes Click here to enter text.

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENVIRONMENT	
Question:	**What were the weather conditions?** Click here to enter text. **Right Click -> Open Hyperlink: (NOAA 3 Day Weather) (NOAA Tides)**
Question: **If yes, why**	**Was poor housekeeping a problem?** No Click here to enter text.
Question: **If yes,**	**Was it too hot or too cold?** No **Conduct a Temperature, humidity, wind reading, plus a Relative Heat index reading, or Wind Chill reading of affected work site.**
Question: **If yes, Why?**	**Was noise a problem?** No Click here to enter text.
Question: **If no, why**	**Was there adequate light? Yes** Click here to enter text. **Note: Conduct a Lighting Survey & document on Lighting Survey Form**
Question: **If yes, Why?**	**Were toxic or hazardous gases, dusts, or fumes present?** Choose an item. N/A

PERSONNEL	
Question: **If no, why**	**Were workers, on this job site, experienced in the work being done?** Yes Click here to enter text.
Question: **If no, why**	**Had they been adequately trained?** Yes Click here to enter text.
Question: **If no, why**	**Could they physically do the work?** Yes Click here to enter text.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Initials of Person Making Statement _____

MANAGEMENT	
Question:	**Were safety rules communicated to and understood by all employees?** Yes
If no, why	To the best of my knowledge they understood
Question:	**Were written references and specific jobsite safety procedures available for your review if needed?** No
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were Safety Procedures being enforced?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Was there adequate supervision?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were workers trained to do the work assigned to you?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Had a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) been filled out?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
If yes,	**Who has possession of the original JHA?** Safety **Note: The original JHA must be obtained for this file.**
Question:	**Had procedures been developed to overcome the hazards?** No
If no, why?	N/A
Question:	**Were any unsafe conditions corrected?** No
If yes,	**What were the unsafe conditions & how were they corrected?** There were none at the start of the job
If no, why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Was regular maintenance of equipment carried out?** Yes
If no, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were regular safety inspections carried out?** Choose an item.
If no, why?	Click here to enter text.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Initials of Person Making Statement

This space is for additional questions. Delete any unused lines or add additional lines if necessary.

Question: How many employees were you supervising on 11/10/2018?
Answer. 12 total

Question: Did you and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) go to the 02 level under the job site and into the stateroom adjacent to the bulkhead?
Answer: Yes into the gear locker and the Array room but not the stateroom

Question: Who placed the fire watches?
Answer:. The burner places them. I did not see him place them.

Question: How many fire watches were provided to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Answer: 5

Question: Do you think 5 fire watches were adequate?
Answer: Yes but I he only placed 4.

Question: Do you think there should have been a fire watch in the stateroom on the 02 level?
Answer: Yes

Question: Do the hot workers always place their fire watches?
Answer: Yes and I feel they should because they know the job.

Question: Where were you when you found out there was a fire and who told you?
Answer: I was in the shaft alley on the Cole and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told me.

Question: Did you have discussion with the burner about the close proximity of the stateroom bulkhead?
Answer: No, however he had been in that area and cut out other plates up to that same bulkhead.

Question: What was the distance from the point of unintended Hot Work and the stateroom Bulkhead?
Answer: He should have stayed off that bulkhead at least 4 inches before cutting up to the bulkhead.

The Following questions have been added 11/14/2018 to clarifying the actions leading up to the fire in USS Oscar Austin.

Question: Do you agree that the night note that you initialed is the night note that you and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) discussed and agreed to during your shift turn over?
Answer: Yes.

Question: Did you tell (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to cut out piece #13 on DWG F53711-110-8570464 Rev.B?
Answer: No

Question: Referring to the night note, which line item refers to what you told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to work?
Answer: The second line from the top of the page

Question: Which piece number is referred to in the second line item on the night note?
Answer: Piece one.

Question: Did you review DWG F53711-110-8570464 Rev.B with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the night of the fire?
Answer: No not on the night of the fire, however I have reviewed it with him in the past. He has been the burner that has removed all the other plate along that bulkhead.

Question: Did you review that night's, night note with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Answer: No. I did not show him the night note.

Question: Did you feel confident that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) understood your directions as to what exactly you expected him to do?
Answer: Yes. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said "I Got It"

Question: When we went to the job Site with me 11/14/2018 at 1510 and saw where (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made his cuts is there any way in your mind that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) could have confused your instructions to work piece one.

Answer: No

Question: Is there anything you would like to expand upon in this statement:

Answer: No I feel like I gave him proper instructions. I took him top and bottom to show him the Job. I don't understand why he did what he did.

Question	Is there anything you wish to add to this statement?
Answer:	No
Question	Did you understand all of the questions that I have asked you?
Answer:	Yes
Question	Were all of your answers true to the best of your knowledge?
Answer:	Yes

This investigation is closed within the files of this office, pending receipt of further amplifying information of investigative value.

Employee's Name	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
Employee's Job Title	Shipfitter Supervisor	**Employee's Badge #**	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Employee's Signature & Date	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	11-14-18	
Safety Department Information			
Interviewer's Name	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
Interviewer's Job Title	Manager	**Interviewer's Badge #**	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Interviewer's Signature & Date	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	11/14/18	

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

BAE SYSTEMS
SAFETY DEPARTMENT
Witness Statement Template
Revised – 07 July 2015

This Witness Statement is provided to clarify the events leading to:		
Statement of: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	**Job Title:** Shipfitter Supervisor	**Badge #:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Date and Time of Statement:	11/11/2018	1430
Date and Time of Incident:	11/10/2018	1930 Approx
Type of Incident: Class "A" Fire & Class "C"	**Companies Involved:** BAE Norfolk Ship Repair (NSR) AR Tech	
Exact Location of Incident: (i.e., Ship, Space, Building #, Shop)	USS Oscar Austin 02, 03 & 04 Levels	

In your own words please describe the day's events starting from when you reported to work up to and including the incident, continuing through the time that the incident was corrected or medical treatment was complete.

I arrived at work at approximately 1545. I went to plate shop supervisor's office to get a turn over from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for the Oscar Austin and from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for Cole second shift work. After getting the jobs from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I then went by the AR Tech fire watch coordinator to tell them how many fire watches I needed for each ship. I then went to Bldg. 620 to get up with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get the jobs to be worked in 620. I then met with all my shipfitters and burners for 620, Oscar Austin and Cole in 620. We went over the jobs, filled out JHA's and I put the shop 620 people to work. As I was putting the 620 people to work the Oscar Austin and the Cole crews went to the ships and I told them to wait on me till I get there. After putting the 620 people to work I went to the Oscar Austin first. I met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the 03 level fwd at frame 160 stbd. When I finished with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came on the job and I took him to the job and showed him everything about the 04 and 03 level. Then we went down to the 02 level and I showed him where he would be and looked up to show him exactly where he would be working.

GENERAL QUESTIONS	
Question:	**How long have you worked at BAE Systems NSR?** 10 years
Question:	**Did you report the incident to your supervisor?** Yes
If yes,	**What is the name of the supervisor you reported the injury to?** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

If no,	**Why not?** N/A
Question:	**Did you report the incident to the main gate?** No
If yes,	**When?** No they were already notified when I found out
If no,	**Was this incident reported to the Main Gate?** Yes **Who notified the Main Gate?** Ships Force **When?** At approximately 2000
Question:	**What do you think could have prevented this incident from occurring?** The burner should not have been that close to the bulkhead and a firewatch should have been placed in the stateroom.
Question:	**Were there any other witnesses?** Yes
If yes,	**What were their names and who did they work for?** Fire Watches (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) & (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

TASK	
Question:	**Was a Safe Work Procedure used?** No
If not, Why?	Well not really he started scrapping out too close to the bulkhead
Question:	**Had conditions changed to make the normal procedure unsafe?** No
If yes, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were the appropriate tools and materials available?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were the proper tools being used?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were safety devices working properly?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Was lockout used when necessary?** No
If not, Why?	N/A

MATERIAL

Question:	**Was there an equipment failure?** No
If yes,	**What caused the equipment to fail?** N/A
Question:	**Was the machinery poorly designed?** No
If yes,	**What was the design problem?** N/A
Question:	**Were hazardous materials or substances involved?** No
If yes,	**What were the hazardous materials or substances?** N/A
Question:	**Were they clearly identified?** No
If not, Why?	N/A
Question:	**Was there a less hazardous alternative substance possible and available?** No
If yes,	**What was available?** N/A
Question:	**Was the raw material substandard in some way?** No
If yes, Why?	N/a
Question:	**Was a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) Used?** No
If yes,	**Where is the SDS?** N/A **Note: Get the original SDS used for this incident file.N./A**
Question:	**What PPE was being used?** Yes
Question:	**Were you wearing your gloves?** Yes
If no, Why?	Click here to enter text. **Note: If employee's injury involves their hands, the gloves they were wearing at the time of the injury become part of the investigation. Get photos front and back of both gloves involved**
Question:	**Was any required PPE not used?** No
If yes, why?	But I don't know for sure
Question:	**Were the users of the PPE Properly trained?** Yes
If not, Why?	Click here to enter text.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Initials of Person Making Statement

ENVIRONMENT	
Question:	**What were the weather conditions?** Click here to enter text. **Right Click -> Open Hyperlink: (NOAA 3 Day Weather) (NOAA Tides)**
Question: **If yes, why**	**Was poor housekeeping a problem?** No Click here to enter text.
Question: **If yes,**	**Was it too hot or too cold?** No **Conduct a Temperature, humidity, wind reading, plus a Relative Heat Index reading, or Wind Chill reading of affected work site.**
Question: **If yes, Why?**	**Was noise a problem?** No Click here to enter text.
Question: **If no, why**	**Was there adequate light? Yes** Click here to enter text. **Note: Conduct a Lighting Survey & document on Lighting Survey Form**
Question: **If yes, Why?**	**Were toxic or hazardous gases, dusts, or fumes present?** Choose an item. N/A

PERSONNEL	
Question: **If no, why**	**Were workers, on this job site, experienced in the work being done?** Yes Click here to enter text.
Question: **If no, why**	**Had they been adequately trained?** Yes Click here to enter text.
Question: **If no, why**	**Could they physically do the work?** Yes Click here to enter text.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Initials of Person Making Statement

MANAGEMENT	
Question:	**Were safety rules communicated to and understood by all employees?** Yes
If no, why	To the best of my knowledge they understood
Question:	**Were written references and specific jobsite safety procedures available for your review if needed?** No
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were Safety Procedures being enforced?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Was there adequate supervision?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were workers trained to do the work assigned to you?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Had a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) been filled out?** Yes
If no, why	Click here to enter text.
If yes,	**Who has possession of the original JHA?** Safety **Note: The original JHA must be obtained for this file.**
Question:	**Had procedures been developed to overcome the hazards?** No
If no, why?	N/A
Question:	**Were any unsafe conditions corrected?** No
If yes,	**What were the unsafe conditions & how were they corrected?** There were none at the start of the job
If no, why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Was regular maintenance of equipment carried out?** Yes
If no, Why?	Click here to enter text.
Question:	**Were regular safety inspections carried out?** Choose an item.
If no, why?	Click here to enter text.

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

This space is for additional questions. Delete any unused lines or add additional lines if necessary.

Question: How many employees were you supervising on 11/10/2018?
Answer. 12 total

Question: Did you and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) go to the 02 level under the job site and into the stateroom adjacent to the bulkhead?
Answer: Yes into the gear locker and the Array room but not the stateroom

Question: Who placed the fire watches?
Answer: The burner places them. I did not see him place them.

Question: How many fire watches were provided to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Answer: 5

Question: Do you think 5 fire watches were adequate?
Answer: Yes but I he only placed 4.

Question: Do you think there should have been a fire watch in the stateroom on the 02 level?
Answer: Yes

Question: Do the hot workers always place their fire watches?
Answer: Yes and I feel they should because they know the job.

Question: Where were you when you found out there was a fire and who told you?
Answer: I was in the shaft alley on the Cole and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) old me.

Question: Did you have discussion with the burner about the close proximity of the stateroom bulkhead?
Answer: No, however he had been in that area and cut out other plates up to that same bulkhead.

Question: What was the distance from the point of unintended Hot Work and the stateroom Bulkhead?
Answer: He should have stayed off that bulkhead at least 4 inches before cutting up to the bulkhead.

Question	Is there anything you wish to add to this statement?
Answer:	No
Question	Did you understand all of the questions that I have asked you?
Answer:	Yes
Question	Were all of your answers true to the best of your knowledge?
Answer:	Yes

This investigation is closed within the files of this office, pending receipt of further amplifying information of investigative value.

Employee's Name	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
Employee's Job Title	Shipfitter Supervisor	**Employee's Badge #**	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Employee's Signature & Date	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	11-11-18	

Safety Department Information

Interviewer's Name	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
Interviewer's Job Title	Manager	**Interviewer's Badge #**	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Interviewer's Signature & Date	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	11/11/2018	

BAE SYSTEMS
SAFETY DEPARTMENT
Witness Statement Template
Revised – 07 July 2015

This Witness Statement is provided to clarify the events leading to:		
Statement of: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	**Job Title:** Craft 1 Plate Shop Supervisor	**Badge #:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Date and Time of Statement:	13 November 2018	4:35 P.M.
Date and Time of Incident:	10 November 2018	7:30 P.M.
Type of Incident: Class "A" Fire	**Companies Involved:** BAE Norfolk Ship Repair (NSR), AR Tech, VMS	
Exact Location of Incident: (i.e., Ship, Space, Building #, Shop)	BAE NSR, Pier 6, USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79), 03 Weather Deck, Starboard Side.	
In your own words please describe the 2nd Shift events starting from when you reported to work up to and including the incident, continuing through the time that the incident ended and you ended your shift.		

I came in the gate about 3:45 pm on Saturday. I reported in to our Supervisor's Office and I got up with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get the night notes for the USS Oscar Austin. We discussed everything I needed to know. After that I got up with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for the night notes on the USS Cole. After that I proceeded in the direction of Building 620. I stopped by to see the AR Tech Supervisor, I don't know her name, in the picnic area to let her know how many jobs I was going to be working and how many fire watches to do the jobs. I told her I needed 7 fire watches for the Oscar Austin. I normally talk to the AR Tech supervisor (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) but he wasn't there that evening. I told her I was going to be working the same two items I worked on Friday evening, the 03 level and Sonar 2. So then I went to Building 620 to get a turnover for the shop in Building 620. I got that from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) All my employees for both ships, the Cole and the Austin, met me at the shop. I sent three to the Cole, one in the drydock and two in shaft alley. On the Oscar Austin. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) a VMS contractor called me and told me he was going to be a little but he was going to be in. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he's a VMS contractor as well, had been working in Sonar 2 the night before. I put the people to work from building 620 and gave them their JHA's and proceeded to the Oscar Austin. When I got on the Oscar Austin and I met (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the 03 level before (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got there and saw that the Hot work ticket was already signed by the 2nd shift PAI, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) So I was going to take him to Sonar 2 and I met (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ght at the ladder and I told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to wait for me right at the ladder and that I was going to show (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) what to do on the 03 level. We proceeded to the starboard side on the 03 level deck and I showed him the plate that needed to be ripped out. I showed him the hot work ticket and showed him that it had already been side. I proceeded up to the 04 level and came down the

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ladder, to the 03 level to show him the inboard side of where he would doing the hotwork down into the 03 level, starboard array room and took him to the 03 berthing and showed him the where the paint had been removed. So from there we went down the ladder to the 02 level and opened the closet to the Officers Baggage Storage Locker and showed him where the plate was and the two voids to the outboard of that and that the top of those voids on the 03 level were all open and had already been scrapped out. I also showed him the competent person local postings that had been filled out for the day. I told him I had ordered 5 fire watches for that job. I told him to make sure there was one fire watch inside that Officer's Storage locker. I asked him if he was good with the fire watches under that job or did he want (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) under there as well and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was good and that he had it. After that I walked him through where to put the fire watches. I also gave (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) a JHA. From there I went to get (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and took him down to Sonar 2. I signed his hot work ticket as the PAI. I gave him a JHA and he had been working there the night before so he knew what to do. He was going to install a deck insert and that was it. From there I proceeded to the USS Cole. I went to the drydock and I got up with the burner who was going to take off the bottom of the Port fairwater. He had two fire watches and we discussed keeping everything cleaned up and they had a garden hose with a trigger nozzle on the end of it. I asked (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the burner, about the hot work ticket and he showed me where it was posted on the keel blocks. It had been signed by the 2nd shift PAI as well. I gave him a JHA and asked him if he was good. The riggers were there to put the falls on it to take the fairwater down when he finished. I went up the Wingwall and went up on the ship to the Shaft Alley. I checked the competent person local posting and checked the date off before I went down in the hole for safe for workers, safe for hot work. I had two mechanics, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) down there and explained to them the changes we were making to the skid plates installation. I helped them lay the new chocks down there. I checked their hot work ticket and it was signed by the 2nd shift PAI as well. I was helping them lay out the new chocks and told them how to scribe off old chock so we could lower both down a half an inch. That was on the starboard side. On the port side the skid plate had long leg that had be changed. I had to make sure the mechanic knew what he was doing. I stayed in there in the shaft alley until 8:05 p.m. We heard over the loud speaker, to secure all hot work. I told the hot worker to pull the torch back out of the hole because the hot work was secured. As soon as we got to the ladder to climb back out of shaft alley, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the weld craft supervisor came down into shaft alley looking for me. He told me he called me twice and my phone went straight to voice mail so that was why he came down there, he figured out where I was because he couldn't get through to me on the phone. He told me that everyone was looking for me because there was a fire on the Oscar Austin, up there where (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was working. As soon as we got up on the deck I saw all the lights from the fire department equipment flashing. So we both left the Cole and I proceeded to the Oscar Austin and when I got there I called (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and let him know that we had a fire on the Oscar Austin. I let him know that every one of my people was off the ship. I told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that the fire was where (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was working and I saw (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) sitting on a tool box at the head of Pier 6. I talked with

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from Safety and told him that I was told the fire was where (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was working at. We waited there until after the fire was out and the Fire trucks left. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told me to bring (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) around 10:00 pm to get a statement from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) We went to the safety office around 5 until 10:00 pm. We just missed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) because he was about 5 to 10 minutes late in getting back to Safety. We went back and the CHENG took (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to get his badge and he had to leave everything else there. While (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was there with the CHENG, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told me that the CHENG asked him where he was working and where did he have his fire watches posted. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told me to get a statement from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and give it to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I took (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to building 620 and he wrote his statement and signed it and I came back and gave the statement to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in Safety. It was like 1 in the morning and I wrote my night notes and let them know hot work was secured on the Cole and the Oscar Austin. I put what we were doing on both jobs. I wrote a night note for building 620 as well and sent a copy of all three night notes by email to all DLVANK_NightShiftSuperintendents. And I cc'd all the supervisors on the jobs so they would get a copy. I sent them to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I put my time in and went home around 2:00 am.

GENERAL QUESTIONS	
Question:	**How long have you worked at BAE Systems NSR?** Since 2008
Question: **If yes,**	**Did you report the incident to your supervisor?** Yes **What is the name of the supervisor you reported the injury to?** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Question:	**Did you report the incident to the main gate?** No, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told the ship's force that the black smoke was too thick and the Navy went down and looked and came back and called the main gate and told them they needed to call the fire department.
Question:	**What do you think could have prevented this incident from occurring?** I think that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cut approximately 6 inches that were too close to the bulkhead. He should have kept 4 inches off the bulkhead so that he could have seen what he was doing. I don't know why he did something different that night, he had been working off the bulkhead for over a month, staying off the bulkhead and then proceeding closer to the bulkhead so he could see what he was doing. That's why I didn't insist the other mechanic work there because he had been doing this work for over a month.
Question:	**Were there any other witnesses?** None other than his fire watches.

TASK

Question: **If not, Why?**	**Was a Safe Work Procedure used?** No He made his cut too close to bulkhead. He was doing it safe before, but on this day he was too close to the bulkhead.
Question:	**Had conditions changed to make the normal procedure unsafe?** No, the conditions were the same.
Question:	**Were the appropriate tools and materials available?** Yes
Question:	**Were the proper tools being used?** Yes
Question:	**Were safety devices working properly?** Yes

MATERIAL	
Question:	**Was there an equipment failure?** No
Question:	**Were hazardous materials or substances involved?** No

ENVIRONMENT	
Question:	**What were the weather conditions?** It was just cool **Right Click -> Open Hyperlink: (NOAA 3 Day Weather) (NOAA Tides)**
Question:	**Was poor housekeeping a problem?** No
Question:	**Was it too hot or too cold?** No
Question:	**Was noise a problem?** No
Question:	**Was there adequate light? Yes**
Question:	**Were toxic or hazardous gases, dusts, or fumes present before he started work?** No

PERSONNEL	
Question:	**Were workers, on this job site, experienced in the work being done?** Yes
Question:	**Had they been adequately trained?** Yes
Question:	**Could they physically do the work?** Yes

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MANAGEMENT	
Question:	**Were safety rules communicated to and understood by all employees?** Yes
Question:	**Were written references and specific jobsite safety procedures available for their review if needed?** Yes
Question:	**Were Safety Procedures being enforced?** Yes
Question:	**Was there adequate supervision on the Oscar Austin?** Yes
Question:	**Had a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) been filled out?** Yes, it should have been, I gave one to them.
If yes,	**Who has possession of the original JHA?** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said he has it. **Note: The original JHA must be obtained for this file.**
Question:	**Was regular maintenance of equipment carried out?** Yes
Question:	**Were regular safety inspections carried out? Yes**

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Question	Is there anything you wish to add to this statement?
Answer:	No
Question	Did you understand all of the questions that I have asked you?
Answer:	Yes
Question	Were all of your answers true to the best of your knowledge?
Answer:	Yes

This investigation is closed within the files of this office, pending receipt of further amplifying information of investigative value.

Employee's Name	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
Employee's Job Title	Craft 1 Plate Shop Supervisor	**Employee's Badge #**	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Employee's Signature & Date	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	11-13-18	

Safety Department Information

Interviewer's Name	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
Interviewer's Job Title	Safety Technician III	**Interviewer's Badge #**	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Interviewer's Signature & Date	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	13 November 2018	

Initials of Person Making Statement (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To Whom it may

I was working on the Oscar Austin 03 level starboard Side burning job put all the ~~wat~~ firewatch in areas that needed and started burning about 8 min stopping to take a break before I could start black smoke was coming all over and got two buckets of water and poured on my area smoke coming all over I told everybody to Avociate area I went to the Quarterdeck and Reported it was black Smoke in area Where I was working

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

11/10/18

Enclosure (9)

Enclosure (10)





ITEM	EXISTING PLATE	REPLACEMENT OPTION A SAME MATERIAL GRADE AS EXISTING	SF REQD
0	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	[illegible]
1	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	[illegible]
2	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	[illegible]
3	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	[illegible]
4	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	[illegible]
5	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	[illegible]
6	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	95
7	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	135
8	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	122
9	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	113
10	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	114
11	1/4" THK DH-36	3/8" THK	7.5
12	1/4" THK DH-36	3/8" THK	7.5
13	3/8" THK DH-36	1/2" THK	17
14	3/8" THK DH-36	1/2" THK	19
15	3/16" THK DH-36	5/16" THK	20

(50) ITEM 50 IS FOR MATERIAL TO REPLACE B.E.R.P.s ON DOC 76, 77, 79, 81, & 83 EXISTING IS 3/16" DH-36. REPLACE WITH 43 SQ. FT. 5/16" DH-36.

- ITEM 15 IS FOR TOTAL MATERIAL TO REPLACE 3" HIGH ACCESS CUTS AT BOTTOM OF HOUSE SIDES.

SHIPALT DDG-51-AE83007
INSTALL 03 LVL DECK PLATING FR 160-193 COMPLETE REPLACEMENT

F 53711 110 8570484 B


PLAN 24-7A
INSTALL 03 LVL DECKPLATES
03 LVL FR 160 THRU 193
DECK EDGE AT 03 LVL
DECK EDGE AT 04 LVL
SEE PARTIAL PLAN 29-4D
SEE LOCAL NOTES
INSTALL MANHOLES RETAINED FROM RIP-OUT
SIM 14
1 1/2" TYP
TYP
NOTE:
REMOVE DECK PLATE FROM BERP MOUNTING RING
SEE PARTIAL PLAN 13-7D
NOTE:
FOR BERP SEE GENERAL NOTE 23 & SPECIAL NOTE 57
INSTALL BERP AND FASTENERS RETAINED FROM RIP-OUT
INSTALL AVMC RETAINED FROM RIP-OUT
INSTALL MANHOLE RETAINED FROM RIP-OUT
SEE PARTIAL PLAN 29-2C
SEE LOCAL NOTES
20
CL SHIP
FR 160
LOCAL NOTES:
1. SIZE AND LOCATION OF PARTIAL DECK REPAIR TO BE DETERMINED BY LOCAL ISEA AT TIME OF SHIP CHECK.
2. MATERIAL FOR PARTIAL DECK REPAIR IS DETERMINED BY SIZE OF REPAIR REQUIRED, SEE CN 28.
SHIPALT DDG-51-AE83002
INSTALL 03 LVL DECK
PLATING FR 160-193
PARTIAL REPLACEMENT
F 53711 110 8570464 B


DDG-79 ONLY
DECK PLATING

ELECTRONIC WORK AUTHORIZATION FORM SYSTEM (EWAFS)

UNCLASSIFIED

Product of NSWCM

Home Start WAF Search WAFs Username: (b) (6) NAVY.MIL [Logout]

Main >> WAFs >> View WAF

Help

View WAF

Add Attachment | | Add TWD Record Sheet | Copy To New WAF | Print Preview

Est. Work Start Date: 09 May 2018	Est. Num. Days: 120	Est. Work Complete Date: 05 Sep 2018	
1. Unit: DDG-79 USS OSCAR AUSTIN	2. System: Increas Plate Thickness 05 & 06 LVL	3. WAF No.: DDG-79-00592-00000-2018	Work Center:
4. JSN/Work Item #: 150-80-001	5. Division/LWC/RA: BMF/ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
6. Technical Work Document: Ref 2.2 110-85704464 Rev B			
7. Job Description: ShipALT remove increase deck plate thickness 05 06 LEVELS as per spec item.			

PREPARATION FOR WORK

8. Post Work Testing As Specified:
○ Below ○ In The TWD ◉ No Test Required ○ Formal Test Program

9. Restrictions/Precautions/Remarks:
06 Mar 2018 13:50 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) For what space?

10. Division/Repair Activity Ready To Commence Work
LPO/Div. Off./RA: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date:08 May 2018 14:12

AUTHORIZATION TO WORK

12. Concurrences:

13. Tagout Required: ☐ (NO)
SYSTEM/COMPONENT IS LINED UP FOR WORK, A TAGOUT IS HUNG, VERIFIED AND SIGNED BY THE REPAIR ACTIVITY (IF REQUIRED) AND SHIP
☐ Awaiting RA Signature (NO)
Tagout/Line Item Status
Watch/Duty Officer: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date: 08 May 2018 14:20

14. PLANT/SHIP CONDITIONS (E.G. DRAINED, DE-PRESSURIZED, DE-ENERGIZED) SET. DIVISION/RA IS AUTHORIZED TO START WORK
Watch/Duty Officer: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date: 08 May 2018 14:20
Repair Activity: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date: 08 May 2018 15:20
WAFCOR: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Date: 08 May 2018 15:27

Edit

NOTIFICATION OF WORK COMPLETION

15. Restrictions/Precautions/Remarks:
Add Comment

16. Work Is Complete LPO/DIV OFF or RA: Sign Date:	17. Testing Is Complete WATCH/DUTY OFF or RA: Date:

18. WAF Closed Out
WAFCOR: Date: RA: Date: WATCH/DUTY OFF: Date:

NIGHT NOTES

VESSEL:	*USS Oscar Austin*					11/10/2018	
CONT. NO	*5101411*						
SUPERINTENDENT			Cell #		NAME	TELEPHONE	CELL#
Harris				D.S.SUPV.	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
				N.S.SUPV.			
NIGHT SUPT.		TEL. #	PAGE #	3RD.SUPV.			

Location Of Ship		* INDICATES PRIORITY ** OVERTIME AS REQUIRED
SHOP	ITEM	HRS
01	150-80-001	Continue making up PC#5 STBD 03 weather deck as directed
		No work, continue working
	150-80-001	Continue grinding in way of PC#1 going into Array #3 as directed
		Worked, continue working.
	150-80-001	Cut BHD for FWD stack in way of new deck install as directed
		no work, continue working.
	150-80-001	Continue scraping out PC#4 port side 03 weather deck (Do not cut into ward rm galley)
		No work, continue working.
	468-90-002	Insert deck sonar#2 (2-18-0-Q) as directed
		Worked, continue working
		Ship was secured because of a fire on board. Empolyees mustard at the head of the pier.
		Cover up for weather at end of ship as directed
		CLEAN UP ALL SPACES AT END OF SHIFT

CLEAN UP YOUR WORK SITE @ END OF SHIFT
"SAFETY, NOT JUST A WORD, A LIFESTYLE"

ATTACH HOT WORK NOTICES TO NIGHT NOTE

NOR-F(96)-PO3//

Enclosure (11)

BAE SYSTEMS

SHOP WORK REQUEST

44067

Contract/Project No.	Item/Task No.	Contract/ Project Name	Month	Day	Y
5101411	150-80-001	USS Oscar Austin	11	10	18

INSTRUCTIONS:

	START	1	2	3	4	5	SHIP
Remove lag from overhead of compartment (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 State RM	01	111					
will be marked							

Ordered By: Name, Shop, Badge	Delivered By: Name, Shop, Badge
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	

70.11 .06A- 11/94 NOR-F(96)-P07

Enclosure (12)

This Hot Work Permit ... specified, or cond... ...ts a shorter period of time is ... status in the location(s) below

Start Date: 11/10/2018	Start Time: 07:15:00	Permit Expiration Date and Time: 11/11/2018 7:15:00 AM

Note: This permit is effective for a maximum of 24 hours from start date & time.

Ship or Vessel:	USS Oscar Austin
Compartment Name:	03 Weather deck fr 160/194 (#1)
Compartment #:	03 Weather deck fr 160/194 (#1)
Ship's Contract #:	5101411
Ship's Item #:	321-80-001
Shop:	01
Fire Watch Count:	0
Lock Out/Tag Out Required?	Yes No

Type of Work:
Air Arcing ✓ Grinding Blast
Brazing Stainless Welding Brush & Roll
✓ Cutting ✓ Welding Spray
Other (list below)

Marine Chemist Certificate (MCC)/Shipyard Competent Person (SCP) Required in Space or Adjacent Space or System? Yes No

Trade

Location in Compartment: Deck Bulkhead OVHD Stanchion **Piping System:** Upper LVL Mid LVL Lower LVL

Compartment Type: Confined Enclosed ✓ Open

Current Gas Free Status

Enter with Restrictions Inert Atmosphere Limited Hot Work Not Required Not Safe for Hot Work Not Safe For Workers ✓ Safe For Hot Work ✓ Safe For Workers

Safety/MCC/SCP Instructions Gas Free Scope & Log:

Enter with Restrictions? (List Restrictions)

Adjacent/Affected Spaces, Name & Compartment Numbers: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 [redacted]-A STRM (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130

Scope of Work: Replace ... deck

Supv Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) **Supv Signature:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) **Supv Badge:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) **Supv Phone #:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

... Acknowledgement

... Date:

... Fire Watch ... Permit Authorizing Individual (PAI) Shift Condition Verification

NOV 09 2018

(II.A) HWO is complete, Each FW is validate, and PAI to verify conditions 1-11 below.

#	Condition	HWO 1st SAT	1st N/A	2nd SAT	2nd N/A	3rd SAT	3rd N/A	PAI 1st	PAI 2nd	PAI 3rd
1	Compliant fire extinguisher(s) (seal, pin, tag, & charged)	✓		✓				✓	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	
2	Hot work areas clear of combustibles (35 FT) or covered with fire retardant material & clear of flammable liquids (50 FT)	✓		✓				✓		
3	The SCP log has been updated daily or as often as necessary to maintain atmospheric conditions		✓	✓				✓		
4	MCC/Gas Free Log, Gas Free Work Scope specified, read & verified by each HWO & FW		✓	✓				✓		
5	Qualified FW assigned (must have proof of qualification)	✓		✓				✓		
6	HWO ensures FW has immediate access and established communications	✓		✓				✓		
7	Ensure proper working ventilation established in all required areas	✓		✓				✓		
8	Paint removed a minimum of 4 inches from hot work on all affected surfaces	✓		✓						
9	Lagging removed a minimum of 12 inches from the area of hot work & remaining lagging is covered.	✓		✓						
10	No hot work within 50 feet of a dust collector, fuel cell or flammable liquid storage locker	✓		✓						
11	HWO verifies Lockouts/Tags-plus (if required)		✓	✓						

(II.B) Each FW must verify HWO II.A conditions and fill in the rows below, PAI must validate and authorize PRIOR to work start.

Shift	Name (Last, First) & Company Name	Badge #	Signature	Time	Comments
1st	Stvels Jessica ACMCA		(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	730	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1st	Hendrick Diana Aetna		(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	730	
1	[illegible]		(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
2nd	DeSean AFR	1281	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	6:00	
2nd	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	15..	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		
	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	130			

HOT WORK PERMIT ... OSHA 1915
Reference: NFPA 51B / ... 009-08
NAVSEA Standard Item ...

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

FORM NUMBER:
NOR-F-(96)-3687

This Hot Work Permit is valid for 24 hours unless a shorter period of time is ... Loss of gas free status in the location(s) below ... specified, or conditions change ... (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cancels this Hot Work Permit.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ... HWO must fill in the rows below. PAI must validate and authorize PRIOR to work start.

Shift	Name	Badge #	Signature	Time	Qualification Date / Comments
1st	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	8AM	
1	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	8:00	
1st	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	8:00	
1st	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	8:00	
1	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	8:00	

II.B PAI must verify the conditions listed in II.A are satisfactory and fill in the rows below to authorize the start of hot work.

Shift	Name	Badge #	Signature	Time	Comments
1st	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	2:12	
2	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	5:07	

Shift	Time	PAI Name	PAI Badge #	PAI Signature	Comments

Signature	Date	Time	Comments

HWO or PAI Signature:

This section ... permit shall be removed and ... with the ...

PLEASE NOTE: Upon completion of work, remove and retain this form for Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) in accordance with company policy.

...: (1) Provide a copy for PAI, Supervisor & Ships Designated Representative. (2) Post a ... worksite.

FORM VSRA-HWP-1.3, REV ...

Enclosure ...

HOT WL

Enclosure (4)

ITEM #	COMP #	COMP NAME	WORK TO BE DONE	DATE ENTERED	DATE	FIRE MARSHALL	COMPANY
18-29722	04-159-1-L	HEAD	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	BMF
18-29723	05 LVL	WTHR DECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29724	5-370-0-F	FUEL TANK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29725	05 LVL	WTHR DECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29726	04-150-4-A	CG LOCKER	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29727	04-150-0-C	CHART ROOM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29728	04-158-2-L	CO SEA CABIN	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29729	1-220-01-C	CREW MESSDECK	GRINDING/WELDING/STAINLESS WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29730	05-131-0-Q	DIRECTOR RM	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29731	04-154-4-A	FOUL WTHR GEAR LOCKER	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29732	3-370-0-E	3 GEN	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29733	03-154-2-L	P WAY	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		BMF
18-29734	1-174-01-L	P WAY	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29735	1-78-2-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/STAINLESS WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29736	1-78-1-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29737	1-338-8-Q	HELO BAY PORT	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29738	1-370-2-Q	SSGTG EXH TRK	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29739	1-338-3-Q AWAY FROM 370-382	HELO	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29740	1-370-1-Q	AVN STRM 2	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29741	02-158-4-Q	WARDROOM GALLEY	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/STAINLESS WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29742	3-382-0-D	FAN RM	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29743	1-181-0-Q	CREW/CPO GALLEY	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/STAINLESS WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29744	3-300-2-L	HEAD	GRINDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29745	3-325-1-L	HEAD	GRINDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29746	01-158-4-L	XO STATEROOM	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29747	01 LVL WEATHERDECK PORT	FR 244	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29748	02 LVL WEATHERDECK PORT	FR 203	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29749	1-84-1-Q	DISBURSING OFFICE	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		TECNICO
18-29750	4-174-0-E	MMR 1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29751	4-256-0-E	MMR 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29752	FR 284-286 CRANE	01 WEATHERDECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29753	01-118-1-L	BREEZE WAY STUFFING TUBE	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29754	01-118-4-L	P BREEZ WAY	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29755	FR 160/184	03 WEATHERDECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29756	FR 160/184	03 WEATHERDECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29757	FR 243-246	ANT PLATFORM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29758	FR 216/221	ANT PLATFORM 05 LVL	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29759	4-126-0-E	AUX 1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29760	4-220-0-E	AUX 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29761	4-128-0-C	CIC	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29762	01-300-2-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29763	FR398/475	FLIGHT DECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29764	FR398/475	FLIGHT DECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29765	FWD MAST FR 168	FWD MAST	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29766	04-150-2-L	PILOT HOUSE	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29767	04 FR 145/157	PORT BRIDGE WING	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29768	03-128-0-C	RADAR 1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29769	01-274-1-C	RADAR 3	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29770	03-142-0-C	RADAR 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29771	2-81-0-C	SONAR 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29772	1-81-0-C	SONAR 1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29773	2-81-0-C	SONAR CONT 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29774	FR145/157	PORT BRIDGE WING	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		PLATE SHOP
18-29775	2-126-1-C	COMM/CENTRAL	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29776	2-152-0-C	MAHAWK EQPT RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	IRF
18-29777	2-400-1-C	PASSAGE WAY	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29778	1-78-01-C	PASSAGE WAY	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29779	2-82-2-C	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29780	2-126-2-C	OSER 1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29781	1-126-0-C	CIC	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29782	1-126-0-C	CIC	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29783	2-126-2-C	OSER 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29784	3126-2-C	ALT POWER	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		IRF
18-29785	01-274-1-C	RADAR 3	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		SHEET METAL
18-29786	03-142-0-C	RADAR 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		SHEET METAL
18-29787	1-300-0-C	OSER 3	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18		SHEET METAL

HOT WORK

SERIAL #	COMP #	COMP NAME	WORK TO BE DONE	DATE ENTERED	DATE	#	FIRE MARSHALL	COMPANY
18-29788	2-53-1-C	CSER 1	STAINLESS WELDING/WELDING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1	(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	SHEET METAL
18-29789	04-166-2-P	AT SEA CABIN	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		SHEET METAL
18-29790	1-126-0-C	CIC	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		SHEET METAL
18-29791	01-300-2-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		SHEET METAL
18-29792	4-126-0-E	AUX 1	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29793	03-142-1-C	CSER 4	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29794	01-300-1-C	MT 22	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29795	1-300-1-C	CSER 3	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29796	01-200-2-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29797	02-174-1-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29798	02-188-0-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29799	02-242-0-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29800	02-284-0-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29801	03-174-0-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29802	03-242-0-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29803	05-130-0-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29804	3-370-0-E	3 GEN	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29805	4-174-0-E	MER 1	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29806	4-254-0-E	MER 2	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29807	01-274-1-C	RADAR 3	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29808	3-300-1-E	RADAR RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29809	03-142-0-C	RADAR 2 #1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29810	4-870-5-A	SPLY DEPT STRM #3	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29811	04-150-0-C	CHART ROOM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29812	1-297-1-E	PWAY	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		PIPE SHOP
18-29813	01 FR 284/288 CRANE	W THR DECK STBD	GRINDING/WELDING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29814	01-174-0-Q	INTK/UPTK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29815	01-280-01-Q	FAN RM	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29816	01 FR160/164	W THR DECK	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29817	1-388-2-Q	INTAKE	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29818	03-128-2-Q	ARRAY 2	GRINDING/WELDING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29819	1-125-0-C	CIC #2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29820	3-370-0-E	3 GEN	GRINDING/BRAZING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29821	02-174-0-Q	INTAKE	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29822	03-128-0-C	RADAR 1	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29823	01-274-1-C	RADAR 3	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29824	03-142-0-C	RADAR 2	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29825	02-86-0-Q	UPTAKE	GRINDING/WELDING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		WELD SHOP
18-29826	05-130-0-C	PILOT HOUSE	GRINDING/WELDING/CUTTING	9-Nov-18	10-Nov-18	1		BMF

BAE SYSTEMS
INSPIRED WORK

STOP WORK POLICY

Any Employee has the authority and the responsibility to stop work if an unsafe condition is noted. Contact your Supervisor immediately.

PRE-SHIFT JOB HAZARD ANALYSIS (JHA) / SAFE PLAN OF ACTION (SPA)

Job / Task Description: 03 Deck Repair

Work Area: (i.e. ship name, shop, location) Oscar Austin

Date: 11 10 18

Craft/Department: 01

Job / Project # 510 14 11

Item # 3a1 80 001

Supervisor (i.e. project manager, crew leader) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130

HIRADC (Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Determining Controls)

Use your shop's HIRADC for assistance identifying hazards that you might encounter. If the HIRADC does not address the associated risk inform your supervisor so they can contact safety to update the HIRADC.

STOP Work.

SPEND AT LEAST ONE (1) MINUTE AND HAVE ALL EMPLOYEES OBSERVE THEIR SURROUNDINGS AND IDENTIFY POSSIBLE HAZARDS (Identify and list all potential safety hazards. Ensure all team members are aware of the hazards)

TASK HAZARD / RISK ASSESSMENT

HAZARDS / RISK	SAFE PLAN / CONTROL MEASURES
Block 1. Hazards identified before work begins:	
Welding	Cover effected Areas
Block 2. Hazards in the surrounding area that can affect the task:	
Burning	Fire Watches properly
Block 3. Hazards identified while performing task:	
Scratches	Watch out for others when grinding

IF THE PLAN CHANGES DURING THE DAY THE FORM MUST BE UPDATED AND RESIGNED, OR A NEW A FORM MUST BE COMPLETED.



CHECKLIST

Welding Screen
Other

Trained
CP form posted and updated
Lighting
Marine Chem Cert posted
Gas Free Work Scope
Ventilation
Other

Access ladder
Other

Trained operator
Daily Inspection Completed
Is Tag Out Authorized
Other

(Limited Voltage) hard hat
E (Hi-voltage) hard hat
Communications (radio, cell phone, etc.)
Other

HAND/POWER TOOLS
Inspected
Guards in place
Handles attached
Personal Protective Equipment
Cord condition
Other

WAF & TAG OUT
Is a WAF Required
Is WAF Approved
Is WAF Posted

RESPIRATORY PROTECTION
Natural &/or Mechanical Ventilation
OVC Cartridge
HEPA Filter
Half face
Full face
Full face airline
Fixed barricades
Breathe air monitor
Other

ELECTRICAL
Clear of Water
Cord Condition
Is Tag Out Required
Is Tag Out Authorized
Lockout/Tag Out Conducted by
Has Tag Out been Checked by RA
Clear of walkways / crane rails
Quarterly ground fault inspection
Other

HOT WORK OPERATIONS
Work Area Identified & Assessed
Fire Protection
Fire Watch
Fire blanket
Gas Free Work Scope
Drop Test conducted
Hot Work Permit
Flash Curtain
PAI Signed
Other

HOUSEKEEPING
have been identified and are
leads are properly ran and do
marked or barricaded
hazardous conditions
Other.

FALL PROTECTION
Working from Man Lift
Working Above 5 feet
Harness w/Lanyard or Retractable
Personal Flotation Device (PFD)
Guardrails
Anchor Point above shoulders
Tank Guards
Other

Safety Data Sheet (SDS) formerly MSDS
Airborne contaminates
Heavy Metals
Other
Monitoring required
Spill Kit Available
Asbestos

a and all employees are aware of possible hazards and have been provided proper protective
injuries.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Sign (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Si (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Si (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

S (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

4/4/44

08/91


(b)(5), (b)(6)


(b)(5), (b)(6)


(b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(5), (b)(6)



Enclosure (19)

At approximately 1730 the quarterdeck (QD) reported to the Fire Marshal via hand held radio that a Contractor reported white smoke on the 03 level. I was in the barge wardroom reviewing paperwork when I heard the report and immediately exited the wardroom to go to the ship via the barge rooftop. As soon as I got outside I saw the smoke and interrupted the radio communications and ordered the QD to call away the casualty on the 1MC. By this time I was already on the barge rooftop so was unable to hear if this occurred due to the 1MC not transmitting topside.

When I reached the DC locker on the flight deck I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) entering the starboard helo hangar, where I deduced he was proceeding to the 03 level to investigate the casualty as a Rapid Responder. I also heard the Engineering Duty Officer (EDO), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on the radio trying to reach either the Fire Marshall or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I again interrupted the communications and asked her where she was. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) replied that she was in the Central Controlling Station (CCS), where I deduced she was on watch. I ordered her to report to the locker.

I walked from the locker to the QD to speak with the Officer of the Deck (OOD) when I noticed Sailors started arriving at the locker from the barge. The OOD reported that he had already contacted BAE using the emergency phone and that a BAE Contractor had come to the QD to report the white smoke and stated there was a person trapped in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 During my conversation, the EDO arrived at the locker and immediately began directing personnel.

It was about this time that several BAE personnel were exiting the starboard helo hangar. I stopped the workers and questioned them. I discovered that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of NSC, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the person who I stopped, was burning holes in the deck in the vicinity of tanks on the 03 level at frames 167 and 168, near (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 I asked if all of his personnel were accounted for and he stated that he had 3 personnel working with him and not everyone was there yet. I took down his information and directed him to stay on the flight deck and let me know when all of his people were accounted for.

I observed that the EDO had things under control at the locker and attack teams were getting dressed out, so I informed the Commanding Officer (CO) of the white smoke via text message. According to the time stamp on my cell phone, this was at 1938. At about 1950 the Fire Marshall from USS COLE reported to the QD to offer assistance. I told him we needed another attack team and directed him to the EDO. He immediately began coordinating assistance with his ship via hand held radio as he proceeded to the EDO for additional information.

At about this time I heard a report on the radio that there was a class A fire in the wardroom. At approximately 2000 I confirmed that the OOD had contacted BAE and he said he had done so twice already. I then called BAE myself utilizing the emergency phone. The male who answered stated that he didn't know we needed assistance and was waiting on the word from us if we needed help or not. I clearly stated "We need help NOW" and briefed him on the

status of the casualty. At 2004 I called the CO to provide an update. I provided additional updates to the CO via text at 2009, 2010, and 2022. After I was off the phone with the CO I spoke to the BAE representative who had arrived onboard inquiring about the situation. I relayed what I knew and provided my contact information and then this individual left the ship; I did not get his name. A short time later the Entry Control Point (ECP) reported that Norfolk Fire Department was on scene and was trying to figure out how to get their trucks on the pier.

At approximately 2010 I received a report that there was a class C fire in forward Officer Country and we needed to secure power to the ship. I called BAE on the emergency phone and asked for power to the ship to be secured. At 2012 I received a report that the class C fire appeared to be out. Attack teams stayed on the scene. A short while later we began a muster of personnel. The CO arrived onboard about 2025 and I briefed her on the situation. At 2026 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) N4 at Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 26, called and I informed him of the situation. At 2035 I called the Damage Control Assistant (DCA) and ordered her to come in. At 2045 I called the DESRON Staff Duty Officer (SDO) and informed her of the situation. At 2100 I attempted to call our Operations Officer (OPS), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) so that he could come in to start a SITREP, but received no answer; I did leave a voicemail. I followed up immediately with a text. We finally connected at 2103. At 2106 I informed the Department Heads of the incident for situational awareness.

At about 2150 the DCA began preparing to enter the spaces for initial atmospheric testing. The initial reports DCA made from the scene indicated the spaces were not safe for personnel. At approximately 2230 I began discussing potential desmoking methods with the EDO and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) It was determined that ventilating without power would require extension cords, so I contacted BAE facilities via phone at 2242. At the same time, ship's force escorted a team from the Norfolk Fire Department to the wardroom to meet DCA with a battery operated fan similar to our RAM fan. At approximately 2255 DCA returned from the scene and provided pictures as well as additional information on the condition of the spaces. The spaces were deemed safe for personnel at this point so DCA led the CO, Executive Officer (XO), me, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the scene to document the damage. While at the scene the Norfolk Fire Department requested to depart the ship, which the CO granted. During the inspection we observed a purse in perfectly good condition and a fire extinguisher with the pull pin and tamper seal intact in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 We returned to the flight deck at approximately 2340.

Sometime after 0000 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) returned to the ship to retrieve his belongings. I told him that it was likely that his items had been burned, but he insisted they wouldn't be. I considered this information and decided that it would be beneficial to get his account of what happened prior to the incident. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I escorted (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the 03 level, directly behind (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 where he was working. He pointed out the spot where he was burning and where his Fire Watch was located (approximately 15 feet behind him, seated on a rectangular cardboard box). I observed a fire extinguisher with the pull pin and tamper seal

intact a few feet in front of the location of the Fire Watch. Before proceeding, I allowed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to retrieve his hard hat and security badge from the scene, but required him to leave his jacket in place. We then proceeded to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 where he stated his second Fire Watch was located near the previously observed purse and unused fire extinguisher. He had some difficulty locating the spot where his third Fire Watch was located due to the disarray of the spaces. Throughout the search (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) profusely apologized and was genuinely surprised that the spaces were in such poor shape. He was in disbelief that his work caused such extensive damage. Eventually he found the correct space, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 which contained the two voids at frame 167 and 168. In the space I observed another fire extinguisher with the pull pin and tamper seal intact, as well as a stool that is not normally stowed in the space. We then returned to the flight deck and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) left the ship.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I then escorted the CO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the location where (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had just showed me he was working. I relayed what I had learned to the CO and then she departed the group since she had already seen the damage inside the skin of the ship. One person remaining in the group removed the two hot work chits that were posted. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I continued to show (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the same spots (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had pointed out, as well as the surrounding damaged spaces. After they thoroughly documented the damage, we returned to the flight deck, where I insisted they allow me to take pictures of the hot work chits that were removed from the scene. Afterwards, they left the ship.

I then proceeded to the barge wardroom to check-in with the CO and XO. At about 0015 DCA secured the original DC plates in her stateroom, placed unused plates in the locker, and departed the ship. A brief time later I checked-in with OPS and the Combat Information Center Officer (CICO) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to ensure they had all the information required to send a SITREP. They informed me that they had everything they needed, showed me a copy of the drafted SITREP, which the CO had already reviewed, and stated it would be sent shortly. I then checked-in with the EDO to retrieve the Engineering Log. I was informed that the EDO stopped making entries in the log during the casualty. The last entry she made was "Fire reported…" at 1934. I instructed her to transcribe the events contained in the Deck Log. It wasn't until several hours later that I realized this was not what I should have done, so at that time I chose to add an entry that discussed the discrepancy rather than re-write the log, which is not authorized. Next, I collected all the scratch paper used in the locker and on the QD, as well as the DC plates from DCA's stateroom to secure in the CO's cabin before her departure.

Knowing there would be a lot of visitors on 11 NOV to inquire about the incident, I proceeded to prepare the wardroom (pre-stage coffee, donuts, etc.) Before going to sleep for the night I retrieved the original Deck Log and the completed deck log and secured them in my stateroom. I finally went to sleep about 0330 on 11 NOV.

Throughout the entire incident I observed OSCAR AUSTIN Sailors acting quickly and selflessly. The Sailors from USS COLE performed superbly as well and did everything professionally and without delay. The EDO did an amazing job of controlling the situation and keeping the CO and me informed. Also of note, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did a great job of motivating Sailors. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) proved essential by keeping track of everyone's location. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was keeping meticulous tabs of the situation from inside the locker. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did a fantastic job of keeping equipment organized and personnel properly equipped. The remainder of the duty section was putting forth 110% non-stop effort to keep things under control at the scene.

While Norfolk Fire Department did not provide any personnel for the attack teams, they did assist with our injured personnel, refilled our SCBA bottles quickly, and provided a team and equipment to assist with atmospheric testing. They remained courteous and professional throughout the incident.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I was the Officer of the Deck for the 1700 to 2200 watch, the watch had been pretty quiet until about 1930. It was then we had about 3 contractors come to the quarterdeck to report that there was white smoke on the 02 level, no other information was given at the point by the contractors and they departed the ship before they would let me get any information. At the same time I had my Petty Officer of the Watch call the casualty away. I knowing that most people in the duty section have radios on them called the casualty away over the radio as well. This was to allow a faster response from those with a radio and immediate actions from the rest of my watch standers not on the quarterdeck. I had my topside rover make sure that the emergency brow was open in case anybody on the ship to get off and had my ECP to secure and restrict access to the pier. Once the report was made over the barge and the ship 1MCs, I picked up the red emergency phone to call away the casualty to BAE and requested for emergency assistance. Within minutes duty personnel continued to respond to the casualty as trained and directed the reports came in that the white smoke was in fact a fire. I immediately picked up the red phone again and updated BAE that we did have a fire onboard and again requested emergency services immediately including the fact of the possibility of a missing BAE personnel might be trapped in a space. The duty section responded amazing with timely response and amazing team work to put the fire out. Within 5 minutes the fire marshal from the USS COLE had come over to the ship stating they had an extra attack team on the way and addition personnel dressing out at their locker to help out, we gladly accepted. At this time I was between the helping communicate messages with the locker on broken messages and USS COLE personnel coming on and off the ship to the USS COLE. After about 15 more minutes and no emergency services still onboard we called BAE for the emergency services for the 3rd time. Now I want to say I made sure during each of the 3 phone calls I told them that we needed them to call the fire department and medical services. The duty section was well engaged with the fire. My watch standers we logging as much information as possible to keep an accurate timeline of the events in the deck log. Finally, After about 30 minutes from the first call to BAE the Norfolk fire department showed up to the scene with ambulance on standby just in case. At this point we the teams of USS OSCAR AUSTIN and USS COLE had the fire contained and cooling hotspots. As the night continued I continued to keep my watch standers updated and in control of their posts, while contractor personnel continued to try to comeback onboard.

I don't remember much more in the amount of specifics or the timetable of what happened and when. However, the deck log is will be an accurate time table of what happened from my perspective from the Quarterdeck and watch stander stand point of what we heard and did.

I know that my watch team did everything we needed to do during the situation on hand to the best of our training and experience. I know that we wanted to do more during the fire to help the rest of our shipmates but we did what we could at the time as watch standers.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

On 10 November 2018, ~~at~~ on or about 1940, I heard a fire called away on the IMC. I immediately went to change into FFV's. Upon reporting to the repair locker, I teamed up with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and went to start investigating the fire. After having to change SCBA bottles twice, I made one final trip to the Pilot House to attempt to cool the deck with fire fighting water.

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

On the night of Nov 10 2018 I was laying in my rack when I heard over the radio that there was report of white smoke coming from ~~FH~~ A compartment. I jumped up got into battle dress and sprinted to the location. I was headed to the pilot house from the starboard side ladder well by CIC upon going up to the 01 level I grabed a CO2 bottle pulled pin and tested for agent. The test came back SAT so I proceeded to walk up the ladder to O Country when I seen that the fire was to big to fight with just CO2 so my CHEIF ordered me to report back to the repair locker. I got dressed out and went in with a hose team on the port side of O Country by the ward room my team started to combat the fire along side second hose team we fought the fire until we were relieved by a hose team from the USS COLE.

(b)(6)

13 Nov 2018

3 NOV 18

THE EVENTS OF 1 NOV 18. DURING THE WATCH OF THE 17-22. THE ALARM WAS SOUNDED FOR FIRE ON BOARD THIS SHIP. I COULD SEE SMOKE COMING OUT OF THE STARBOARD SIDE OF THE SHIP. I reported ~~the~~ to the repair LOCKER ON THE FLIGHT DECK, DRESSED OUT, and STOOD BY FOR ORDERS and DIRECTION. I joined a hose team and engaged the fire on the Starboard Side from CIC, AND REPEATED THIS UNTIL THE FIRE WAS OUT. AFTER the SMOKE CLEARS AND FIRE WAS OUT I ESCORTED the Norfolk Fire Department thru the affected spaces to install a vent fan and to gas free and Test the air quality of the Spaces.

I WAS WOKEN UP [redacted]. I GOT DRESSED AND WENT TO THE LOCKER FROM BERTHING. I QUICKLY DONNED FIRE FIGHTING GEAR AND WENT OUT AS INVESTIGATOR WITH [redacted] WE WENT UP THE STBD HELO HANGER LADDER-
C. WHEN WE GOT TO MID SHIPS A CONTRACTOR SAID A WOMAN COULD BE IN [redacted] WE ATTEMPTED TO ENTER FROM THE BRIDGE BUT AFTER 10 OR SO STEPS IN. WE HAD TO BACK OUT. WE WHEN ENTERED THE SHIP FROM THE HATCH THAT LEADS INTO PORT O-COUNTRY. WE THEN ATTEMPTED TO GO UP INTO THE RADAR SPACES. BUT STILL HAD Ø VISIBICITY. WE THEN STARTED LAYING OUT HOSES.
AT THIS POINT WE WENT AROUND THE CORNED AND SAW THE FIRE. MY VIBRALERT WENT OFF. [redacted] AT THIS POINT WAS AT THE SCENE WITH US. WE RETURNED TO THE LOCKER I GOT A NEW BOTTLE AND WENT BACK OUT WITH [redacted] WE WENT BACK IN THE SHIPS THROUGH THE PORT BREAK UP THE PORT LADDER WELL TO O-COUNTRY.
AT THIS POINT THE LOCKER ASKED US TO SEND THE TEAM BACK. THE POWER CUT OFF AND I TOLD THE LOCKER 1. FIRE APPEARS TO BE OUT. I TOLD THE TEAM TO GO BACK BUT THEY WOULDN'T TILL THEY WERE RELIEVED. WE THEN WENT UP THE PORT LADDER WELL INTO LOADCENTER ROOM 1 ONCE THAT WAS CLEAR WE WENT INTO [redacted] AND CLEARED THAT. AT WHICH POINT I HAD MY VIBRALERT GO OFF. WE RETURNED TO THE LOCKER. I RECEIVED A NEW BOTTLE AND WENT OUT WITH A FIRE TEAM TO COOL THE PILOT HOUSE. UPON MY BOTTLE RUNNING OUT I RETURNED TO THE LOCKER AND UNDONNED ALL MY GEAR.

[redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ON 10 NOV 18 AT APPROX 1930 I HEARD REPORTS OF WHITE SMOKE OVER MY CSOOW RADIO AS I WAS PREPARING TO SHOWER AND GO TO SLEEP FOR THE NIGHT. I PUT MY COVER BACK ON TURNED THE LIGHTS ON IN BERTHING AND RAN TO THE LOCKER ON THE FLIGHT DECK. YOU SEE SMOKE AND SMELL SMOKE AS SOON AS YOU WERE OUTSIDE. I WAS ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF INVESTIGATOR AND MY PARTNER WAS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) WE PRESSED OUT AND MADE OUR WAY TO THE CASUALTY. ON OUR WAY A CONTRACTOR TOLD US A FEMALE WAS TRAPPED IN EITHER A (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. OR (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 WE ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE HER BUT WE COULD NOT BECAUSE THE SMOKE WAS TOO THICK TO SEE THROUGH. WE CALLED OUT AND BANGED ON EQUIPMENT WITH NO RESPONSE. UPON BACKING OUT OF THAT LADDER WELL NEAR (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 WE FOUND TWO MEMBERS OF THE FIRE PARTY WITH A HOSE. WE HELPED FAKE A HOSE FOR THEM AND SPOTTED FLAMES NEAR THE WIRES STATEROOM. WE ATTACKED THE FLAMES AS LONG AS WE COULD TILL WE NEEDED TO LEAVE THE SCENE BECAUSE OF OUR SCBA'S. I RETURNED TO THE SCENE TWO MORE TIMES ONCE AS INVESTIGATOR AND ONCE AS TEAM LEADER FOR A USS COLE HOSE TEAM.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

UNOFFICIAL INCIDENT REPORT

PREPARED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DATE: 10NOV2018 TIME: 1926L

LOCATION: BAE REPAIR FACILITY

INCIDENT: CLASS A, C FIRE

T-1926 BAE Contractor reports white smoke on 03 Level, ship immediately notifies BAE via RED phone and manned INPORT emergency team.

T-1927 I assume duties as Locker Officer/Locker Leader. My EDO is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) My CDO is CHENG.

T-1930 Primary Boundaries are as follows (Unable to be set due to ongoing DMP repairs)

- PFWD 158
- PAFT 174
- SFWD 111
- SAFT 193

T-XXXX Rapid response team goes to the scene.

T-XXXX 2 Investigators out/go on air.

T-1953 USS COLE arrives onboard with personnel to assist.

T-1955 Class A fire reported IVO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and engaged by investigators and rapid response with CO2. CO2 was ineffective/Engaged fire using BAE firefighting water.

T-1955 BAE Contractor reports possible Female BAE worker trapped in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130

T-2005 BAE reports Norfolk Fire Department in route.

T-2006 5 Man hose team out/go on air.

T-2009 Class A fire engaged using BAE firefighting water.

T-2009 Fire reassessed as Class C fire.

T-2011 All Shore Electrical Services are secured to the ship.

T-2012 Class A appears to be out IVO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 and surrounding Wardroom Areas.

T-2017 8 inches of FFW on Deck.

T-2021 Norfolk Fire Department Arrive on the Pier.

T-2024 Hose team begins Cooling Bulkheads.

T-2025 4 Man Search team out to search (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 for possible BAE working.

T-2030 Search team reports (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 clear.

T-2034 2 Investigators out.

T-2033 8 inches of FFW on Deck.

T-2036 CO arrives onboard and is briefed of the ongoing casualty.

T-2041 2 Investigators out.

T-2044 BAE Reports All Personnel Accounted for.

T-2045 4 Man search team move begin assessing for hot spots and assisting Hose team.

T-2051 4 Man Team out to relieve hose team/go on air.

T-2055 5 Man Team returns to Locker/off air.

T-2059 2 Investigator out.

T-2102 Hot Spot found (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 Hot spot cooled using FFW.

T-2102 Fire out.

T-2103 4 Man team out to relieve hose team. /On air.

T-2113 5 Man team out to assist hose team and check for hot spots. /On air.

T-2122 2 inches of water on deck Pilot House.

T-2129 Hose team engaging Hot spots.

T-2132 4 Man Team returns to Locker/ Off air.

T-2134 4 Man Team returns to Locker/ Off air.

T-2137 5 Man Team returns to Locker/ Off air.

T-2138 All OSA personnel have returned to the Locker and all personnel are accounted for.

T-2157 TWO OSA Sailor reports to medical for evaluation due to smoke inhalation.

T-2201 2 Man Gas Free engineer team go out/On air.

T-2216 ONE OSA Sailor transported by on scene EMS to local hospital for further evaluation.

T-2240 1 Man escort out to escort Norfolk Fire Department to the Scene for atmospheric testing's and damage control assessments.

T-2256 Gas Free Team returns to the Locker/ Off air.

T-2304 CO/XO in route to scene to asses Damages.

T-2326 Norfolk Fire Department depart the Ship and Pier by permission of the CO.

T-2333 Atmospheric conditions safe for Personnel.

T-2341 CO/XO return to locker.

T-2350 I am relieve of my duties within the Locker.

Biggest set backs were initially we had trouble locating the exact location of the fire as it is that the smoke was so heavy fire teams had trouble seeing around. Once power was secured visibility was nearly zero and teams relied on each other to stay close and together as they moved through the ship. Securing of Power was absolutely vital in the success of combating this casualty. Tremendous amounts of electric wiring and debris obstructed passageways and made it very difficult to search the affected areas. Communications were limited but still effective and reports were constantly coming in via the investigators. USS Cole provided outstanding assistance. They were able to supply additional NIFTI devices and personnel for the follow on hose teams. We anticipated having to refill SCBA's and were able to put together an effective system of refilling bottles using the COLE's charging station. Additional bodies were used to transport empty bottles to be filled and then returned and set up for future use. Once Norfolk FD arrived they were able to provide with additional flashlights for the teams as well as portable "NIFTI like" devices to assistance in seeing through the smoke and they were able to assist in testing atmospheric conditions and deeming them safe for personnel. All in all everyone up and down the deck plates responded without hesitation and quickly contained and combated the casualty.

Events documented above are not of official report but simply my account of the events that occurred. Additional amplifying information can be found from the ships deck log as well as any other logs kept during our casualty.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

On Saturday night I was lying in my rack [illegible] time before my 22-02 when I heard the 1MC sound the fire alarm. I immediately got up and started yelling for everyone to get dressed and hurry up. I went out to the corner box and grabbed PPE and threw it on as fast as I could. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself ran as fast as we could to the scene, where there were about 4 contractors holding a fire hose by the Load Center right inside the STBD Breakr. They were fighting the fire by spraying water up the ladder well when we told them to leave.

I then grabbed the hose went on air and climbed up the ladder. ~~When I started~~ When I got up to the top of the ladder the entire ceiling for as far as I could see was on fire. I could barely see anything the smoke was so thick I couldnt even see the nozzle in my hand. The walls were on fire and I could see flames as far as I could see. I first sprayed the immediate area and cleared a spot to stand and then sprayed the hose and moved forward as much as I could but the heat was very intense. I sprayed from top to bottom and side to side until my mask started [illegible]. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were at the bottom of the ladder and feeding the hose up to me, we stayed and fought until I was out of air and then when I got out of the space and returned to the corner box.

After the corner box I got another SCBA pack on and went up to the scene that I was at with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to keep putting agent on the fire. The fire got to hot and it was clear that the spaces above us were on fire and we were quickly over ground from where we were at (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and it decided to go up to the port side and try to get up to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 area. We went to the port side and helped clear One got the hose charged and set up there and at some point I used a CO^2 bottle in EWD 0 country by the ward room but it pulled back because the walls were all on fire. I again then ran out of oxygen so went back to the corner box.

I got another SCBA pack on and people from the locker dressed me out when I escorted the Cole's hose team back up to the STBD side. Bucher had a team on the port side and I had a team on the STBD side.

BAE SYSTEMS
ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

(b)(5), (b)(6)



Incident Title: FIRE – USS OSCAR AUSTIN , PIER 6
Case Identification: 20181110-36

Status: Closed IR	Report Date/Time: Nov 10, 2018 21:28 EST
Custom Status:	Occurred on: Nov 10, 2018 19:30 EST
Priority:	Ended on: Nov 10, 2018 20:06 EST
Created by: (BAE - NSR) ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	Last Modified on: Nov 12, 2018 08:38 EST
Assigned to: (BAE - NSR) ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	

CC Recipient List

((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Person(s) Involved

Type of Involvement	Subject	Was subject arrested/referred?	No
Last Name	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	First Name	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Gender	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	Telephone No. (Include Extension)	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Comment	Works for NSC.		

Responding Agencies

Responding Agency	Fire	Responding Agency	Ambulance
Agency Name	Norfolk Fire Department	Officer Name	Battalion Chief/ Chadwick
Agency/Department report filed?	Yes	Report Number	Incident number 39156

Narrative

ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

At approximately 1930hrs on 11/10/18, ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) called BAE Main gate from the quarterdeck of the Oscar Austin, to inform the main gate officers that white smoke was seen coming from the 03 level, forward stack area of the forward deck house, starboard side. Initially 911 was not contacted as per the Oscar Austin request. Approximately 8 min later supervisors ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) responded to pier 6 and observed white smoke coming from the location previously stated. Supervisor ((b)(6), liaised with ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ((b)(6), (b)(7) ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that NSC personnel grinding in compartment (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 Forward (SHY) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 started as a small class "A" fire on the floor of that compartment. The fire became a class "C" fire and spread between frames 127 and 174. At this point ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) notified quarterdeck personnel of the fire. The officer of the desk immediately dispatched 2 fire teams from the Oscar Austin and requested assistance from the USS Cole who dispatched 2 fire teams as well. Approximately 15 min into fighting the fire, ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) equested that BAE Main Gate Officer contact the fire department for assistance. Norfolk Fire Department dispatched the following units, Engine 8, Ladder 8, Rescue 1, and Ladder 2. All Norfolk Fire Department personnel were supervised by Battalion 1's ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who generation incident number 39156.

Initial reports were that one unknown person was possibly trapped in a compartment below the affected area. These reports were false. No BAE or contract personnel were injured during the incident. In speaking with ((b)(6), (b)(7) he confirmed, that all personnel had gotten out prior to his reporting the fire to the Oscar Austin's quarterdeck. The fire was officially extinguished at 2006hrs.

11/12/18

The Safety Shop is leading the investigation of this incident. No additional information.

ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Attachments

Incident 10NOV18 Oscar Austin.pdf
Oscar Austin medical 10Nov18.pdf

History List

Nov 10, 2018 22:14	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	Open IR	Created
Nov 10, 2018 22:14		Open IR	Viewed
Nov 11, 2018 21:06		Open IR	Viewed
Nov 11, 2018 21:18		Open IR	Template Export (PDF)
Nov 12, 2018 07:19		Open IR	Viewed
Nov 12, 2018 07:21		Open IR	Viewed
Nov 12, 2018 07:22		Open IR	Template Export (PDF)
Nov 12, 2018 08:33		Open IR	Viewed
Nov 12, 2018 08:38		Open IR	Saved
Nov 12, 2018 08:38		Open IR	Viewed
Nov 12, 2018 08:38		Closed IR	Closed
Nov 12, 2018 08:52		Closed IR	Viewed
Nov 12, 2018 08:52		Closed IR	Template Export (PDF)

BAE SYSTEMS
INSPIRED WORK

BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair (NSR)
INCIDENT - CONTACT INFORMATION
THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY ALLIED UNIVERSAL
FOR INFORMATION PURPOSE ONLY

REPORTER'S NAME:	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	REPORTER COMPANY/ COMMAND:	Oscar Austin
AUS SECURITY PROFESSIONAL NAME:	Ridgeway		
TYPE OF INCIDENT: *CIRCLE ONE*	THEFT SAFETY RELATED VEHICLE RELATED WITNESS STATEMENT ALTERCATION SECURITY VIOLATION OTHER fire		
DATE OF INCIDENT	Nov 10 Saturday	TIME OF INCIDENT:	19:31 pm
LOCATION OF INCIDENT?	03 level Forward Stacks		
WHAT OCCURRED?	Alpha Fire on ship of Oscar Austin person stuck in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 Navy called back for all 2008 911 was called 2010 was class charlie fire 2010 6 fire truck, 2 ambulance 1police		
WHO COMMITTED THIS INCIDENT?	2051 they told me no one was trap		

NOTIFICATIONS:						
LAW ENFORCEMENT REQUESTED?	(YES)		NO		INCIDENT REPORT #:	
LAW ENFORCEMENT PROFESSIONAL NAME:					PHONE #:	

CONTACT INFORMATION:			
REPORTING EMPLOYEE #:		OCCUPATION/ TITLE:	
PHONE #:		EMAIL:	
SUPERVISOR NAME:		SUPERVISOR PHONE #:	

INSPIRED WORK

MEDICAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION

CALLER INFORMATION:

Name of Caller:	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	Phone #:	((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Company/Ship:	Oscar Austin	Date:	Nov 10 Time: 1931

INJURED PERSON:

Name:							
Company/Ship:						Age:	
Location:	03 level Forward Stack	911 Requested?	Yes		No		
Describe Injury:	Fire on Ship						
Additional Information:	Fire on the ship of Oscar Austin person stuck in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 (b)(3) 10 4pm was called back for 911 2008pm 911 was called, 2010pm was class charlie fire, 2010 6 fire truck 2 ambulance 1 police 2051pm they told me no one was trap						

NOTIFICATIONS:

911:	Yes		No				
Immediately notify ONE person, starting at the top, from the below list of the medical emergency.							
Medical Department:	Yes		No		Medical Office	757-494-2975	n/a
					Duty Cell	757-390-1013	n/a
					(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Safety Manager	Yes		No		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	n/a
Safety Supervisor	Yes		No		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	n/a
2nd Shift Superintendent	Yes		No		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	n/a
Director, Programs	Yes	757	No		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Operations	Yes		No		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Notify the Allied Duty Supervisor and the FSO once notifications are complete.							
Allied Universal	Yes		No		Duty Supervisor	757-646-0226	n/a
Security Manager/FSO	Yes		No		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	n/a

Revised 21 July 2017

(b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Today, 13NOV18

16NOV18

I had the 01-07, so I was in my rack attempting to rest before watch. With my radio on over the radio I heard The cole saw smoke coming out of the ship. I started to get up to get my coveralls on (1940 or so) Once I stepped out of berthing I saw the smoke and smelled burning. Got to the conex right away, grabbed personnel for rapid response w/ SCBA's, ran into MMC Ot who said to go to Stbd side up to 02 Level. When I got there you saw smoke and (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was on a hose fighting the fire I went up to help, We were told to go to port side and fight it afer a while. I waited for (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) so we could go together, we moved the base in case we needed to use it again, then headed to 02 PORT. (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had to go back to Conex Box with low SCBA pack. I saw (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D and investigated 03 (Radar 2), he was told a contractor maybe there, we couldn't get past the Plastic that was in the way, we yelled, pounded + screamed to see if anyone was there. Went back down to 02 Level (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) looked around the corner and saw more of the fire so we picked up the hose and fought until he had to leave because of low bottle, (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) back (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and a team came up to help, with another hose so we could fight it together. I took high while I told (b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to go low. We heard a Pop noise and agreed its a Charlie fire, that got to the locker and fire appeared to be out when they secured power. I went to head back to locker because my pack was getting low. Helped out with swapping bottles + packs as well as comms. in Locker.

(b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (26)

(b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[redacted]

ON 10 NOV 18 AT APPROX 1930 I HEARD REPORTS OF WHITE SMOKE OVER MY CSOOW RADIO AS I WAS PREPARING TO SHOWER AND GO TO SLEEP FOR THE NIGHT. I PUT MY COVER BACK ON TURNED THE LIGHTS ON IN BERTHING AND RAN TO THE LOCKER ON THE FLIGHT DECK. YOU SEE SMOKE AND SMELL SMOKE AT SOON AS YOU WERE OUTSIDE. I WAS ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF INVESTIGATOR AND MY PARTNER WAS [redacted] WE PROCEED OUT AND MADE OUR WAY TO THE CASUALTY. ON OUR WAY A CONTRACTOR TOLD US A FEMALE WAS TRAPPED IN EITHER (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 OR (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 WE ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE HER BUT WE COULD NOT BECAUSE THE SMOKE WAS TOO THICK TO SEE THROUGH. WE CALLED OUT AND BANGED ON EQUIPMENT WITH NO RESPONSE. UPON BACKING OUT OF THAT LADDER WELL NEAR (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 WE FOUND TWO MEMBERS OF THE FIRE PARTY WITH A HOSE. WE HELPED FACILITATE A HOSE FOR THEM AND SPOTTED FLAMES NEAR THE WIRES SCUTTLEROOM. WE ATTACKED THE FLAMES AS LONG AS WE COULD TILL WE NEEDED TO LEAVE THE SCENE BECAUSE OF OUR SCBA'S. I RETURNED TO THE SCENE TWO MORE TIMES ONCE AS INVESTIGATOR AND ONCE AS TEAM LEADER FOR A US COLE HOSE TEAM.

(b)(3), ((b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

[redacted]


(b)(3), 10USC130


(b)(3), 10USC130


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
(b)(3), 10USC130


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
(b)(3), 10USC130

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		CLASS	PANEL
D A	D,D G 0,6,7	8	1,1	R	1,9	E	U	
1 2 3 4	5 - 7	12	13 - 14	15	16 - 17	22	78	79

USS COLE

AT / ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE SHIPYARD

TO OLD DOMINION DRY DOCK

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L		BY
L		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L		BY
L		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L		BY
L		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	28 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41 77
					0700 - 1200 (CONT'D)
0940					RECEIVED FUEL, OIL, AND WATER REPORT.
0941					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1030					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1131					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1145					OOD PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					1200 - 1700
1146					ASSUMED THE WATCH MOORED AS BEFORE
1238					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1331					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1430					WATER SPONSITY BARRIER CLOSED SECURED
					M16 WATCH.
1439					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1533					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1631					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1649					PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					1700 - 2200
1650					ASSUMED THE WATCH. MOORED AS BEFORE.
1658					OBSERVED COLORS.
1701					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1803					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
1902					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
A 1940					WHITE SMOKE REPORTED ON THE OSCAR AUSTIN, PIER 6.
1943					CDO CONTACTED BAE EMERGENCY SERVICES.
BA 1944					REPAIR LOCKER ON FLIGHT DECK MANNED UP.
1947					5 FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL DRESSED OUT IN FULL FIRE
A 1949					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTED WHITE SMOKE ON OSCAR AUSTIN.

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		CLASS	HANDL
D A	D,D,G 0,6,7	8	1,1	R	1,5	E	U	
1 2	3 4 5 - 7	12	13 -14	15	16 - 17	22	78	79

USS COLE

AT / ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE SHIPYARD

TO OLD DOMINION DRY DOCK

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L		BY
		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L		BY
		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L		BY
		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME 18 - 21	ORDER 23 - 29	CSE 30 - 32	SPEED 33 - 36	DEPTH 37 - 40	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY 41 - 77
					1700 - 2200 (CONT'D)
MR 1753					6 FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL, 1 SCENE LEADER, AND 1
					DUTY ELECTRICIAN SENT OVER TO OSCAR AUSTIN. 8 TOTAL PERSONNEL.
** 1944					DUTY FIRE MARSHALL WENT OVER TO OSCAR AUSTIN.
1958					FIRE MARSHAL REPORTED THAT FIRE ON OSCAR AUTIN
					HAS BEEN LOCATED IN FWD OFFICER COUNTRY AND
					WARDROME.
1959					NORFOLK FIRE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN NOTIFIED.
20000					REPORT OF ONE CONTRACTOR TRAPPED IN (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130
					(b)(3) 10 U.S.C.
20001					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ARE WITH RESCUE
					SQUAD ONBOARD USS OSCAR AUSTIN.
20003					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
MR 2005					~~OSCAR AUSTIN REQUESTED ADDITIONAL SCBA BOTTLES.~~
					WITH FIRE FIGHTING TEAM ONBOARD OSCAR AUSTIN.
20005					OSCAR AUSTIN REQUESTED ADDITIONAL SCBA BOTTLES.
MR 20006					6 SCBA BOTTLE SENT OVER TO OSCAR ~~AFT~~ AUSTIN.
MR 20007					~~SET~~ HOT WORK SECURED ONBOARD USS COLE.
20008					3 ADDITIONAL SCBA BOTTLES SENT OVER TO OSCAR AUSTIN.
20009					CLASS CHARLIE FIRE REPORTED ON OSCAR AUSTIN, LOSS
					OF POWER TO SHIP.
20010					NORFOLK FIRE DEPARTMENT ARRIVED ON STATION.
20012					6 ADDITIONAL COLE FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL DRESSED
					OUT IN FULL FFE SENT OVER TO OSCAR AUSTIN.
20013					FIRE MARSHAL REPORTED FIRE APPEARS TO BE OUT ONBOARD
					OSCAR AUSTIN.
20022					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) WENT IN TO RELIEVE
					COLE FIR TEAM 1.
20023					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REPORTED OUT OF
					SPACE, UNABLE TO LOCATE CONTRACTOR IN SPACE.

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		USS	CLASS	HANDL
DA	DDG 067	8	11	R	19	E	COLE	U	

AT / ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE SHIPYARD

TO OLD DOMINION DRY DOCK

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800 L.		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200 L.		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000 L.		BY
λ		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 35	37 - 40	41 77
					1700-2200 (CONT'D)
2024					COLE FIRE FIGHTING TEAM SENT IN TO SCENE AND
					COMMENCED COOL DOWN OF TWO OFFICER COUNTRY
2026					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) SENT OVER TO
					OSCAR AUSTIN TO ~~HEE~~ HELP REFILL SCBA BOTTLES.
2030					FIRE MARSHAL REPORTED 100% PERCENT ACCOUNTABILITY
					OF COLE FIRE FIGHTING TEAM ONE, NO APPARENT INJURIES.
2032					14 SCBA BOTTLE BROUGHT BACK ONBOARD TO REFILL.
2033					~~F~~ COLE TEAM 2 IN PROGRESS OF OVERHAUL AND
					COOLING HOT SPOTS. UNKNOWN NUMBER OF HOT SPOTS AT
					THIS TIME.
XXX 1946					C.O., XO, AND CHENG NOTIFIED OF WHITE SMOKE
					ONBOARD USS OSCAR AUSTIN.
2040					CMC NOTIFIED OF CASUALTY.
2041					NOFOLK FIRE INTEGRATED WITH SHIP BOARD FIRE
					FIGHTING TEAM.
MP 2048					COLE FIRE ~~FIGHTIN~~ FIGHTING TEAM 1 COMPOSED OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) SENT IN
					TO RELIEVE COLE TEAM 2. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IS TEAM LEADER.
2048					FIRE MARSHAL REPORTED 100 PERCENT ACCOUNTABILITY
					OF ALL CIVILIAN PERSONEL ONBOARD USS OSCAR AUSTIN
2052					FIRE MARSHAL REPORTED 100 PERCENT ACCOUNTABILITY
					OF COLE FIRE FIGHTING TEAM 2 COMPOSED OF (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2054					FIRE MARSHAL REPORTED CUT OF TEMPERARY ELECTRICAL
MP					LIGHTING TO ~~OF~~ OSCAR AUSTIN DUE TO POSSIBLE EXPOSED
					TEMPERARY ELECTRICAL LIGHTING.
2059					COLE FIRE FIGHTING TEAM 3 CONSISTED OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					FEMALES.
2100					COLE TEAM 1 CONTINUING TO COOL (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130

OPNAV 3100/99 (Rev. 7-84) IF CLASSIFIED STAMP REVIEW / DECLASSIFICATION DATE HERE

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		CLASS	HANDL
DA	DD 079	8	11	R	10	E	U	

USS OSCAR AUSTIN

AT ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE

~~TO~~

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800 L		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200 L		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000 L		BY
λ		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
16 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41 77
					1700 - 2200
2240					DCA ORDERS VENTILATION FOR 02 LEVEL (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS BEEN ON AIR FOR 30 MINUTES.
2242					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LEFT FOR EMERGENCY ROOM ON OWN POWER. RELATED TO PREVIOUS INJURY.
2244					NORFOLK FIRE ON SCENE.
2249					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS BUZZER. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) EN ROUTE TO SWAP OUT BOTTLES. NORFOLK FIRE AND 1 SAILOR REMAIN ON SCENE. DESMOKING COMMENCED.
2256					DCA AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ARE BACK AT LOCKER.
2304					DCA AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ARE BRINGING THE CO AND XO TO SURVEY THE DAMAGE.
2311					WATCH PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					2200 - 0200
2311					ASSUMED THE WATCH. MOORED AS BEFORE.
2326					DCA STILL ON SCENE. 7 PERSONEL TOTAL IN (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 NORFOLK FIRE REQUESTS PERMISSION TO LEAVE. PERMISSION GRANTED. NORFOLK FIRE DISEMBARKED.
2332					GAS FREE ENGINEER REPORTS ATMOSPHERE IS SAFE FOR PERSONNEL.
2341					CO, XO, CHENG HAVE RETURNED TO LOCKER.
2343					LOG CONTINUED ON 11NOV18.
					NO FIRE (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP REVIEW / DECLASSIFICATION DATE HERE

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
DA	DDG 79	08	11	R	10

USS OSCAR AUSTIN

AT / ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE

~~TO~~

CLASS / HANDL: U /

POSITION 0800	ZONE	TIME	POSITION 1200	ZONE	TIME	POSITION 2000	ZONE	TIME
L		BY	L		BY	L		BY
A		BY	A		BY	A		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
					2200-0200 (CONT'D)
0000					CONTINUED THE WATCH MOORED AS BEFORE AT BAE PIER 6 SHIP IS ON SHORE POWER. CO, XO, CMC ASHORE. CDO IS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) OOD IS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0030					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
0122					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL.
0136					WATCH PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					0200-0700
0137					ASSUMED THE WATCH, MOORED AS BEFORE.
0217					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL
0335					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL
0430					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL
0540					TOPSIDE ROVER REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL
0612					RECEIVED DRAFT REPORT
0652					WATCH PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					X (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					0700-1200
0653					ASSUMED THE WATCH MOORED AS BEFORE.
0702					RECEIVED IA REPORT.
0718					RECEIVED DECK LOGS.
0719					I HAVE BEEN PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AS COMMAND DUTY OFFICER.
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0758					RECEIVED FUEL AND WATER REPORT.
0800					OBSERVED MORNING COLORS.
0805					RECEIVED MAG TEMPS. REPORT.

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP REVIEW / DECLASSIFICATION DATE HERE

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		CLASS	HANDL
D A	D D [redacted] Ø 7 9	0	1 1	R	1 Ø	E	U	/
1 2 3 4	5 - 7	12	13 - 14	15	16 - 17	22	78	79

USS OSCAR AUSTIN

AT ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE

~~TO~~

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L		BY
λ		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	OSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41 77
					1700 - 2200
2132					[redacted] RUNNING OUT OF AIR. EDO ORDERS
					[redacted] AND TEAM BACK TO LOCKER.
2138					[redacted] REPORTING TO [redacted] FOR
					LEG INJURY. ESCORTED BY [redacted]
2144					USS COLE SAILORS DEPARTING.
2145					ALL DUTY PERSONNEL ~~ACCOUNTED~~ ACCOUNTED FOR.
2148					PROGRAM MANAGER IS ONBOARD.
2156					[redacted] BEING TREATED FOR SMOKE
					INHALATION.
2204					NO BAE PERSONNEL FOUND IN SPACES.
2206					[redacted] RETURNED FROM MEDICAL.
2213					3 INCHES WATER IN PLWM OUTSIDE CAPTAIN'S CABIN.
					GAS FREE ENGINEER REPORTS WARD ROOM O^2 20.9,
					CO 36 AND RISING.
2216					MEDICAL REPORTS [redacted] IS FINE AND STABLE
					CONDITION. [redacted] WAS EXAMINED, GIVEN
					OXYGEN AND STATUS STABLE, NEEDS MONITORING.
					[redacted] WAS GIVEN OXYGEN AND NEEDS
					MEDICAL ATTENTION AND IS TAKEN TO EMERGENCY ROOM.
2217					WARD ROOM IS NOT SAFE FOR PERSONNEL.
2220					(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 NOT SAFE FOR PERSONNEL
2226					NEED TO VERIFY HOT SPOTS IN WARD ROOM AFTER GAS
					FREE CHECK COMPLETE. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 IS 88 DEGREES, NO
					HOT SPOTS. NORFOLK FIRE EN ROUTE TO MEET GAS FREE
					IN WARD ROOM.
2228					130 DEGREES IN SPACE NEXT TO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130
2229					WEAK SPOT IN DECK HEADING BACK TO WARDROOM.
					WARD ROOM IS STILL OK. [redacted] AND
					TEAM STANDING BY IN WARDROOM.
2238					[redacted] REPORTS STATUS OF AIR IS 20.

OPNAV 3100/99 (Rev. 11/2008)

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP REVIEW / DECLASSIFICATION DATE HERE

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REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		CLASS	HANDL
DA	PD[redacted]	8	11	R	10	E	U	
1 2	3 4 5 - 7	12	13 - 14	15	16 - 17	22	78	79

USS OSCAR AUSTIN

AT / PASSAGE FROM BAE

TO

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L		BY
λ		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L		BY
λ		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
18 - 21	23 - 29	30 - 32	33 - 36	37 - 40	41 77
					1700 - 2200
2030					8 INCHES WATER OUTSIDE CAPTAIN'S CABIN. SPACE STILL HOT.
2036					CO ONBOARD.
2042					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) EN ROUTE TO 'O' COUNTRY. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) TO RELIEVE (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ON SCENE.
2048					INVESTIGATORS REPORT FIRE APPEARS TO BE OUT. EDO REQUESTS INFO ON RUNNER. NO ANSWER.
2053					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ORDERED TO RELIEVE TEAM AT O COUNTRY. SENDING ANOTHER ATTACK TEAM.
2054					MUSTER COMPLETE OF ALL DUTY PERSONNEL. ALL ACCOUNTED FOR.
2100					BAE ELECTRICIANS ON BOARD. TO SECURE POWER
2105					NORFOLK FIRE DEPARTMENT FILLING BOTTLES ON PIER. VSS COLE FIRE MARSHAL EN ROUTE TO AFD.
2106					1 HOT SPOT FOUND IN (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 1 HOT SPOT COOLED. POWER SECURED TO SHIP.
2107					EDO REQUESTS STATUS OF PILOTHOUSE FROM (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REQUESTS RELIEF TO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130. REPORTS 3 VSS COLE SAILORS AND SELF TO BE RELIEVED.
2110					RELIEFS EN ROUTE. TO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130
2113					(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FROM BAE FACILITIES. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WILL RESTORE POWER WHEN ~~READY~~ WE ARE READY.
2114					RELIEF EN ROUTE.
2115					2 ADDITIONAL VSS COLE SAILORS ABOARD.
2119					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REPORTS TEAM RELIEVED, EN ROUTE TO LOCKER.
2120					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEING TREATED FOR SMOKE INHALATION.
2121					4 INCHES ON DECK IN PILOTHOUSE. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND TEAM OUT OF AIR, BACKING OUT.
2129					(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ENGAGING HOT SPOTS.

OPNAV 3100/99 (Rev. 11/2006) IF CLASSIFIED STAMP REVIEW / DECLASSIFICATION DATE HERE

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REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3100-10

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SHIP'S DECK LOG SHEET

USE BLACK INK TO FILL IN THIS LOG

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY		CLASS	HANDL
DA	DD[redacted]079	81	11	R	10	E	V	

USS OSCAR AUSTIN

AT / ~~PASSAGE FROM~~ BAE

~~TO~~

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800 L		BY
A		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200 L		BY
A		BY

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000 L		BY
A		BY

LEGEND
1 - CELESTIAL
2 - ELECTRONIC
3 - VISUAL
4 - D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
					1700-2200
1951					INVESTIGATORS REQUEST STATUS OF HOSETEAM.
1953					USS COLE PROVIDE 6 PERSONEL TEAM AS BACK UP
1954					ATTACK TEAM TWO ON SCENE
1957					3 PERSONNEL EN ROUTE TO 03 LEVEL.
2000					HOSE TEAM REPORTS 2 INCHES WATER ON DECK.
2002					SECOND CALL TO BAE TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE.
2004					TEAM 2 REPORTS ARRIVAL AT [redacted]
					TWO BAE SECURITY PERSONNEL ARRIVE.
2007					SPARE SCBA BOTTLES BEING MOVED TO FANTAIL.
2009					REPORT OF CLASS C FIRE
2010					5 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FROM COLE.
					BAE FIREFIGHTERS ARRIVE. MEDICAL ON SCENE.
2012					FIRE APPEARS TO BE OUT. REPORT COMES FROM
					'0' COUNTRY, HALFWAY TO WARDROOM.
					POWER SECURED TO SHIP. REQUESTED FROM BAE.
2014					REPORT REQUESTED FROM [redacted]
2016					INVESTIGATORS REPORT [redacted] SMOKEY, BUT
					NO APPARENT FIRE. HOSE TEAM PUTTING WATER ON
					DECK TO COOL SPACE.
2018					ATTACK TEAM CALLED BACK BY EDO. ATTACK TEAM
					REMAINS IN PLACE TO PUT WATER ON DECK.
2019					RELIEF EN ROUTE FOR ATTACK TEAM.
2020					FIRST HOSE TEAM RELIEVED. EN ROUTE TO LOCKER.
2023					EDO, [redacted] REQUESTS MUSTER ~~REQUESTS~~
					REPORT OF DUTY SECTION 1.
2024					CO EN ROUTE TO SHIP.
2027					EDO ORDERS 4 PERSON ATTACK TEAM FROM
					USS COLE TO LOCKER.
2029					INVESTIGATORS REPORT [redacted] CLEAR.

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP REVIEW / DECLASSIFICATION DATE HERE

IF CLASSIFIED STAMP SECURITY MARKING HERE

[illegible] / [illegible] other groups / when [illegible] / A/C on hold / [illegible] less

No A/Ts until [illegible] over / don't go ~~A/Ts~~ into [illegible]

watch on ship until done

On Saturday, 10 Nov 18, I was at home sleeping. I woke up to a call from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] on OSA. She recommended I go to the ship as there was a Class Charlie fire. After that I noticed 2 missed calls from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] the DESRON 26. I called him back and he was curious about the fire. He had been called by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] USS COLE's DCC, and told him about the situation.

Around 2100 I got to the ship and spoke with Chug, she told me to get to the locker. Inside the DC annex (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] was the locker office, he was plotting and handing out gear. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] was acting as locker leader, helping to direct personnel and relay information. She is also duty section 1's EDO. I also met up with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] gave me the rundown on the situation. A contractor was ~~doing~~ ~~welding~~ removing cutting material out. A Class Alpha fire was started and the welder and his fire watches ran away. The fire spread into a Class Charlie. The had the Norfolk Fire Dept Standing By, they were told to just wait there. The USS Cole was providing f:d w/ personnel [illegible] up teams scba bottles, gas free kit bag, & additional NIFTI's. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] ~~[illegible]~~ assisted with directing teams.

The Captain (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] the XO, CSO, and Ops showed up at some point. As teams came back with information, I gave him updates such as smoke dissipation, hot spots, and team locations.

Somewhere around 2200 the smoke had dissipated enough for unrestricted visibility. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] We asked to borrow Cole's 6 gas analyzer as Friday our oxygen sensor failed the daily fresh air calibration. It was reading 13.3% Oxygen, even when conducting the calibration on the flight deck. The COLE's 6 gas was also inop due to the oxygen sensor. They brought us their gas free kit ~~[illegible]~~ in addition to ours. (1/4)

Fire was called away, I Reported to the locker.
AFTER that I dont Remember

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

OCT Notify? (req'd written)

Noted

add to sample machine to cough?

We borrowed 4 flashlights, and their Gas Analyzer, and their NFT, we used the flashlights with the teams. Once all the teams were tasked and visibility was good, [redacted] and I put on FFE's to go gas free. I borrowed one of the 4 flashlights from the FD as well as their gas analyzer. Her and I went on air and entered the Stbd helo hanger. We went up ~~through the ladder to the~~ Stbd side. Gas free readings were normal. We went up the Stbd side C/C ladder. [redacted] Noticed her mask wasn't tight enough for a good seal. So we went into the Stbd break to let her fix it in fresh air. Once she was good we went up the Stbd ladder to the CO's side of ford O. We had to go over one of the fire temp FM hoses to get up and we immediately saw damage and FFW. There were damaged cables, the FCO Unit was totally hut away. ... the door was half way pulled. This is where we first started reporting gas free readings. Readings were normal and safe for personnel with oxygen at 20.9%. This was until around the CO's Cabin where Oxygen stayed at 20.9% but CO got above 30 ppm. The alarm on the analyzer went off. We continued on and went into ford O staterooms to check them. They were ~~goo~~ safe for personnel. When we got to the Wardroom the readings rose again. When the sensor was over by where the TV used to be, once again CO rose to over 30ppm but oxygen was at 20.9. Both the Wdrm and the CO's Cabin area were deemed not safe for personnel.

After reporting this via the radio we went up to the 03 level on the port side. The readings were safe for personnel. The same for the 04 and 05 levels. We went down the Stbd side. In the radar room the pt side, temps in the overhead were 111°F. Gas free readings were safe for personnel.

Going down the ladder, stbd side from 03 to 02 level by the CO's cabin, I found weak spots in the deck landing. Putting weight down at the top of the ladder caused the deck to move. Going down the ladder there were several loose steps and we recommended the ladder not safe for personnel.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and I made a second pass by the CO's cabin en route to the wardroom. The Norfolk fire department was going to meet us at the wardroom. During the second pass by the CO cabin, gas free readings fell. Oxygen was 20.9% and CO ppm fell to safe levels. That area was declared safe for personnel. We went to the wardroom and while waiting we retested the wardroom. Oxygen was still 20.9% and CO dropped to safe for personnel.

Additionally while waiting I took some videos and pictures at approximately 2236. We met up with NFD at about 2240. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and I showed them the fwd ladderwell and where the bad landing was. We also discussed gas free readings and where the nearest access to fresh air was. We recomended the accesses from the port and/or stbd break. They put a fan on the stbd side.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and I left and went back to the locker. At this point I only had about 15 m of air left. We got back and updated the CO, XO and Cheng. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and I took off our masks and packs.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] asked us if the area was safe for personnel and if she could see the damage. She put on fire fighting coveralls and boots due to being here in civilian attire. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and I took the CO, XO, ... ng, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] to view fwd O country. We went thru the stbd helo hangar to the boat deck and entered the superstructure via the stbd break access. We passed by the fan the NFD

3/9

Set up. We viewed all the spaces, following the same route (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
as I used to gas free. No one was on air, the only change to the route is that we didn't go down the stbd side ladder from 03 to 02 level. Instead we went back up to the pilot House and used that to pass back over to port side. We took a second to pull a ~~hose~~ hose from the 04 to 05 level stbd side pilot house. Every time we went to the pilot house, we spent a few minute on the port bridge wing in order to get fresh air. We left the supe structure and went back to the flight Deck.

They were done restowing gear on the flight Deck. I took the used DC plates and any casualty notes to my stateroom. I left the ship at about 0820 am.

V/r (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

41/4


(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)




(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

BAE SYSTEMS

USS Oscar Austin 1411
Pier 6

Duty CDO
Sat
Sun
Cell

Weekend Work Schedule:

Duty Superintendents
BAE SYSTEMS
Vessel -

Office NO.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Cell NO.
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MARMC - SAT
MARMC - Sun

Shop / Sub		11/10/2018 Saturday	Saturday	11/11/2018 Sunday	Sunday	Description
Plate Shop	01	15	7	15	7	03 LVL Deck Install, [redacted] Sonar2 inserts, 02 BERP Plates
Welding Shop	02	11	6	11	6	Support shop 01,07, Aft Stack, [redacted]
Inside Machine Shop	04					
Outside Machine Shop	05	E				
Electric Shop	06	E				
Pipe Shop	07	9		9		ACB12, SPQ9, CIC Piping
Sheet metal Shop	08	13	4	13	4	Bliss Caps, Vents CSER 3- [redacted] Fwd IC
Paint Shop	09	5	4	5	4	Sonar spaces, [redacted] 05-06 LVL's
Facilities	10	4		4		Services
Carpenter Shop	11	7		7		ELEX spaces NOMEX prefab
Insulator Shop	27	5		5		Insulate CSER 3, [redacted]
Riggers Shop	12	6		E		Assist Trades, AIT's, Subs, Dry Dock
Crane						
QA / NDT	16	2	1	2	1	Checkpoints
Labor Shop / Fire Watch	17	X	X	X	X	AR Tech
Competent Person	18	1		1		
Total MD		63	15	57	15	
Total MH		504	120	456	120	
Subcontractors	Sub					
HEPAC		X		X		
	Sub					
AMSCAFF		X		X		
	Sub					
JRF		X		X		
	Sub					
MSP		X		X		
	Sub					
BMF		X		X		
	Sub					
TECNICO		X		X		
	Sub					
	Sub					
Aerial Lifts						
PUMPING REQUIRED		YES				
STOREROOM		YES				

ORIGINAL
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

NOR-F(96)P-54

Enclosure (33)

OVERTIME REQUEST FORM

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Dept/Craft: 01 Date: 11/8/2018 Vessel: Oscar Austin

Job: 1411 Work Item: 150-80-001 468-90-002 Superintendent: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Work Item Description: Structural Repairs

	Saturday App / Dis		Sunday App / Dis		Holiday App / Dis	
Craft Sup'v						
Lead Ship Sup't	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
Program Manager						
Dir. Bus. Ops						
V.P. Shipyard Ops						

		MANPOWER			
DATES	SHIFT	MECHANICS	SUPERVISORS	SHIFT LENGTH	HOURS
11/10/2018	1st	14	1		120
11/10/2018	2nd	6	1		56
	3rd				
11/11/2018	1st	14	1		120
11/11/2018	2nd	6	1		56
	3rd				
	1st				
	2nd				
	3rd				

ACCELERATION IS:
REQUESTED ☐ MOD ☐
AUTHORIZED ☐ BASIC ☐
THIS BLOCK TO BE COMPLETED BY THE LEAD SHIP SUP'T

OTHER SUPPORT REQUIRED
GAS FREE ☐ PUMPING ☐

DATE THIS ACTIVITY IS SCHEDULED TO COMPLETE: _____
CHECK POINT SCHEDULED: ☒ N/A ☐

Continue removals 03 level STBD weather deck and install
Continue removals 03 level Port weather deck and install
Insert AFT BHD of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 nway of pipe removals above door
Open Burp plates 02 port side weather deck frame 281/296
Insert deck Sonar #2 in way of equipment install

01 X 02☐ 04☐ 06☐ 07☐ 08☐ 09☒ 10☐ 11☐ 12☐ 13☐ 16☐ 17☐ 26☐

REASONS THE WORK WAS NOT COMPLETED ON NORMAL SCHEDULE

- ☐ GFI PROBLEMS
- ☐ CFM PROBLEMS
- ☒ GFM PROBLEMS
- ☐ SHIPS FORCE/SIMA INTERFACE PROBLEMS
- ☐ GROWTH/NEW WORK
- ☐ TRADE INTERFACE PROBLEMS
- ☐ LACK OF SUBCONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE
- ☑ SCHEDULE CHANGES
- ☐ CONDITION REPORT ANSWER
- ☐ SUBCONTRACTOR SUPPORT

EXPLANATION OF BOXES CHECKED

NOTE: OVERTIME REQUESTS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE PROGRAM GROUP BY THURSDAY 2 P.M

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



Enclosure (34)


(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



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
(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IN-PORT WATCH BILL

04 Nov 2018

CREW SHIFT DRYDOCK

DUTY SECTION 1 OF 6

EFFECTIVE 10 NOV 2018 THRU 11 NOV 2018

Unit: OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) **UIC: 21953**

WATCH STATION	TIME	RANK RATE	NAME	BRANCH	QUAL	PRD
CDO	0700 - 0700	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130	USN	Q	Nov 2019
SECTION LEADER	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Jul 2019
CSOOW (25/61)	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Oct 2020
ATTWO	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Mar 2020
EDO	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Sep 2020
DUTY WEPS	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Feb 2020
DMAA INPORT	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Jun 2019
DUTY GUNNERS MATE	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Feb 2019
DUTY DH OPERATIONS	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Dec 2019
FIRE MARSHAL	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Aug 2020
RADIO WATCH/ DUTY IT	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Jun 2021
BRF	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Oct 2019
				USN	Q	Oct 2020
				USN	Q	Oct 2020
				USN	Q	Jul 2019
				USN	Q	Dec 2019
SRF	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Nov 2020
				USN	Q	Oct 2019
				USN	Q	Oct 2021
				USN	Q	Aug 2020
				USN	Q	Nov 2021
CHIEF OF THE GUARD	0700 - 1200			USN	Q	Jun 2020
	1200 - 1700			USN	Q	Oct 2019
	1700 - 2200			USN	Q	Jun 2019
	2200 - 0200			USN	Q	Jun 2020
	0200 - 0700			USN	Q	Oct 2019
OOD INPORT	0700 - 1200			USN	Q	Oct 2019
	1200 - 1200			USN	Q	Jun 2021
	1700 - 2200			USN	Q	Oct 2020
	2200 - 0200			USN	Q	Oct 2019
	0200 - 0700			USN	Q	Jun 2021
POOW INPORT	0700 - 1200			USN	Q	Dec 2019
	1200 - 1700			USN	Q	Dec 2019
	1700 - 2200			USN	Q	Aug 2021
	2200 - 0200			USN	Q	Dec 2019
	0200 - 0700			USN	Q	Dec 2019
MOOW	0700 - 1200			USN	Q	Aug 2021
TOPSIDE ROVER	0700 - 1200			USN	Q	Aug 2020
	1200 - 1700			USN	Q	Nov 2020
	1700 - 2200			USN	Q	Nov 2021
	2200 - 0200			USN	Q	Aug 2020
	0200 - 0700			USN	Q	Nov 2020
WATERSIDE SECURITY	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Oct 2020
				USN	Q	Nov 2020
PIER SENTRY CONTACT	0700 - 1200			USN	Q	Sep 2021
	1200 - 1700			USN	Q	Apr 2022
	1700 - 2200			USN	Q	Jul 2020
	2200 - 0200			USN	Q	Sep 2021
	0200 - 0700			USN	Q	Apr 2022

Legend: Q = PQS Qualified; I = Interim Qualified; U/I = Under Instruction/PQS Assigned; N/Q = Not Qualified/Not Assigned

Relational ADM

Enclosure (36)

IN-PORT WATCH BILL

04 Nov 2018

CREW SHIFT DRYDOCK

DUTY SECTION 1 OF 6

EFFECTIVE 10 NOV 2018 THRU 11 NOV 2018

Unit: OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) **UIC: 21953**

WATCH STATION	TIME	RANK RATE	NAME	BRANCH	QUAL	PRD
PIER SENTRY CONT #2	0700 - 1200	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	USN	Q	Oct 2021
	1200 - 1700			USN	Q	Jul 2020
	1700 - 2200			USN	Q	Nov 2018
	2200 - 0200			USN	Q	Oct 2021
	0200 - 0700			USN	Q	Jul 2020
COS SUPERVISOR	0700 - 1300			USN	Q	Dec 2019
	1300 - 1900			USN	Q	May 2019
	1900 - 0100			USN	Q	Sep 2020
	0100 - 0700			USN	Q	Aug 2020
INPORT EQUIPMENT MON	0700 - 1300			USN	Q	Dec 2020
	1300 - 1900			USN	Q	Jan 2021
	1900 - 0100			USN	Q	Aug 2018
	0100 - 0700			USN	Q	Jan 2021
SOUNDING & SECURITY	0700 - 1300			USN	Q	Jun 2019
	1300 - 1900			USN	Q	Jan 2021
	1900 - 0100			USN	Q	Jul 2022
	0100 - 0700			USN	Q	Jan 2021
SCENE LEADER	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Jun 2019
INVESTIGATOR	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Nov 2018
				USN	Q	Oct 2021
EAM LEADER	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Jan 2021
NOZZLEMAN	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Nov 2021
HOSEMAN	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Aug 2020
REPAIR ELECTRIAN	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Nov 2020
BOUNDARYMAN	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Sep 2021
				USN	Q	Jul 2020
				USN	Q	Apr 2022
				USN	Q	Sep 2021
AFFF OPERATOR	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Aug 2018
COLORS FLAGSTAFF 1	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Jul 2020
COLORS FLAGSTAFF 2	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Aug 2021
COLORS JACKSTAFF	0700 - 0700			USN	Q	Apr 2022

ET 12

WATERSIDE : 7-12 - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

12-17 - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) > FIRST INVESTIGATOR

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) - 2ND LINE REHSP

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) > RAPID RESPONSE

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

① CO_2
② FIREHOSE

Legend: Q = PQS Qualified; I = Interim Qualified; U/I = Under Instruction/PQS Assigned; N/Q = Not Qualified/Not Assigned

Relational ADM

IN-PORT WATCH BILL

04 Nov 2018

CREW SHIFT DRYDOCK

DUTY SECTION 1 OF 6

EFFECTIVE 10 NOV 2018 THRU 11 NOV 2018

Unit: OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) **UIC: 21953**

Additional Instructions:
BEFORE YOU SUBMIT LEAVE, LOOK AT THE TRACKER BELOW. STGC WILL DENY LEAVE IF THERE IS NO DUTY SWAP CHIT.
DUTY SWAP CHITS MUST BE APPROVED BY STGC PRIOR TO SECTION LEADER APPROVAL IN NSIPS.

SCHOOLS/TAD:
(b)(3), (b)(6), 01OCT18-16NOV18 (VIRGINIA BEACH, VA)
(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) : 23OCT18-19DEC18 (GREAT LAKES, IL)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 12OCT-30NOV18 (MCF)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) 28AUG18-30NOV18 (ARB)
((b)(3), (b)(6), (b) 28AUG18-30NOV18 (FSN)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b) : 01OCT18-05NOV18 (SAN DIEGO, CA)
(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7) 13JUN18-06NOV18 (DAHLGREN, VA)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b) 28AUG18-30NOV18 (FSN)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b) 09OCT18-04JAN19 (VIRGINIA BEACH, VA)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) 28AUG18-30NOV18 (FSN)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 05NOV18-09NOV18 (NORFOLK, VA)

LEAVE:
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) 22NOV18-05DEC18
( )

FSA:
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)
(c)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Submitted By: _____

Reviewed By: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _____

Reviewed By: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _____

Approved By: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) _____

Legend: Q = PQS Qualified; I = Interim Qualified; U/I = Under Instruction/PQS Assigned; N/Q = Not Qualified/Not Assigned

Relational ADM

ENGINEERING LOG — 19-77 EDITION
NAVSEA 3120/2B (REV. 10-81) S/N 0116-LF-031-2116 (IS OBSOLETE) — CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS

U. S. S.				HULL NUMBER
OSCAR AUSTIN				DDG-79

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	TIME	TIME ZONE CHANGE TO	TIME ZONE CHANGE FROM
10	NOV	2018	TSR		

AT/PASSAGE FROM	PASSAGE TO	TOTAL MILES TRAVELED TODAY
BAE SYSTEMS PIER 6		0

EQUIPMENT STATUS *(Need not be completed for continuing pages)*

MAIN ENGINES	PLANT STATUS	BOILERS
SECURED	COLD IRON	

GENERATORS	STEERING ENGINES COMBINATION
SECURED	SECURED

DAYS OUT OF DRY DOCK	CATAPULT STATUS (CV'S Only)	DAYS SINCE LAST HULL CLEANING
~~16~~ 17		~~16~~ 17

DRAFT FWD	DRAFT AFT	DRAFT MEAN	TONS
20'0"	19'6"	19'8"	78FE

LIQUID LOAD	PERCENT OF FULL LOAD (%)
276,679	50%

MAJOR EQUIPMENT OUT OF COMMISSION
SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM SHEET

EXAMINED DAILY AND CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT

SIGNATURE OF ENGINEER OFFICER/RANK	DATE OF SIGNATURE
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)	13NOV2018

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
		10	NOV	2018
0000	THE SHIP IS MOORED STBD SIDE BOW OUT ON PIER 6 BAE SYSTEMS, NORFOLK, VA. THE			
	ENGINEERING PLANT IS ALIGNED IAW ATTACHED ADDENDUM SHEET.			
0032	IEM AND S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 5 DROPS			
	PER MINUTE.			
0128	IEM AND S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 5 DROPS			
	PER MINUTE.			
0224	IEM AND S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 5 DROPS			
	PER MINUTE.			
0235	PROPERLY RELIEVED AS CCS SUPERVISOR BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
0235	ASSUMED THE WATCH AS CCS SUPERVISOR.			

CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS — PAGE NO.

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Enclosure (37)

ENGINEERING LOG ADDENDUM — CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
10	NOV	2018

PLANT STATUS: COLD IRON / TRAIL SHAFT / SPLIT PLANT / FULL POWER / AUX STEAMING

GTM:	☒ 1A	☒ 1B	☒ 2A	☒ 2B		
GTG:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3			
FOSP:	☒ 1A	☒ 1B	☒ 2A	☒ 2B		
FOST SUCTION:	☒ 1A	☒ 1B	☒ 2A	☒ 2B		
LOSP:	☒ 1A	☒ 1B	☒ 2A	☒ 2B		
FIRE PUMP:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3	☒ 4	☒ 5	☒ 6
SWSP:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3	☒ 4	☒ 5	
A/C PLANT:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3	☒ 4		
C/W PUMP:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3	☒ 4		
C/W EXP TANK:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3			
L/O PURIFIER:	☒ 1	MRG CRP	☒ 2	MRG CRP		
R/O UNIT:	☒ 1A	☒ 1B				
DEMINERALIZER	☒ 1					
CRP:	☒ 1	☒ 2				
LPAC:	☒ 1	115 120 125	☒ 2	116 120 125	☒ 3	115 120 125
LPAD TYPE I:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3			
LPAD TYPE IA:	☒ 1	☒ 2				
REEFER:	☒ 1	☒ 2				
STEERING UNIT:	☒ 1A	☒ 1B	☒ 2A	☒ 2B		
F/O PURIFIER:	☒ 1	☒ 2				
F/O XFER PUMP:	☒ 1	☒ 2				
FRESH WTR PUMP:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ PIER	☒ BARGE		
P/W TANK SUCTION:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ 3	☒ 4		
VOHT:	☒ 1	☒ 2	☒ PIER	☒ BARGE		
OIL/ WATER SEP:	X					

ADDENDUM KEY

O = AROUND EQUIP. ONLINE

X = INBOX EQUIP. OOC

☐ = AROUND EQUIP. STBY

REMARKS:

PAGE NO.

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION
NAVSEA 3120/2C (REV. 10-81) S/N 0116-LF-031-2120

9-77 EDITION
IS OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
		10	NOV	2018
0315	IEM AND S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DROPS PER MINUTE.			
0423	IEM AND S/S REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DROPS PER MINUTE.			
0525	IEM AND S/S REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DROPS PER MINUTE.			
0627	IEM AND S/S REPORTS ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 5 DROPS PER MINUTE.			
0632	PROPERLY RELIEVED AS CCS SUPERVISOR BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
0634	EDO PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
0634	ASSUMED THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS EDO LATE ENTRY: 0632 ASSUMED THE WATCH AS CCS SUPERVISOR.			
0719	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
0826	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
0923	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
1017	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
1120	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL, PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
1234	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
1327	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM.			
1442	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 DPM			
1534	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE IS 4 DPM.			
1647	IEM & S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE IS 4 DPM.			

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ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION
NAVSEA 3120/2C (REV. 10-81) S/N 0116-LF-031-2120

9-77 EDITION
IS OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
		10	NOV	2018
1735	IEM + S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL, PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 GPM.			
1823	IEM + S/S REPORT ALL CONDITIONS NORMAL. PORT STERN TUBE LEAK IS 4 GPM.			
1845	PROPERLY RELIEVED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AS CCS SUPERVISOR.			
	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
1845	ASSUMED THE DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES AS CCS SUPERVISOR.			
1934	FIRE REPORTED ON 03 LEVEL BY BAE CONTRACTORS.			
1944	ONE CONTRACTOR TRAPPED IN (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130, INVESTIGATORS REPORT.			
1949	INVESTIGATORS HAVE 20 MINUTES ON AIR REMAINING. INVESTIGATORS LOAD CONTRACTOR OUT.			
1951	INVESTIGATORS REQUEST STATUS OF HOSE TEAM.			
1953	USS COLE PROVIDE 6 PERSONEL TEAM AS BACK UP.			
1954	ATTACK TEAM TWO IN SCENE.			
1957	3 PERSONNEL EN ROUTE TO 03 LEVEL.			
2000	HOSE TEAM REPORTS 2" WATER ON DECK.			
2002	SECOND CALL TO BAE TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE.			
2004	TEAM 2 REPORTS ARRIVAL AT (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130 TWO BAE SECURITY PERSONNEL ARRIVE.			
2007	SPARE SCBA BOTTLES MOVED TO FANTAIL.			
2009	REPORT OF CLASS "C" FIRE (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
2010	5 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FROM COLE. BAE FIREFIGHTERS ARRIVE. MEDICAL ON SCENE.			
2012	FIRE APPEARS TO BE OUT. REPORT COMES FROM 'O' COUNTRY, ITHINAY TO WARDROOM. POWER SECURED TO SHIP. REQUEST FROM BAE.			
2014	REPORT REQUESTED FROM (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130			
2016	INVESTIGATORS REPORT (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 SMOKEY, BUT NO APPARENT FIRE. HOSE TEAMS PUTTING WATER ON DECK TO COOL SPACE.			
2018	ATTACK TEAM CALLED BACK BY EDO. ATTACK TEAM REMAINS IN PLACE TO PUT WATER ON DECK.			

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ENGINEERING LOG-CONTINUATION
NAVSEA 3120/2C (REV. 10-81 S/N 0116-LF-031-2120 — 9-77 EDITION IS OBSOLETE — CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS

TIME	RECORD OF ALL OF EVENTS OF THE DAY	DAY 10	MONTH NOV	YEAR 2018
2019	RELIEF EN ROUTE FOR ATTACK TEAM			
2020	FIRST HOSE TEAM RELIEVED. EN ROUTE TO LOCKER.			
2025	EDO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REQUESTS MUSTER REPORT OF DUTY SECTION 1.			
2024	CO EN ROUTE TO SHIP.			
2027	EDO ORDERS 4 PERSON ATTACK TEAM FROM USS COLE TO LOCKER.			
2029	INVESTIGATORS REPORT ARRAY ROOM CLEAR			
2030 ~~2033~~	8" WATER OUTSIDE CAPTINS CABIN. SPACE STILL HOT. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
2036	CO ONBOARD.			
2042	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) EN ROUTE TO 'O' COUNTRY. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) TO RELIEVE (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ON SCENE.			
2045	INVESTIGATORS REPORT FIRE APPEARS TO BE OUT. EDO REQUEST INFO ON RUNNER. NO ANSWER.			
2053	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ORDERED TO RELIEVE TEAM AT O COUNTRY. SENDING ANOTHER ATTACK TEAM.			
2054	MUSTER COMPLETE OF ALL DUTY PERSONNEL. ALL ACCOUNTED FOR.			
2100	BAS ELECTRICIANS ON BOARD TO SECURE POWER.			
2105	NORFOLK FIRE DEPARTMENT FILLING BOTTLES ON PIER. USS COLE FIREMARSHAL EN ROUTE TO EDO.			
2110	1 HOT SPOT FOUND IN (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130, 1 HOTSPOT COOLED, POWER SECURED TO SHIP.			
2107	EDO REQUEST STATUS OF PILOTHOUSE FROM (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REQUEST RELIEF TO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 REPORT 3 USS COLE SAILORS AND SELF TO BE RELIEVED.			
2110	RELIEFS EN ROUTE.			
2115	2 ADDITIONAL USS COLE SAILORS ABORD.			
2119	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REPORTS TEAM RELIEVED, EN ROUTE TO LOCKER.			
2120	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEING TREATED FOR SMOKE INHALATION.			
2121	4" OF WATER ON DECK IN PILOTHOUSE. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND TEAM OUT OF FIRE, BACKING OUT.			

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ENGINEERING LOG-CONTINUATION
NAVSEA 3120/2C (REV. 10-81 S/N 0116-LF-031-2120 9-77 EDITION IS OBSOLETE CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS

TIME	RECORD OF ALL OF EVENTS OF THE DAY	DAY 10	MONTH NOV	YEAR 2016
2109	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ENGINEERING HOTSPOTS			
2132	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) RUNNING OUT OF AIR. GOD ORDERS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) AND TEAM BACK TO LOCKER.			
2138	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REPORTING TO (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) FOR LEG INJURY, ESCORTED BY (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
2144	USS COLE SAILORS DEPARTING.			
2145	ALL DUTY PERSONNEL ACCOUNTED FOR.			
2148	PROGRAM MANAGER ONBOARD.			
2156	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) TREATED FOR SMOKE INHALATION.			
2201 2208	NO BAE PERSONNEL FOUND IN SPACES. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
2204	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) RETURNS FROM MEDICAL,			
2213	3" WATER IN PWAY OUTSIDE CO'S CABIN. GAS FREE ENGINEER REPORTS WARDROOM O^2			
/	20.9, CO 36 AND RISING.			
2214	MEDICAL REPORTS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IS FINE AND STABLE CONDITION. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) WAS EXAMINED,			
/	GIVEN OXYGEN AND ~~NEEDS MEDICAL ATTENTION~~ STATUS STABLE, NEEDS MEDICAL MONITORING. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
/	WK GIVEN OXYGEN AND NEEDS MEDICAL ATTENTION AND IS TAKEN TO EMERGENCY ROOM.			
2217	WARDROOM IS NOT SAFE FOR PERSONNEL.			
2220	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130 NOT SAFE FOR PERSONNEL.			
2224	NEED TO VERIFY HOTSPOTS IN WARDROOM AFTER GAS FREE CHECK COMPLETE. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130			
/	IS 88 DEGREES, NO HOT SPOTS, NORFOLK FIRE EN ROUTE TO MEET GAS FREE IN WARDROOM.			
2228	130° IN SPACE NEXT TO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130			
2229	WEAK SPOT IN DECK HEADING BACK TO WARDROOM. (b)(3),(b)(6)(b)(7)(c) AND TEAM STBY			
/	IN WARDROOM.			
2238	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) REPORT STATUS OF AIR IS 2Ø.			
2240	DCA ORDERS VENTILATION FOR Ø2 LEVEL. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) HAS BEEN ON AIR 30 MIN.			
2243	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) LEFT FOR EMERGENCY ROOM ON OWN POWER, RELATED TO PREVIOUS			
/	INJURY.			
2244	NORFOLK FIRE ON SCENE.			

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ENGINEERING LOG-CONTINUATION
NAVSEA 3120/2C (REV. 10-81 S/N 0116-LF-031-2120 9-77 EDITION IS OBSOLETE CLASSIFICATION UNCLASS

TIME	RECORD OF ALL OF EVENTS OF THE DAY	DAY 10	MONTH NOV	YEAR 2018
2049	(b)(3),(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) HAS RUDDER. DC2 EN ROUTE TO SWAP BOTTLES, NORFOLK FIRE AND			
	1 SAILOR REMAIN ON SCENE - DESMOKING COMMENCED			
2050	DCA AND DC2 ARE BACK AT LOCKER.			
2054	DCA AND DC2 ARE BRINGING THE CO AND XO TO SURVEY DAMAGE.			
2056	DCA STILL ON SCENE, 7 PERSONEL IN (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130, NORFOLK REQUEST TO LEAVE.			
	PERMISSION GRANTED. NORFOLK FIRE DISEMBARKED.			
2332	GAS FREE ENGINEER REPORTS ATMOSPHERE IS SAFE FOR PERSONEL.			
2341	CO, XO, CHENG REPORT TO LOCKER.			
2342	SECURE FROM CASUALTY.			
2359	CONTINUED THE WATCH AS CAS SUPERVISOR (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			
2359	ALL AVAILABLE SAILORS ONBOARD WERE EMPLOYED IN COMBATING THE CASUALTY FROM 1934 UNTIL THE END OF THE DAY. AS SUCH, ALL ENTRIES FROM 1934 TO 2342 WERE DERIVED DIRECTLY FROM THE DECK LOG AND REPEATED HERE FOR CONTINUITY PER MY DIRECTION AFTER THE CASUALTY WAS OVER. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)			

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASS PAGE NO.

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SAT

Daily Fire Marshall Turnover Report

Date: 10 NOV 18	Y/N
Fire Marshall Report	Y
Draft Report	Y
Duty Section training critique & muster sheet	—
Training Topic: INVESTIGATOR	
Number Hot Work chits	106
Number Cold Work chits	0
DC Closure/Fitting Log	N/A
Material Condition/Darken Ship Log	N/A
Repair Locker check sheet	Y
PHD6 fresh air calibrated	N
SCBA bottles verified (S/N):	Y

Additional Comments: DC on watch for training

Off Going FM: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

On Coming FM: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ER LCPO:

DCA:

Enclosure (38)

SUN

Daily Fire Marshall Turnover Report

Date: 11 Nov 2018

	Y/N
Fire Marshall Report	Y
Draft Report	Y
Duty Section training critique & muster sheet	Y
Training Topic:	
Number Hot Work chits	95
Number Cold Work chits	0
DC Closure/Fitting Log	N/A
Material Condition/Darken Ship Log	N/A
Repair Locker check sheet	
PHD6 fresh air calibrated	
SCBA bottles verified (S/N):	

Additional Comments: Charlie fire, had help from the USS COLE, Some equipment in Locker is still USS Cole's Sorting through CONEX, set aside FFE's used to go out and get cleaned.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Off Going FM:

On Coming FM: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ER LCPO:

DCA:

FR1

Daily Fire Marshall Turnover Report

Date: 09 NOV 18

	Y/N
Fire Marshall Report	Y
Draft Report	Y
Duty Section training critique & muster sheet	Y
Training Topic: INVESTIGATOR	
Number Hot Work chits	89
Number Cold Work chits	0
DC Closure/Fitting Log	N/A
Material Condition/Darken Ship Log	N/A
Repair Locker check sheet	Y
PHD6 fresh air calibrated	Y
SCBA bottles verified (S/N):	Y

Additional Comments: COLD WORK CHIT FOR [redacted] DENIED DUE TO PLATE SHOP HAVING HOT WORK CHIT IN FOR [redacted]

Off Going FM: [redacted]

On Coming FM: [redacted]

ER LCPO: [redacted]

DCA:

SHIPYARD OSHE COMMUNICATION FORM

Event Date & Location	
EVENT DATE: (MM/DD/YYYY)	6/6/2018
EVENT LOCATION:	USS Oscar Austin in Dominion Dry Dock at BAE NSR
SUBMITTED BY:	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MARMC Safety Department
ORGANIZATION NAME:	NAVSEA Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center (MARMC)
SUBMISSION DATE: (MM/DD/YYYY)	6/8/2018
EVENT CATEGORY:	Class A Fire
EVENT DESCRIPTION:	Class "A" fire reported in Main Machinery Room #1 (MMR1) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 13 (b)(3) 10 U.S at 1015. A rag located in-between pipes ignited from contractor welding operations.
ACTIONS TAKEN:	Fire watch extinguished the flame with fire bottle (rag had caught fire). Quarterdeck, MARMC TSDO, Safety and Project Manager notified. Hot work was secured for investigation.
RECOMMENDEDACTIONS FOR OTHER SHIPYARDS:	Ensure hot work operators, fire watches and Permit Authorized Individuals (PAI's) thoroughly inspect areas of hot work and sign appropriate blocks of the hot work chit before hot work begins.
COMMENTS:	Attentive hot work operator and fire watch prevented the spread of fire.

USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) LESSONS LEARNED

SUMMARY

USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) was in BAE shipyard, moored starboard side to pier 6 for a regular scheduled CNO maintenance availability. A berthing barge was moored on the port quarter of the ship and access was via a brow rigged to the flight deck. Temporary services were established throughout the ship requiring numerous hatches, scuttles, and doors to be secured in the open position. The ship also received 450 VAC shore power from the pier through the ships shore power breakers.

Contractors were continuing work on installing new deck plate in support of the deck-thickening modification in the overhead of compartment (b)(3),10USC130 and removing old deck plate on the 03 Level weatherdeck via cutting followed by "washing" using a torch, and grinding. "Washing" is a method of removing excess steel and/or welded joints to accommodate fitting or replacement of new material using an oxygen-fuel cutting process. This process tends to create more slag than other types of hot work. As part of this process existing structures are ground to fit new plate before being welded in place. Fire watches were posted as directed on the hot work permit.

While cutting/washing, the Hot Work Operator (HWO) cut approximately three to six inches past the directed stopping point into the overhead of compartment (b)(3),10USC130 (Stateroom), which did not have a fire watch and had not been prepped for hot work. The 03 level fire watch observed smoke emanating from holes in the deck plate. The HWO secured burning and shot oxygen onto the smoking area to try and cool the molten material. This practice is typically used by welders to quickly cool an area of metal. With smoke continuing to emanate, the 03 level fire watch offered to discharge the fire extinguisher. The HWO opted instead to pour two buckets of water into the holes; the water was obtained from the temporary fire hose station located on the 03 level weatherdeck port side. This did not stop the smoke.

The HWO and two fire watches evacuated the area. The third fire watch evacuated (b)(3),10USC130 (b)(3),10US via the Bridge and then the outside ladders. The employees evacuated the area and notified the quarterdeck of the smoke (1935 Local). Upon initial report of the fire, two OSA duty section crewmembers immediately responded to the scene with CO2 bottles. Traveling forward on the starboard side and moving up the ladder (b)(3),10USC130 , they quickly realized the fire was too intense for CO2 bottles. They deployed a firehose and began to battle the fire. They were joined by a duty section member who had donned a SCBA and turned over the nozzle, supporting as hoseman. A second hose team was deployed up the port side to attack from Passage (b)(3),10USC130 Indications are the fire started as a Class A fire then transitioned to a Class C fire as insulation was burned away from overhead cables. Once firefighters realized the fire had transitioned to a Class C fire ship personnel secured the power to the ship by opening the shore power breakers in MER 2 and the fire was extinguished shortly thereafter at approximately 2012.

USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79) LESSONS LEARNED

LESSONS LEARNED

Training

- Train using the boundaries in a shipyard environment (there are very few!). Expect to not be able to set boundaries with installed doors/hatches/etc. Have smoke curtains in these areas attached all the time and ready to deploy; this works better than no boundary at all.
- Conduct duty section drills for EVERY duty section, not just the 3 required during inspections. When drilling, make it realistic by removing the number of Sailors that are normally on watch.
- Actually go on air for drills so Sailors know how to use equipment.
- Recommend designating a Repair Party Leader or Locker Officer on the watchbill.
- Ensure everyone is cross trained; realistically you won't wait for the personnel on a watchbill to arrive in order to respond, the first Sailors dressed out will respond in whatever capacity needed.
- Manage entrance to the locker so that personnel don't crowd the locker.
- NFTI operator error is common – train, train, train!

Equipment

- Have the Fire Marshal check equipment daily; when discrepancies are found, fix immediately!
- Mark DC gear with unique identifier (i.e. DDG79) so borrowed equipment can be returned.
- Have A LOT of functioning flashlights and keep A LOT of extra batteries on hand.
- Using the LED light bar was similar to using bright lights in fog - train without them.
- S/F flash lights were not able to penetrate the smoke/steam - buy the good ones!
- Know how to secure temporary services, even if it is contractually someone else's responsibility. There was a delay in securing temporary services, which fueled the fire.
- INSIST the shipyard does NOT use plastic nozzles on temporary fire hoses. If they will not provide anything else, use your own nozzles.
- Insist that all temporary services follow height restrictions (i.e. >36" from deck, <12" from overhead, etc.) otherwise maneuvering through passageways or hatches is nearly impossible.
- Keep at least 1 way to fill SCBA bottles at all times. If it's a slow method, take this into account and make plans early to get more bottles/refill. Plan for Sailors to use bottles quickly!
- Put a limit on the number of hot work chits allowed. Base this number on what YOU can handle. Insist there is a start and stop date and time listed and hold contractors accountable for sticking to those dates/times. DO NOT ALLOW BLANKET CHITS FOR A SPACE!

Shipyard

- Plan for SWICS not being up, especially in the yards. Research using temporary repeaters or the handheld radios will not work. Train with emergency comms kit or messengers.
- For access cuts (openings in the hull not normally present) insist that contractors cover with plastic/smoke curtains/etc. when not in use. This will help with boundaries.
- All lines running through hatches/scuttles/etc. are supposed to have identification tags with equipment and termination points so they can be removed/secured quickly. INSIST this happens! You'll have to verify repeatedly or this will quickly get out of control.
- Ensure multiple attack teams have unique identifiers to identify where reports are coming from.
- Ensure standardized nouns for space names because bullseyes melt. If the standardized name is forgotten, identify spaces based on orientation [ex: port vs starboard side]
- Insist that EVERY company completing work has a WAF and hot work chit; do not stand for piggy backing off another company's chit.
- Make sure dressing out quickly is emphasized during drills and strive to reduce the time.
- Conduct drills using multiple attack teams or a rescue team and an attack team simultaneously.
- Conduct egress training more often while in the yards due to the dynamic space configurations.

(b)(3),10USC130 (Stateroom) onboard USS OSCAR AUSTIN. The seat of the fire was at the top right hand corner of this picture.